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This issue of Intersections: East European Journal of Society and Politics (IEEJSP) 
covers three sections of articles, research notes, interviews and book reviews. In the 
first section our authors portray some major trends in the recent history of labour in 
Eastern Europe from a genuine semi-peripheral perspective. The articles of the 
second section discuss two salient issues of present-day East European politics: the 
mechanisms through which populism is shaping governance and the impacts of non-
fulfilment of electoral pledges on representative democracies. The third section 
continues the debate about spatial exclusion and marginality that was the main topic of 
the previous issue of IEEJSP. The articles in this issue, however, focus on the political 
mechanisms beyond the Roma marginalisation in local communities: the invisibility of 
Roma political participation, the political economy impacts on ghettoization and the 
political strategy of moral panic in shaping Roma segregation. 
 
Towards a new labour history: Eastern European perspectives 
The ‘working class’ under state socialism 
 
Labour history writing in Eastern Europe has been suffering from an ideological bias 
both before and after the change of regimes. During the era of state socialism, labour 
histories had to be in line with the legitimating discourse of the ruling Communist 
regimes across the region. According to this discourse, the Party ruled in the name of 
an allegedly homogeneous working class with a revolutionary consciousness, whose 
century-long struggle against capital was won with the leadership of the Party (the 
‘vanguard’). Scholars, whose work contradicted this legitimating discourse, risked their 
academic careers.  
A famous example is the show trial against Miklós Haraszti, who wrote a 
sociography of factory work, in which he argued that workers are exploited to the 
same extent under socialism as under capitalism; moreover, they are conscious of 
their exploitation (Haraszti 1978). Since they do not consider the factory as theirs, 
they use all kinds of small tricks to cheat the proprietor, the State, and its local 
representatives (factory management, trade union leaders, foremen). They refuse to 
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follow labour protection regulations, they falsify work-sheets, they cheat with the 
calculation of norms (they are ‘looting’) they feel alienated and lonely in the brigades, 
they misappropriate materials and use machines for their own purposes (such workers 
are called ‘homers’, who are portrayed as thieves in the satirical journals) and they do 
not consider the misappropriation of state property as stealing. At the subsequent 
show trial sociologists, in fact, argued that they heard even sharper opinions of 
interviewed workers, so workers’ discontent was by no means unknown to the regime. 
Workers’ social and political opinions (‘the conditions of the working class’) were, in 
fact, carefully monitored, and strictly confidential reports were sent to the centre and 
the top functionaries about the political mood of working-class districts. Nevertheless, 
as the show trial shows, the open admission that ‘real’ workers behaved differently 
from the socialist ideal, tested even the relatively liberal Kádár regime’s tolerance.   
Thanks to this relative liberalism, however, in Hungarian sociology there were 
three major scholarly directions, which started the revision of the ‘classical’ 
legitimating discourse. The first grew out of ethnographic research on labour and the 
most famous representative is István Kemény. Kemény investigated various working-
class groups in different industries and living places. During his ethnographic study he 
compared their origin, family circumstances, training, education, the nature of their 
work (how monotonous it is, what physical effort it requires and whether a special 
knowledge is needed to perform the given task), their financial and living conditions. 
Based on his fieldwork data he gave a more differentiated analysis of working-class 
consciousness than what was propagated by the official ideology. The fieldwork of 
Kemény showed that the industrial working class was not homogeneous either in its 
social composition nor in its culture, and stratification manifests itself even in the 
division of labour: immigrant workers, who are usually less qualified than their native 
urban counterparts, occupy lower ranks in the production hierarchy and specialists, 
who often come from old working-class dynasties, monopolize the posts of 
functionaries, foremen and other key positions in production (Kemény 1990). 
The most famous member of the second school, which focused on social 
stratification, was Zsuzsa Ferge (Ferge 1976). Her research showed that school 
continues to reproduce social inequalities in socialist Hungary – in fact, with the 
dispossession of people cultural capital became the most important form of capital 
that parents could pass on to their children. Thus, the children of working-class 
parents received worse grades in school than those of employees and intellectuals. 
The stratification surveys of the 1960s refuted that social and material inequalities 
cease to exist under state socialism, and thus, it became clear that the theory of two-
class-one stratum (working class, peasantry, intellectuals) was infeasible. 
The third direction was that of industrial sociology and it mainly relied on 
surveys and participant observation. Lajos Héthy and Csaba Makó conducted 
research on the impact of technical development on working-class consciousness in 
the Rába factory (Héthy and Makó 1975). However, the survey also contained 
questions about the workers’ trust in enterprise democracy, the trade union, and even 
in the Party itself. It is perhaps not surprising that workers were less satisfied with the 
trade union than with the Party, nor did they hold enterprise democracy to be a 
participatory one. They thought in fact that they did not have much say in enterprise 
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decisions. But the majority likewise argued that they could not even influence their 
immediate environment: only one third of the respondents thought that the 
management was interested in the proposals and innovations of the workers and less 
than one third agreed with the statement that the enterprise took an interest in the 
welfare of the employees. Makó and Héthy (1978) also demonstrated that workers, 
who occupied core positions, could successfully bargain with the management over 
the wages and the fulfilment of the plan.   
Following the lead of these schools (mainly that of industrial sociology) Michael 
Burawoy conducted fieldwork in the Lenin Steel Works in Hungary. From his 
comparative studies in capitalist and postcolonialist countries he concluded that the 
despotism of early capitalism was replaced by hegemonic despotism, where workers 
gave concessions to capital to preserve their factories and workplace. His Hungarian 
fieldwork experience led him to the conclusion that the socialist factory regimes also 
developed into hegemonic despotism but at that time he was optimistic about the 
prospect of socialist workers’ establishing self-governing, self-managing regimes after 
they got rid of the tutelage of the Party (Burawoy and Lukács 1992).  
 
Rediscovery of the working class 
 
While both Eastern and Western leftists shared Burawoy’s opinion at the time, the 
collapse of state socialism did not verify left-wing hopes for a ‘tertium datur’ in the 
Lukácsian sense (neither Stalinism nor capitalism). There was only sporadic working-
class resistance to the restoration of capitalism and full-scale privatisation. In spite of 
this, socialist workers were seen by many economists as ‘lazy’ or ‘unfit to work’ in a 
competitive environment, and their association with the fallen regime nourished a 
further bias against the re-discovery of labour histories – after they had been liberated 
from the tutelage of the Party. 
The collapse of state socialism widely discredited legitimizing narratives of the 
old Communist parties, which were based on a simplistic equation of class, class 
consciousness and political action and organisation (Welskopp 1993). Anthropologists 
studying workers in Central and Eastern Europe, indeed, argued that the workers 
became the new subaltern class (Kideckel 2002; 2008; Buchowski 2001; Kalb 2009; 
Kalb and Halmai 2011). While sub-alternity was used by Rudolph Bahro (1977) to 
explain workers’ location at the bottom of a knowledge-based division of labour in 
socialism,1 the transformation of socialist political economies to a market economy 
have deepened the subalternalization of labour according to this stream of authors. 
Kideckel, for instance, argues: ‘The dominant trends, however, have been to sanctify 
individualized ownership at the expense of social equity, to pursue inappropriate loan 
policies, and to facilitate a corrupt bargain between owning and political classes at the 
expense of labor. Industrial workers have fallen to near the bottom of the economic 
and social scale, there is still no effective middle class, and class boundaries are further 
solidified’ (Kideckel, 2002, 115). 
																																																								
1 See also Konrád and Szelényi (1979).  
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This new political bias hindered the recognition that labour histories can be 
written from various angles and that in the Western literature there was a call for 
writing a new labour history, which has also been referred to as global labour history 
(Van der Linden 2007). The call for a new labour history seeks to re-orient traditional 
labour history-writing, which focused on large-scale social movements, strikes and 
party histories, and also in the West towards a widening use of social historical and 
anthropological methods to study different working-class milieus, cultural contexts, 
gender relations and everyday working-class life. There is also a re-orientation towards 
the global South and the inclusion of non-free workers (in contrast with the focus of 
the old labour histories on the white, male wage-earners, who are seen as members of 
the ‘traditional’ working classes).   
In Eastern Europe, there have been recent attempts to re-discover the working 
classes in the postsocialist era (see Ost 2005; Kalb and Halmai 2011; Kideckel 2008; 
Trappmann 2013), and there is an increasing interest in the new labour history among 
young researchers. The investigation of the social milieus of working classes and the 
recognition that there have been various working-class groups has been an important 
part of new labour history, which has strong connections to social history (from the 
German literature see, for instance Vester et al. eds. 2001). In Hungary, Tibor Valuch 
is the most prominent representative of this new approach.   
Another, ‘Eastern European’ specific field is the recollection of state socialism 
in working-class memory. While workers were often uncritically associated with the 
state socialist past, the memories of state socialism are far more controversial (see e.g. 
Bartha 2014; Bittner 1998; Rudd 2000). The memory of state socialism, however, 
remains to be a contested field of contemporary politics and ideology.2 Dominic 
Boyer (2006) argues that in East Germany several journalists told him that speaking 
critically of unified German society was something they were loath to do because such 
criticism was immediately taken by their Western colleagues as a lack of commitment 
to democracy and as a yearning for a return of the GDR. To illustrate the point of the 
essentially different rights of talking of the future and the totality of a society, he cites a 
journalist, who complained that while it was natural for West Germans to ask their 
‘Ossi’ counterparts, how they could have lived under such a totalitarian regime, they 
would not understand the reverse question: how could one live in a society, where so 
many people are unemployed or threatened with unemployment (Boyer 2006, 374) 
or where – as in the case of Hungary – sociologists showed the existence of a large 
underclass?3 
																																																								
2 See, e.g. the insightful introduction of Maria Todorova (2010).  
3 Ladányi (2012) argues that one-fifth of the population of the country lives in segregation and he 
concludes with the argument that since the collapse of state socialism, deprivations have been multiplied: 
‘Geographical segregation, the segregation of the poor, and primarily that of the Roma population sharply 
increased after the change of regimes. If one looks at the maps of where the unemployed, the uneducated 
and the Romas are concentrated, these maps are easily interchangeable. The relationship is so strong 
among the processes of segregation that they show the same tendencies. In the North-eastern, Eastern 
and Southern, South-western regions of the country there is a concentration of small poor, and multiply 
disadvantaged settlements (törpefalu or aprófalu), where there is a very high concentration of the 
excluded and multiply disadvantaged Roma population’ (Ladányi 2012, 175).  
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Of course, workers en bloc cannot be seen as part of the precariat even though 
many of them undoubtedly belong to the losers of the change of regimes. Ferge 
(2010) argues that the working class constitutes a separate category within the social 
structure – but mention must be made of the fact that the ‘working class’ is highly 
segmented with a fragmented group consciousness (if it exists at all) so it is more 
appropriate to speak of working classes. Szalai (2004) argues that a dual model is 
needed to describe contemporary Hungarian society in which she distinguishes 
between the workers of the multinational companies and the workers of the domestic 
sector. The latter are described as poorly paid, badly exploited ‘bricoleurs’, who are 
often informally employed and they live from one day to the next while the former are 
better paid, have better working conditions and enjoy a higher degree of job security 
than the bricoleurs. At the same time, Szalai stresses the differentiated character of the 
Hungarian working class and the weakness of the local trade unions, which account 
for the weak (or non-existent) class consciousness. The specification of the model is 
rendered difficult by the lack of empirical research which Erzsébet Szalai strongly 
advocated. Other Hungarian sociologists also recognised that the specific working-
class perspective was missing from the literature, for instance Ágnes Losonczi (2005) 
urged for new oral history projects, which would analyse the impact of the change of 
regimes on workers without the old and new political distortions, separating collective 
memory from ideology and counter-ideology.  
We should also take into consideration that in Eastern Europe de-
industrialisation (the decline of heavy industries, mining, textile industry) was 
paralleled with processes of re-industrialisation in certain regions, mainly driven by 
global capital. Therefore it is fully justified to speak of the highly fragmented structure 
of the ex-socialist working class, and we should also stress that workers in different 
industries and companies have access to labour interest representation to a very 
varying degree. That said, it is not to deny that a significant part of the ex-socialist 
‘working class’ became self-employed or unemployed: Ferge (2010) estimates that one 
million jobs were lost in Hungary as a result of economic re-structuring while 
according to the calculation of Mark Pittaway, there were 23% fewer jobs in Hungary 
in 2008 than in 1989 (Pittaway 2011).   
The present issue seeks to explore new research and theory on Eastern 
European labour, which attempt to answer the call for the re-orientation of old labour 
history and at the same time remain open to a critical engagement with the social and 
material inequalities developed by global capitalism. Burawoy observed that the new 
capitalist labour organisation increases the exploitation and dependence of labour 
already in the mid-1980s: what kind of wage dispute can be successful in the advanced 
Western countries when the management threatens to transfer production to cheaper 
countries (where there is no strong working-class movement and resistance)? In 
Eastern Europe the picture is mixed because of the parallel processes of the decline of 
the old socialist industries and re-industrialisation as observed above; nevertheless, 
labour interest representation remains weak and concentrated on multinational 
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Critical perspectives on Eastern European labour: this issue of IEEJSP 
 
For this special issue, we interviewed Marcel van der Linden, who is one of the 
chief representatives of global labour history. In the interview he shows how this 
history developed out of traditional working-class history and how the category of 
worker (which mainly meant white, male wage-earner) was extended to include other 
major groups of labourers in the non-European parts of the world. He also gives 
interesting examples for how this Euro-centrism of old labour history was challenged 
and how important it is to include non-free workers and women workers in the 
analysis. It is worth stressing that reproductive work also counts as an integral part of 
the analysis since ‘caring’ (housework, raising of children, etc.) is central to the 
maintenance of the life of the wage-earner. The well-known labour historian also 
speaks of the global processes, which render (most) labour relations inflexible, 
incalculable and often informal – both in the global North and in the global South. 
This is paralleled with the weakening of trade unions in the global North and the 
difficulties of the establishment of labour representation in the global South. As a 
result, people turn for defence to religious fundamentalist and right-wing populist 
movements. He also shares with us his thoughts on the Western left-wing criticism of 
state socialism and contemporary Russia. Marcel van der Linden also discusses the 
(possible) relationship between political activism and labour history writing. The 
interview provides a nice framework to this special section, which attempts to bring 
together papers that address the Eastern European ‘specificity’ (between the global 
North and global South as Marcel van der Linden also formulated), while they aspire 
to contribute to the new labour history. 
Sonja Dragović sets out to analyse new Eastern European labour initiatives 
through the example of the case study of a Croatian textile factory, Kamensko, which 
was closed down and left workers unpaid for seven months. The author carefully 
documents the process through which the workers of the factory trained themselves to 
be activists and set up Kamensko Opened, the first non-governmental organisation in 
Croatia founded and led by industrial workers. Other NGOs and civic organisations 
also supported the workers’ struggle. Sonja Dragović’s article shows how ‘global capital 
moves around in search of the cheap, skilled labour that is closer to home than the 
sweatshops of Asia, keeping the largely exploitative textile industry in Eastern Europe 
alive’. It also demonstrates the overall weakness of labour interest representation in 
the region as well as the essential deficiency or lack of labour legislation, which would 
effectively defend workers’ rights against capital. Sonja Dragović’ research explores the 
mechanisms through which workers gain empowerment under the difficult conditions 
of neoliberal capitalism (and she also focuses on the gender dimension since many 
interviewed workers are women!) and succeed to obtain – with the help of the NGOs 
– the support of a wider community. Given the sporadic working-class resistance to 
the neoliberal project in Eastern Europe, it is very important to document existing 
initiatives for a scholarly audience. The argument that the factory was set up for 
bankruptcy in order to be torn down and its land used for the new real-estate 
development brought the support of the local community for the workers. The case 
sadly depicts, how defenceless workers are in the new regime, who rather choose to 
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work even without pay than to be unemployed. Sonja Dragović cites Bohle and 
Greskovits, who relate ‘Croatia’s weak state capacity’ to the ‘combined effect of an 
unbalanced nationalism, war and its aftermath, and the semiauthoritarian nature of the 
Tudjman regime that undermined an originally capable state’ (2012, 194). From a 
comparative perspective, however, it can be said that workers had no say in the 
outcome of privatisation in countries such as Poland (Ost 2005; Trappmann 2013) or 
Hungary (Nagy 2012). It is a very far-reaching topic how the original self-managing 
ideas were replaced by the neoliberal recipes across the region4; nevertheless, the 
outcome is the strengthening of the support of far-right-wing, populist parties with an 
overtly nationalistic, anti-globalist programme (Ost 2005; Kalb and Halmai 2011; 
Feischmidt and Hervik 2015). It is all the more important to analyse cases when 
working-class resistance manifests itself in new labour initiatives; further, it is capable 
of attracting wider social support. 
Ádám Mayer’s paper continues a tradition, which has been started in the 
second thematic issue of Intersections. East European Society and Politics: it is 
critically engaged with the Eastern European specificity of knowledge production and 
self-understanding. He starts from the assumption that Eastern European social 
sciences have been developing self-defeating and self-orientalising tendencies since at 
least the change of regimes (see also Tlostanova 2015; Petrovici 2015). Therefore, he 
suggests a theoretical parallel with African social thought, arguing that it can offer 
illuminating insights into the history of global marginalisation. Mayer shows with the 
example of Nigerian Marxism, how rich critical thinking can develop as a response to 
the experience of peripherization and he gives some theoretical examples how to fight 
against Euro-centrism and neo-colonialism, which ‘stratify’ modern social thought. In 
the global hierarchy of knowledge production Eastern Europe does indeed occupy a 
lower rank – it is enough to think of the list of leading universities or academically 
ranked journals. Further, the regional academies also suffer from self-orientalism; and 
here we can also cite – alongside Marcel van der Linden – Dipesh Chakrabarty, who 
argues that the reference point for many Indian historians continues to be the West. 
The outcome is often a list of what ‘have not’ yet happened events in India (in 
comparison with Western Europe and North America). Eastern European scholars 
often encounter the same problem. By recognising the creative potential of African 
social thought to revitalise Eastern European social sciences, we already made a step 
forward to fight Western cultural hegemony. 
The research note by Attila Gulyás reviews the literature on how to measure 
subjective well-being (SWB), an important part of which is work satisfaction. Attila 
Gulyás reflects on the fact that the nature of work has changed dramatically as a result 
of technological development as more and more people are doing routine white-collar 
work. Their satisfaction with the job may be influenced by several factors – but it 
seems safe to argue that money alone cannot explain work satisfaction. It was 
observed that SWB did not increase in proportion with economic wealth – this later 
became known as the Easterlin Paradox. SWB was developed as a concept to indicate 
that happiness was not a mere ‘sum’ of economic indicators but it also includes the 
																																																								
4 In Hungary, the journal Eszmélet (Consciousness) seeks to preserve the most consistently the 
intellectual heritage of self-management and the concept of tertium datur. 
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everyday positive and negative effects people experience in various domains of their 
lives (this adds the ‘subjective’ element). Gulyás then goes on to introduce some 
current international surveys that may be used for SWB related research and 
describes the applied methodology. He critically notes, however, that the 
methodology was developed for Western European countries, and it may be 
important to investigate the impact of the between-country differences on the validity 
of the measures. There are numerous points where asking about satisfaction and 
happiness in different countries may lead to significantly different opinions when 
controlling for other factors. Two important factors are the wording of the survey 
questions and the approach to happiness in the given culture. As for Hungary, the 
data show a steady, very slowly descending SWB value, which didn’t change 
significantly until the 2008 crisis and the 2010 elections (after which it reached its 
negative peak). When taking into account data on happiness, the author concludes 
that in Hungary the collapse of state socialism had the strongest effect on SWB among 
the recent major events in the country’s history. 
The last few decades brought a change in the work itself as the ‘traditional’ 
working classes are increasingly replaced by routine white-collar wage-earners – at least 
in the advanced capitalist countries. In these circumstances it is obvious that the 
attitude to work, the expectations of work and how work influences people’s well-
being is also changing, which renders SWB a relevant and fruitful subject of research.  
The coming of the neoliberal era brought about fundamental changes in the 
social composition and bargaining power of wage-earners. Eastern Europe 
experienced these changes somewhat belatedly as Communist regimes artificially 
maintained ‘traditional’ working classes and universal employment to avoid social 
protests. The collapse of state socialism removed former barriers to neoliberal 
transformation: old industries were severely reduced; however, de-industrialisation was 
paralleled with processes of re-industrialisation, mainly driven by global capital. 
Eastern Europe thus occupies an ‘in-between’ position in relation to the global North 
and the global South. The papers of our thematic bloc aspire to bring some examples 
of new labour initiatives and critical social thought in the region, which facilitate a 
productive dialogue with global labour history.  
 
Discursive governance, populism and pledge fulfilment  
 
In the field of Eastern European politics, a major issue often associated with the 
persistent disappointment with well-being prospects of the people is the rise of 
populism. Concerning Western Europe, Cas Mudde wrote about the emergence of a 
populist Zeitgeist in a seminal article already more than a decade ago (Mudde 2004). 
In this context, Peter Mair pointed to a division of labour between the mainstream 
West-European parties that typically govern ‘but are no longer seen to represent’ 
(Mair 2011, 14) and the parties of protest populism that seem to better fulfil the 
representation, but tend to adopt a populist political attitude and are typically in 
opposition. The thesis of inadequate fulfilment of the representation function of 
national party systems is, however, even more valid in the case of Eastern Europe 
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where the weaker institutionalisation of the party systems makes the new democracies 
of the region more susceptible to the rise of populist challenges (Kriesi 2014). This 
process has been paving the way for the rise of a new ‘centrist populism’ (Učeň 2007) 
and in several countries of Eastern Europe populist parties came into power thus they 
are governing, dominating the policy agenda as well as the style of political 
communication. 
 
Populism in Hungary and making sense of pledge fulfilment: this issue 
of IEEJSP  
 
Hungary represents a typical case of populist democracies (Pappas 2014). The article 
by Zoltán Ádám and András Bozóki in this section of IEEJSP explores the faces of 
Hungarian populism in government position. The authors argue that the populist idea 
of governance intends to reconcile the anti-elitist and anti-institutional perspective of 
popular participation with limiting the public contest for power. According to Ádám 
and Bozóki a peculiar feature of this Hungarian populism is the politicized 
understanding of Christianity that also provides legitimacy for charismatic leadership. 
The specific features of Eastern European new democracies have probably 
fertilized the research agenda presented by Miklós Sebők. The conceptual framework 
of Sebők’s article interprets mandate fulfilment in the context of normative theory of 
representation. The study has a particular focus on pledge fulfilment and the author 
argues that non-fulfilment of electoral pledges is not necessarily bad for democratic 
representation. An empirical novelty of this article is the operationalisation of good 
and bad forms of mandate slippage and Sebők provides ample evidence about the 
conditional compatibility of non-fulfilment of pledges with representation. 
From a broader theoretical perspective the logic of discursive governance is 
shaping the instruments of populist politics and often the effectiveness of discursive 
governance decides the viability of mandate slippage. Interpreting the varieties of 
discursive governance is embedded into the social constructivist tradition in the 
chapters of the Discursive Governance in Politics, Policy and the Public Sphere 
volume edited by Umut Korkut, Kesi Mahendran, Gregg Buckan-Knapp, and Robert 
Henry Cox; this volume is reviewed by Gábor Illés. The articles explore the discursive 
mechanisms through which political parties and major policy actors are successful or 
fail to achieve particular policy goals and the readers are also informed about the 
patterns of perception of the targeted recipients of these discourses, the wider public. 
The empirical analyses cover a large variety of policy fields and European regions 
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Political mechanisms beyond the Roma marginalisation in local 
communities 
 
Spatial exclusion and marginality was the main topic of the previous issue of 
Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics. Our authors discussed 
the different faces of spatial and social peripheral inclusion of the marginalised Roma 
through labour market, housing and urban policies as well as local development 
policies. The articles of this issue, however, explore the implicit political mechanisms 
beyond the Roma marginalisation in local communities. 
Júlia Szalai investigates the apparent Roma policy puzzle. While in the past 
decade the issue has become largely thematised and national as well as European 
inter-governmental Roma policy strategies were developed, marginalisation of the 
Roma has nevertheless rather increased in education, work and the daily conditions of 
living, and the tendencies of exclusion of the Roma have become stronger in a wide 
range of local communities. Szalai argues that the invisibility of Roma political 
participation may be a major factor in the reproduction of deprivation and exclusion 
of the Roma. 
Enikő Vincze and Florina Pop portray the process of ghettoization of the Roma 
in two settlements (Bufa and Poligon) in Aiud, a small town in Romania. The authors 
argue that recurring discretionary use of power has deprived individuals of their 
human rights and often pushed them into instances of bare life. Local housing policies 
include forced evictions, the reluctance to legally recognise informal housing and to 
provide local resources for the improvement of housing conditions. In addition, 
Vincze and Pop pinpoint that the development of welfare dependency discourse and 
subsequent exclusionary local policies against the Roma has been legitimised by the 
neoliberal shift in social policies. 
Ioana Vrabiescu explores citizenship rights limitation of the Roma under 
metropolitan governance in Barcelona and Bucharest. The article interprets the 
process of denial of the right to the city in the context of a moral panic political 
strategy. Vrabiescu presents how urban governance enacts moral panic against the 
Roma and implies practices of evictions and voluntary returns as forms of spatial 
cleansing. Scapegoating of the Roma preserves the social conflict, and at the same 
time alleviates the political responsibility to secure social provisions for vulnerable 
groups. The author demonstrates that local authorities of Barcelona and Bucharest 
not only force the mobility of the Roma, but also blames this vulnerable ethnic group 
for their alleged failed integration. 
 
Failing Europe?  
 
The three sections are followed by a review of a thought-provoking volume edited by 
Jody Jensen and Ferenc Miszlivetz about the interdisciplinary perspectives on the state 
of European integration and the challenges that face the common European project 
(Reframing Europe’s Future. Challenges and Failures of the European Construction) 
by Gábor Kardos. The book offers a critical discussion about the impacts of the 
financial crisis, the economic strategies of the possible way-out, as well as of what 
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constitutes ‘Europe’. The main thesis of the book is that Europe remains a widely 
contested terrain, both intellectually and practically. Indeed, the articles of this issue of 
Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics seek to contribute to 
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Marcel van der Linden was research director of the International Institute of 
Social History (Amsterdam) until 2014, and is now Senior Researcher at the 
Institute as well as Professor of Social Movement History at the University of 
Amsterdam. He is also President of the International Social History 
Association and chair of the Editorial Committee of International Review of 
Social History. He has published widely on various aspects of left-wing 
intellectual history (e.g. Western Marxism and the Soviet Union: A Survey of 
Critical Theories and Debates since 1917), social movements and labour 
history. He is a chief advocate of global labour history, a new paradigm in the 
writing of labour history, which has been taken over by several labour 
historians. This paradigm is less well-known in Eastern Europe where labour 
history became a stepchild after the change of regimes and it is only recently 
that there has been a growing interest in this field among social historians. In 
the interview I asked Marcel to introduce this paradigm and tell us something 
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E. B.: The International Institute of Social History is mainly known to experts in 
Eastern Europe. Can you introduce us briefly to the history of the Institute? 
 
M. L.: The Institute is a very old institution. It was founded in 1935 as a rescue 
operation for archives from Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia. It was a privately 
financed initiative, financed by a life insurance company that had connections with the 
Dutch Labour Party. 
Originally, it collected archives like the archive of the German Social 
Democratic Party, the SPD (also comprising the original Marx-Engels papers), which 
was travelling through Europe after Hitler came to power, and then later archives of 
the defeated anarcho-syndicalists in Spain and Menshevik archives.  
It has grown significantly since then, so now the total collection of the Institute 
amounts to about 55km of shelf space and it is now part of the Royal Netherlands 
Academy of Sciences. It goes on collecting materials especially in the global South, 
Africa, Latin-America and Asia but with the policy that we try to keep the materials 
where they come from. If we find interesting material, let’s say in India, then we first 
try to bring that to an archive in India itself. If that is not possible, then we bring it to 
Amsterdam. Most of the time we succeeded in finding places at the location itself, 
where you can deposit these materials.  
Since 1986 the Institute has also been pursuing research projects. That’s a 
much later development. Since that period we have been building a research 
department, officially established in 1993, and that department focuses mainly on 
international matters and since the late 1990s, on global labour history, which means 
that we try to reconstruct the history of work and workers movements and working-
class politics across the globe from about 1500 up to the present. 
 
E. B.: For those of us, who are less familiar with your work, the concept of global 
labour history might require some more explanation. What is this new paradigm, and 
how does new labour history-writing differ from the old working-class histories? 
 
M. L.: Our approach to global labour history has been developing gradually out of 
traditional labour history. Traditional labour history very much focused on certain 
groups of workers, industrial workers, dock workers, miners, sometimes agricultural 
workers, especially wage earners and it had a very institutional approach, it focused 
mainly on strikes, parties, unions, resolutions. The new approach is that we broaden 
the notion of the working class, so that we include also slaves, share-croppers, and the 
labour of people, who make this whole working class possible, and this includes 
housewives and all those who do unpaid work for the maintenance of families and the 
households. So this is a much broader approach. And we not only study many more 
forms of organisational initiatives (all kinds of self-help, cooperatives, mutual aid 
societies, attempts like self-employed women’s organisations in India and South 
Africa) but we also try to expand the notion of the working class so much that we 
include non-European parts of the world as well, where we can only recently speak of 
a huge expansion of the traditional working classes, which had been the focus of old 
labour history. 
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E. B.: You recently held a very inspiring lecture at the Central European University.1 
Why do you think that it took so long for labour history to discover the global South? 
 
M. L.: Because we were very Euro-centric. For instance – let me tell you this from my 
personal development. Already in the late 1980s I started to think about labour 
movements in a more global way. The project that I want to tell you about was on the 
history of revolutionary syndicalism, and a book came out of it, which I edited 
together with a colleague from Canada.2 We wanted to have an international 
perspective but at that time we only focused on Europe in the wider sense – European 
or European settler colonies. We included the United States, Argentina, Australia, 
and so on, but we did not think of the possibility that there would have been any 
revolutionary syndicalist movements in East Asia. Only in recent years has it become 
clear that movements like this and also anarchist movements have been much more 
global than we had thought. Gradually you have to step out of this framework of 
Europe and its settler colonies and see that you have all kinds of developments 
elsewhere that were neglected. And I think that the classical problem of Euro-centrism 
is that we are always looking for things that are like what we already know from 
Europe, which includes North America in this case. Thus, Europe is showing the way, 
it has done and achieved great things, and other countries and movements have to 
catch up and do the same things and in the same way as we did them in the past. And 
this is a problem for historians especially so in the global South because then they are 
confronted with the problem, which the Indian historian Dipesh Chakrabarty has 
called the problem of the ‘not yet’. All the time Indian historians, for instance, will 
have to say that this happened in India but not yet this because – and then they 
compare India implicitly with Britain or another European country. The attempt is 
now to leave all these separate cases in their own right and try not to have this 
unilateral perspective on history. 
 
E. B.: The typical working-class image then, is that of a white (European), male wage-
earner. Can you tell us some examples, where this image has been challenged? 
 
M. L.: One example could be the history of labour management, where we usually 
assume that the great innovations like Taylorism or Fordism originated in the US or 
in Western Europe, while now through the study of the history of slave labour we 
know that many of these forms of labour disciplining and creating labour incentives 
started earlier in slave plantations, for instance, in the Caribbean where you already 
had synchronised labour but without an assembly line, you had time measurement to 
see what was the most efficient way of doing a certain job. So many of the inventions 
and labour management, that we consider to be of the North, were first tried out on 
unfree workers in the South. The same goes for job description. It is attributed to Mr 
and Mrs Gilbreth around 1910. But originally we know now – it was an invention of 
                                                 
1
 Caribbean Radicals, a new Italian Saint and a Feminist Challenge. 1 February 2016. 
2
 Revolutionary Syndicalism: An International Perspective. Edited with Wayne Thorpe (Aldershot: 
Gower/Scolar Press, 1990). 
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Governor Lachlan Macquarie of Botany Bay (now Sydney) in Australia where he used 
job descriptions to discipline the policemen in the colony. These policemen were all 
convicts paradoxically, who half time worked as policemen and half time as labourers. 
For the half time they worked as policemen, they needed a job description – the 
governor thought. And later he expanded this to other occupational groups in the 
convict colony as well. So many management methods have been tried out on unfree 
workers first, and I think that there is a logic to it, because it is easier to try out new 
methods on unfree workers, who cannot object so much as free workers, and when it 
works – you found out how it can be done – you apply it to free workers. 
 
E. B.: I already mentioned your lecture, where you spoke of the feminist challenge. 
What can you tell us about the gender bias of old labour history and how was it 
challenged? 
 
M. L.: There was absolutely a gender bias, and it was a very long-term bias because 
labour history in the modern sense – traditional labour history – started in the 1880s, 
and certainly until the 1960s, and maybe the 1970s, the history of labour and labour 
movement was mostly written from the perspective of the male bread-winner, and 
only thanks to the second wave of feminism of the 1960s and 70s did we begin to see 
how important the work of women was – not just women workers, which is in itself a 
very important category – workers in factories, for instance, in the textiles were often 
women – but also the women who ran the households and families and facilitated the 
male worker in his earning the money wage for the household. So in many respects 
the second wave of feminism has contributed significantly to this changing outlook of 
modern labour history.   
Let me tell you some examples! Women even in the advanced capitalist 
countries were for a very long time unfree. For instance, in the Netherlands until 1956 
women could only have a paid job until they married. That means that as soon as they 
married, they had to leave the job and become a housewife. Or they had to choose 
not to marry. The Netherlands is not an exception. In many cases the women were 
tied to their husband in several ways, certainly also economically. They could not run 
a shop, and so on. There has been a whole wave of emancipation since the mid 20 
century, which contributed to the partial emancipation of women.  
But I can mention another example from old labour history. Chattel slaves 
were predominantly male, which created a gender imbalance in the colonies. This 
meant, so to speak that women were in a demand – but of course, very often, they 
were subject to sexual violence. While in the old labour history, this story was not 
written, the oppression of women should also be part of a global labour history. 
 
E. B.: You mentioned that the work of housewives, that enables the male worker to 
work full-time, should also be part of labour history. Without getting into the long 
debate about the nature of reproductive work, can you clarify your position? 
 
M. L.: Reproductive work is also productive work, in the sense that it also produces 
goods and services, services like the so called productive work does. In that sense 
there is no difference between the work in the household and work for wages and I 
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note here that reproductive work is a basic condition without which it is impossible to 
have the so called productive work. A wage-earner cannot earn a wage unless he lives 
in a house, which is cleaned a bit every day and where he has food, which is prepared 
for him, so even if we assume a male bread winner, so a man, who earns the money 
for the whole family, there is still a lot of subsistence labour – household labour – 
necessary to maintain this unit for which he earns the money. 
     
E. B.: To a large extent, old labour history focused on the achievements of workers’ 
struggles – be that in the form of strikes, social movements or revolutions. How do 
you see these achievements from a historical perspective? 
  
M. L.: We have to differentiate between different parts of the world. In Europe – 
including the socialist bloc – there were significant achievements for the working 
classes after the Second World War. They managed to get very good social security 
arrangements, there was a reduction of unemployment until the 1970s. In the East, 
unemployment was unimportant for a long time. 
Standard employment relationship was part of this development from the 
1940s till the ‘80s, when the working-class position improved in parts of the world. 
There you have this situation that workers can have a full-time job where they earn 
enough money to support a small family, with some social security attached to the job 
and some influence on the shop floor, co-determination or other forms of interest 
representation. In this period, the working class had a strong position, relatively 
speaking. 
The neoliberal counter-offensive started in the late 1970s, which in several 
waves in Western Europe reduced these achievements of the working class by 
introducing large-scale unemployment, reducing social security arrangements, making 
them more rudimentary, for instance, Hartz IV in Germany. The standard 
employment relationship is gradually being broken down everywhere in the world, I 
would say, although there still remain islands of standard employment.  
And then we have the collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe, which led to the 
deterioration of working-class conditions, at least for significant parts of the working 
class. So I would speak of the rise and fall of working-class power – from a historical 
perspective. 
In other parts of the world it is very different. Take the example of Brazil! 
The labour movement of the working class gained a lot of strength in the 1970s and 
‘80s, and it could even build a new workers party, which came into government, and 
then became a victim – well, supporter  –  of a kind of neoliberalism, so now we see a 
deterioration of working-class conditions in Brazil as well. So you have different 
rhythms in different parts of the world regarding the achievements of the working 
classes. 
I might add here that I am also involved in the International Panel on Social 
Progress – a new initiative, chaired by Amartya Sen. Our task is to write a report on 
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E. B.: Thanks, I am very much interested! But speaking of Eastern Europe, I have a 
question. Some authors think that neoliberalism was, in fact, tested in Eastern Europe 
after the change of regimes. What do you think?   
 
M. L.: Neoliberalism is in fact a current, which has developed since the 1940s. Hayek 
was one of the founders of the Mont Pèlerin Society in 1947, which then met every 
year, where they prepared a plan for a neoliberal revolution. When Thatcher and 
Reagan came into power, they could serve them the recipes for introducing more 
market forces on a plate. This also contributed to the undermining of state socialism 
in Eastern Europe. But the beginnings were in the West. 
 
E. B.: The neoliberal turn in the West was paralleled with a massive reduction of the 
traditional working classes. How do you see this development on a global scale? 
 
M. L.: Well, you should not forget that much of the industry, which has disappeared 
from Europe, went to other parts of the world, especially to East Asia. In the 1950s 
Britain was the largest ship-builder in the world. By the end of the 1950s, early ‘60s 
Japan had taken over. 
Now more than 90% of all ships are built in East Asia – China, Korea, Japan. 
There has been a massive shift of work – employment – from Europe and United 
States to East Asia. So there is a massive process of proletarianisation going on in the 
global South, for instance in China  – at a grand scale – but also in India, South 
America, parts of Africa. So I would rather speak of a shift, which is also reflected in 
the trade union movement, which became relatively stronger in the South – 
sometimes unions are growing significantly, while in the North they are weakening. 
And perhaps it is interesting: within this working class, female labour is increasing. 40 
per cent of the world workforce (wage earning class) is female. So back to the report 
on social progress: in general the position of women in the world seems to be slightly 
improving. More and more women learn to read and write, they have more access 
independently to labor market, they can work for wage if they want or become self-
employed. Although this is a limited development, a slight positive trend can be 
observed.  
 
E. B.: Where do you see the place of Eastern Europe in this global division of 
labour? 
 
M. L.: I really don’t know the answer. I don’t know enough about it. You have a very 
contradictory evolution. Wages are lower, so there is a relocation of Western 
industries to Eastern Europe, but these countries also witnessed a massive de-
industrialisation after the collapse of state socialism – and I don’t know enough about 
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E. B.: The world-system school has strong ideas about the inequalities within the 
structure of the capitalist world-economy – I am mainly thinking of the unequal 
exchange between the centre and the periphery. How do you see the relationship 
between the global North and the global South? 
 
M. L.: I think that on a global scale we see that income differentials are flattened, the 
global Gini coefficient is becoming smaller but within countries – and this is partly of 
course through the rise of China and India, which means that there is more wealth 
and more income in parts of the global South – at the same time, within the countries 
you see an enormous increase of social inequality. I have somewhere in my computer 
a Gini index graph of the United States, where you see that from the early twentieth 
century till the present it got really huge – it was low in the 1950s and ‘60s and now it 
is really going up and it is the same as it was in the early twentieth century. Within the 
countries inequality is increasing – so you have a double movement. On a global scale 
you see a reduction of inequality between countries – there is still a large amount of 
inequality but less than it was – but within countries you see an increase of inequality. 
This is not to deny that there are still important differences: in Vietnam GDP per 
capita is now eleven hundred dollars a year, and in Germany forty thousand. So you 
have an enormous gap between these two countries, although we should also 
recognise that there is also precarianisation in the North now, which means that some 
aspects of the labour relations become a bit more similar. I spoke of the breakdown 
of standard employment relations – well, this is a huge challenge which workers of the 
North have to face. And of course, there is a lot of terrible inequality in the world, and 
this contributes to the problem of mass labour migration, migrants searching for a 
better future somewhere else. 
 
 
E. B.: You spoke of the rise and fall of working-class power – at least in Europe. How 
do you see the political and interest representation of labour from a global 
perspective? 
 
M. L.: On a global scale trade unions are weakened, together with the traditional 
working-class parties. Social democracy is globally in a crisis – Communist parties 
have to a large extent disappeared or merged or they went bankrupt like in Finland, 
and unions are declining, too. Although there are new initiatives to have a different 
type of unions – new social movement unionism in parts of Brazil, India and Korea – 
but global union density now, according to the International Trade Union 
Confederation, the ITUC, is 7 per cent. Of the 2.9 billion strong workforce in the 
world 2 hundred million are organised in unions. We exclude from this calculation 
the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, which is larger than the ITUC, but which 
we do not consider to be a trade union. 7 per cent of the workers is organised in 
unions and this percentage is declining. In Europe union density is relatively high – in 
Norway 70 per cent or so. In the global South this is even lower than 7 per cent. In 
India it is, for instance, 3.2 per cent. 
The traditional labour movement is extremely weak now, but there is a paradox 
because there is a lot of working-class protest. Examples: there was a very large strike 
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in India two years ago when more than a hundred million workers were on strike for 
two days, you had a general strike in the area of Jakarta, Indonesia, when the whole 
region was paralysed, you have enormous amount of strikes in South Africa, an 
upsurge of struggles in South America, but all these are not translated into 
organisational forms yet. We have a transitional period when the traditional labour 
movement seems to be disappearing and we have not yet found an alternative. And in 
this situation we see that all kinds of – let me call them – pseudo-alternatives come. In 
Latin-America and South Africa you see a dramatic rise of pentecostal churches. In 
Brazil one quarter of all people is in the pentecostal church. Hamas in Palestine 
would be a similar thing. Or the Shiv Sena movement in India – that is a Hindu 
fundamentalist movement. They also provide social support for the people – they 
create social networks, people help each other in cases of emergency, and so on. They 
partly do what trade unions should and could do. This is combined with a strong 
belief, which also gives people a sense of usefulness, and of direction, so they know, I 
am part of this movement, I am a real Hindu, I am doing the right thing, I can be 
proud of what I do and at the same time I have some support. This is what my Indian 
colleague Sabyasachi Bhattacharya called the vernicularisation of labour politics. Non-
traditional organisations take over part of the things labour movements did in the past. 
That is what we see now due to this crisis of the labour movement. 
 
E. B.: How does global labour history translate into political activism? 
 
M. L.: Well, in labour history we try to study five centuries but when we talk about the 
present, I would say, we are now studying working classes and labour movements that 
are in a deep crisis. You know, if I want to be optimistic, then maybe we can help to 
give some orientation for the future. You also see it in a more general sense that 
separate states have less influence on economics because of globalisation. We are also 
here in a transitional period that social movements, for instance, Occupy – they 
generally emphasise the things that they do not want – they do not want the bankers to 
cheat and so on – but they do not say what the positive solution would be. And that is 
because if separate states can no longer be the solution, and there is no supranational 
state, which can be the solution, then you have nowhere to address many of your 
demands. In the past labour movements and other social movements addressed their 
demands to the state but now it is much more difficult to do this. Here there is a 
significant change happening in politics.   
 
E. B.: If I may paraphrase what you said, you mean that the old left has suffered a 
defeat in organisational terms, and this has led to the rise of nationalism and religious 
fundamentalism worldwide. 
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E. B.: While there is a crisis of the labour movement, can we also speak of a crisis of 
capitalism?  
 
M. L.: There is no crisis of capitalism. There is a crisis of capital. Capitalism would 
only be in crisis if there were an alternative. There is no alternative. In fact, there has 
never been so little alternative as there is now. And capitalism has shown in the last 
150 years that it can overcome every crisis, and it will also overcome this crisis if we 
just give it a few more years,      
10 or 20 years, it will overcome this crisis as well because it is not threatened 
from the inside. Or another option would be – and this is of course what people like 
Wolfgang Streeck would say – he wrote this article ‘How will capitalism end?’ in the 
New Left Review.3 In 2016 it will also appear as a book. He says that even if there are 
no enemies of capitalism any more, and he also includes state socialism here, 
capitalism will collapse because it reaches the limits of what it can do in its expansion 
– commodification of labour, land and money, all the Polányian things – it exhausts its 
possibilities, and then it is not very clear what will happen. And my guess is that we 
would only see the end of a certain kind of capitalism, but not of capitalism as such. 
That’s why there is no alternative. But that’s speculation, of course. 
 
E. B.: You wrote a very illuminating and thorough book about left-wing criticism of 
state socialism. How do you see the place of state socialism in global labour history?   
 
M. L.: A divergent past? A bifurcation? I am just joking. My book is on what Western 
Marxists thought about the Soviet Union, especially the Western Marxists who 
thought that the Soviet Union was not socialist. And what was it then, if it was not 
socialist? And in the first 70 years, no, in the first 50 years of the existence of the 
Soviet Union there were mainly three approaches. One approach said, well, it’s just a 
form of capitalism, state capitalism. Another theory said it’s a new form of class 
society, with a new kind of ruling class, which has never been seen before. And 
thirdly, Trotsky’s position was that it was a degenerated worker state. So it’s still a 
workers’ state, but it is corrupt and bureaucratised … and so on, so it needs a political 
revolution.  
And because the three theories all have their theoretical problems, which I 
cannot go into now, in the 1960s and ‘70s you get a fourth current which says, well, 
classical Marxist categories are not enough to understand what’s happening in the 
Soviet Union, we need a new kind of approach. And the most interesting approach 
that was then developed, I think, was the one by Hillel Ticktin, a South-African 
British economist, who had studied in Kiev, and so studied the Soviet Union from the 
inside. He argued that in the Soviet Union you saw at that time, in the 1970s already, a 
dramatic increase of waste. So that in his time two-thirds of all the industrial output 
was useless. And this situation was deteriorating further so that he predicted the 
collapse of the Soviet Union within a few decades in 1973.  
                                                 
3
 The book, Gekaufte Zeit. Die vertagte Krise des demokratischen Kapitalismus (Frankfurt/Main: 
Suhrkamp, 2015), has already been published. 
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Of course, that prediction has come true. I think that was a good analysis. The 
Soviet Union was at first, in the first decades, showing a staggering growth of the 
economy, but this growth itself paralysed the possibilities of further growth, because 
through this growth planning became more and more complicated and since there was 
no reliable information coming from bottom up from the factories, of what they really 
could produce, and wanted to produce, planning became more and more kind of 
‘quasi’ planning. And waste increased, and growth then went down, from the 1950s on 
already you see the decline of the growth rate, then around 1978 or 1980 growth 
reached zero, and then went below zero. Then it was only a matter of a few years and 
the whole thing collapsed. So it was an industrialisation dictatorship I would say, which 
then in the end reached its limits and therefore also partly failed. It has never been, I 
think, a real alternative to capitalism. As Ticktin would say, it was a society in limbo, a 
dead-end street.  
 
E. B.: Many Western Marxists expected that a kind of democratic socialism would 
develop in Eastern Europe after the collapse of the rule of the Communist Parties. 
What did you think would happen, at that time? 
 
 
M. L.: I didn’t expect that, no. I was not so optimistic because I thought, well, it will 
depend on the workers what will happen, and the workers would have to really change 
society. But society was not changed by the workers. Society was in crisis and it was 
changed from the top down. And of course you had some worker struggles in the 
Soviet Union, Russia, after 1990, especially the miners were very crucial, but they 
were kind of labour aristocracy. For the rest, I think, workers didn’t protest so much, 
so that the oligarchs could become kind of capitalists without much resistance from 
below. And what we now see, I think, also because of this lack of working class 
resistance, is that we have a kind of further bureaucratic degeneration, where the 
social forms are very similar to those of the late Soviet Union. Some people, for 
instance Ticktin, even say that this society is still not a capitalist society and it’s also not 
a worker society, it’s still a society in limbo, but it can survive because of natural 
resources.  
 
E. B.: Do you speak of Russia, or the whole of Eastern Europe? 
 
M. L.: Russia, not about the rest of Eastern Europe. Russia, as I said earlier, is a 
special case of course. It’s different from EU countries and Eastern Europe.  
 
E. B.: So you wouldn’t call Russia capitalist?  
 
M. L.: If it is a kind of capitalism, it’s a very strange kind of capitalism, a completely 
new form of capitalism. I’m not sure how to characterise Russia. But it’s not a 
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E. B.: What would you call a ‘normal’ capitalist society? 
 
M. L. The Netherlands! Even though we have still lots of subsistence labour going on, 
and we still exploit free nature, which we do not buy, but just destroy… 
 
E. B.: What do you think of the Eastern European societies? Without Russia? 
 
M. L.: You are on your way… you have now been transformed into capitalist societies, 
I would say… but I would not consider Eastern European capitalism as the most 
advanced form of capitalism; that I would say more for north-west Europe, or parts of 
the United States and Canada, but yes, Eastern Europe is developing along the lines of 
capitalist logic.  
 
E. B.: How would you explain the fact that there was such weak working-class 
resistance to capitalism in Eastern Europe? 
 
M. L. I think that partly Stalinism is to blame for this. Because if you only show, 
constantly, for many-many years, you show in the mass media, stories about the 
misery of capitalism, and then people get to know about all the shopping possibilities, 
the wealth, and so that is also in the West, then people start to mistrust the 
information that they get, and they think that capitalism is a good thing, it gives you 
freedom and money and so on, so people had a lot of false hopes of capitalism I 
think. That’s part of the explanation.  
 
E. B.: Do you think that the same explanation exists in the global South? Is there a 
belief that capitalism is somehow good, or should be good…? 
 
M. L.: Well, most people, of course, envy Japan or the United States and so on, 
because they think that life is better there. And also, Norway, since the refugees now 
coming to Europe – Slavoj Žižek wrote a nice essay on this – most of them want to go 
to Norway, because they think that is the wealthiest country in the world, and social 
inequality is the lowest and – of course, Norway is perhaps the most pleasant variant 
of capitalism that exists in the world, although it’s a bit cold there.4 So – yes, people 
have these dreams about a better life in advanced countries. 
 
E. B.: Why should one fight against capitalism if it is held to be good also in places, 
where you don’t have the most advanced forms of capitalism?  
 
M. L.: But people do not fight against capitalism; they fight for better wages, better 
working conditions, and so on. People do not fight against capitalism. I don’t think 
that ever in history workers have fought against capitalism as such. There’s a very nice 
analysis of this in The phenomenology of perception: do you know that book? It has a 
chapter where, at the end somewhere, Maurice Merleau-Ponty argues that in the 
Russian revolution for instance, you have the peasants who were dissatisfied with the 
                                                 
4
 Slavoj Žižek, ‘The Non-Existence of Norway’, London Review of Books, 9 September 2015. 
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situation and then started to demonstrate and walk to the city, and so, and workers 
were doing the same, and then suddenly they realised: my God, we have made a 
revolution! But they didn’t know that they were toppling down the government and 
then were transforming society, that was not their intention, they just wanted their 
small things! Suddenly, this unintended consequence was a huge transformation of 
society, and that’s, more or less, what happens all the time. People do not have these 
grandiose ideas, ‘We will overthrow capitalism’, or whatever. They have more modest 
wishes. 
 
E. B.: Yes, but you can argue: you had leaders who had clear ideas… 
 
M. L.: Yes, but then, of course, another question here would be, what do you think of 
the October revolution. I would say it was not really a revolution. I think that it was a 
coup d’etat, with mass support.  
It was not a social revolution in the sense that the masses themselves did 
something, they supported something that others, the vanguard did. So in that sense I 
would call it a hybrid of coup d’etat and a revolution. And the real revolution was the 
February revolution. That was a real revolution. But I know that here I have a very 
dissident opinion.  
 
E. B.: One can also argue that dictatorship was an outcome of the economic 
backwardness of Russia…  
 
M. L.: You have situations in history where there is no easy way out. That’s what I 
would think. That in many situations there is no real solution in the short term. And 
this also means that progress of politics has also to build on long term pedagogy. I 
think to have a really democratic society, you need decades or maybe hundreds of 
years of education where people learn to rule themselves. For instance, I think that 
the reason why in Scandinavia democracy is so strong – relatively speaking – is also 
because already in the seventeenth-eighteenth centuries they had lots of free peasants, 
who were not in any feudal relationship, and they decided their local affairs among 
themselves, at the village level, more or less democratically, of course with a male bias. 
And so the later achievements and the whole social democratic movement and the 
building of parliamentary democracy and welfare state: they could build on this 
foundation. So it was those hundreds of years of training, acting in (limited) free ways, 
that anticipated, pre-dated democracy. While if you introduce democratic structures 
in situations where this kind of pre-history does not exist, then it’s much more difficult 
to do this. Well, I would guess. That’s also why I think that the left should think more 
in these terms, also of how do we raise the self-awareness, self-consciousness, and the 
democratic level of populations, and this means that we have to do a lot of 
experiments with cooperatives, and small-scale initiatives in the kindergarten and 
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E. B.: How do you see the relationship between labour history writing and political 
activism?  
 
M. L.: Well, most colleagues will deny that there is a relationship. Most labour 
historians at least in Europe will not consider themselves, working as scholars, as part 
of an activist thing. At the same time, I think that many-many labour historians are 
also politically engaged on the progressive side of the political spectrum, whatever that 
may mean… As individuals, people will often not see the immediate connection. But I 
think if we develop global labour history in the way I just described, then we will 
automatically be, I hope, of help in finding a political orientation. And therefore to 
direct activists in the right direction.  
 
E. B.: You said that you don’t really see an alternative to capitalism. 
 
M. L.: True, yes. 
 
E. B.: So how do you see the future of the left? The global left? Can we speak at all of 
a global left?  
 
M. L.: Well, there are left people everywhere in the world, so that’s yes – but I think 
that we will have to start anew. We have to reform the trade unions, if that is possible, 
you see trade unions now have an orientation towards collective bargaining, that’s the 
main task that many unions have: to negotiate with employers and make a contract for 
three or five years or whatever… That doesn’t work for the largest part of the working 
class in the informal sector, these are people who have two or three jobs at the same 
time, or for a short time, (for a short period, two weeks maybe, or a day), so collective 
bargaining is not something they are interested in. What we need is new forms of 
organising, for instance also through the creation of mutual benefit societies, aid 
societies for sickness, unemployment, and so on. You can see that many self-
employed people in Europe are now organising. So trade unions have to change, they 
have to become much less autocratic, so that they could become part of this project of 
democratic education, they have to become more open to coloured people and they 
definitely need more women in the leadership, so – trade unions will have to change 
fundamentally. For the rest I think, we should try to do as much grass-roots organising 
as possible. To build new forms of organisations.  
And then we have all these people in the informal sector, self-employed people 
who are in fact informal wage-labourers… if you are self-employed and you have only 
one or two customers, then you’re kind of wage-labourer for these people, although 
officially you are an employer of yourself. So I think we should move away a bit from 
this orientation towards the traditional working class, the miners, the factory workers. 
We should widen the modern wage-earning class to a large extent, to the largest extent 
to include all people, who live from their work. In services and so on.  
And then of course you have another point, that for instance in our kinds of 
societies, the large majority of the work force is in wage labour. Maybe 80% or so of 
the people does wage labour. Most of these people we would not consider 
traditionally as working class. And the huge difference is that the CEO of a 
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multinational organisation also receives a wage. But we would no longer consider him 
to be a worker, of course. So we have a differentiation of the working class, which has 
become in this sense the wage-earning class, which is enormous, and the very varieties 
within it are large, so what we also need to do is to better understand the different 
milieus within this wage-earning class. Some sociologists have been working on this, 
for instance, Michael Vester, do you know him?5 So we need to understand that 
better. And then see what the possibilities are for organising.  
 
E. B.: Do you think that we can still speak of a working class? 
 
M. L.: I would, yes. I would speak of a working class and – my definition of the 
working class is the same as that of Karl Marx and that of Max Weber: all those 
people who have to sell, have to hire out their labour power in order to survive. In 
that sense I would say, yes, we still have. The large majority of the working population 
is working class, in that broad sense. Yes. 
 
E. B.: Class consciousness has been a favourite term of the old left. Is there any of it 
left after the fall of this discourse?  
 
M. L.: No, no, true, there’s not so much class consciousness, certainly not of this 
group as a whole. Small group-consciousness is what one can encounter… But we shall 
also see that in the past in the traditional working class, the blue-collar working class, 
there was also not often that really broad class consciousness. Also, what we could 
observe was mostly group consciousness. That has been exaggerated under the 
influence of Marxist ideology. The presence of a real social and class identity among 
workers was often not class consciousness in that sense.  
 
E. B.: So you would rather speak of group consciousness also today? 
 
M. L. Yes. And the point is of course to extend the group as much as possible.  
 
                                                 
5
 Michael Vester et al, Soziale Milieus im gesellschaftlichen Strukturwandel (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 
2001). 
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This article examines the case of closed Croatian textile factory 
Kamensko and the non-profit organization Kamensko Opened, 
formed by the factory workers when they lost their jobs in 2010, after 
working without pay for seven months. It seeks to show the ways in 
which textile workers brought novelties into the Croatian labor 
struggle and provided means of subsistence while facing an array of 
challenges—bogus privatization and real-estate speculations, weak law 
protection, lack of political representation and gender-based 
discrimination. These ways can become rather creative and turn the 
group of factory workers into exemplary, although unlikely activists, 
who voice the concerns of an aging population of Croatian industrial 
workers while developing a small business to support themselves. The 
results were obtained through qualitative analysis semi-structured 
interviews with nine former Kamensko workers and an extensive 
review of newspaper coverage of the events related to factory closure. 
The findings show that political struggle and work within the 
framework of a non-profit organization have empowered the workers 
and brought them the support of the wider community. Their method 
could be used by unions to a certain extent, for the sake of creating 
connections and allies within the rest of the civil society. 
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The East-Central European region entered the post-1989 era with a considerable 
industrial strength, skilled unionized labor and an established social contract upon 
which the power of different communist regimes used to rest. As political structures 
eroded to pave the way for new, democratic developments, economic change took 
place as well, promising a bright future with the free market. For industry, this largely 
meant a switch to private ownership—instead of being centrally regulated by 
bureaucratic governments, or self-managed by the collectives of workers, factories 
were now to attract private capital that was supposed to ensure the quality of 
production and success in the competitive, increasingly globalized market. 
Globalization and liberalization of markets and capital flows threatened that if labor 
was not obedient and cheap enough, it could always be found elsewhere. The workers 
started losing the rights previously guaranteed by the state in the neoliberal reform 
process that has (as yet) been neither completed nor reversed.  
Burawoy (2002) admits that the workers reacted to such development much 
more calmly than expected. He explains such a state of affairs as a result of ideological 
disappointment in socialism, the idea now forever tainted by the experiences from the 
period under communism. Capitalism promised a better future, and when it failed to 
deliver labor found itself in an ideological dead-end, with no alternative to turn to. 
Another important factor comes from labor’s insufficient capacities to act: the 
potential for joint action of the industrial workers only weakened as numerous 
factories, former central places of economic and social production, got dismantled. 
With the state and capital standing firmly on the same side—against labor, as that is the 
way leading to higher profit margins and pleasing capital, which the new political 
leadership of the region rushed to satisfy, and with pressing political changes often 
driving public attention away from the rights of workers toward the questions of 
national and religious sentiments, it is no wonder that labor has lost its local power 
and its transnational awareness. The future, according to Burawoy (2008; 2010), might 
see either the Polanyian-type counter-movement to marketization, encompassing all 
parts of society hurt by capitalist commodification and concentrated on solving local 
problems caused by global capitalism, or the Marxian-type struggle of exploited 
workers united across the national borders.  
The following study of the textile factory Kamensko in Zagreb, Croatia, 
showcases the locally organized counter-movement started by dissatisfied workers and 
joined by students, non-governmental organizations, researchers, consumers, artists 
and activists concerned with labor rights, social justice and privatization of public 
space. The analysis shows how the workers gradually lost the rights of factory 
ownership and management, how they kept clinging onto the ones they still had—to 
work and to have at least some monthly income and social insurance—and how in the 
end they were left without any of it, due to the liberalized labor laws, the connections 
between city planning and private speculative developers, and flawed Croatian 
judiciary practice that has not protected the workers’ rights even five years after the 
event. Furthermore, it shows how global capital moves around in search of the cheap, 
skilled labor that is closer to home than the sweatshops of Asia, keeping the largely 
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exploitative textile industry in the Eastern Europe alive (see Baševska, 2015). Finally, it 
shows the condition of the rights of the female workforce in Croatia and the inception 
of cooperation between diverse social actors, the aim of which was to publicize the 
problems workers of Kamensko faced, to improve the condition of labor, and to point 
to the issues of speculative real-estate developments and submission of public space in 
the interests of capital. A rather obvious connection between the rising value of the 
plot of land the factory occupied and the increasing troubles workers had with getting 
their monthly salaries was investigated, bringing workers and the organizations of civic 
society together for the first time in the short history of Croatian neoliberal capitalism 
(see Ivandić et al., 2015). These new alliances and the ripple effect they have already 
produced are important for the future of Croatian labor movement, whatever else that 
might hold.  
Other labor initiatives in the region are sporadic, but exist nevertheless. One of 
the experiments now underway is a detergent factory Dita in Tuzla, Bosnia and 
Hercegovina, taken over by the workers who succeeded in restarting production and 
are currently struggling to keep the company afloat. Even though the workers of 
Kamensko and Dita are going through similar processes and acting in similar 
environments, there is no cooperation or exchange between the two collectives, other 
than possible sympathy for one another’s struggle. The reason most probably lies in a 
lack of capacities to sustain regional activities (the labor ties built in the time of former 
Yugoslavia no longer exist), but also in a greater interest of workers to focus on the 
local issues, as that is where their problems are most likely to be resolved. If the 
potential benefits of cross-border cooperation in this disintegrated region were greater, 
the actions of labor would probably move in that direction as well.  
It is uncertain that the attempts of Kamensko workers and their allies to 
improve the condition of industrial labor in Croatia will come to fruition. However, 
the persistence they showed thus far in advocating for their rights, building the 
network and pointing to problems that should no longer be ignored deserves 
recognition. Other groups of workers in Croatia and the rest of the region of former 
Yugoslavia—those employed in services, as well as unemployed, underemployed and 
precariously employed people—might soon see the benefit in supporting causes such 
as this, against the damaging reforms of labor laws and further cuts in social services.  
Finally, even if the actions of Kamensko do not result in an improvement of 
workers’ rights and better law protection for them in the future, it is still important to 
investigate such initiatives and the problems they struggle to articulate. While we 
recognize that traditional labor history has lost much of its appeal both for 
methodological and ideological reasons, there is a new global labor history,1 which 
continues to search for new perspectives while documenting labor struggles 
throughout the world as a continuing critique against the inequalities brought about by 




1 See e.g., Linden (2008). 
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Declining unions and new labor struggles: The case of Croatia 
 
‘I live off 2000HRK salary, which I never receive. You can imagine how I live.’ A 
poster with this slogan took a prominent spot in one of the protests of DTR workers 
in Zagreb, where they demanded their salaries to be paid and their textile factory to be 
saved from collapse. It says a lot about the post-socialist condition of the textile 
industry and its workers in Croatia. Official data show a constant decline in number of 
workers: according to Milat (2012), 110.000 textile workers in Croatia have lost their 
jobs since 1990; the number of employees dropped from 130.000 in 1990 to 21.400 
at the end of 2011. At the same time, the pay stays low: average salary in textile 
industry is 50 per cent lower than the national average in Croatia, while salaries of 
women in this sector are 30 per cent lower than the salaries of their male colleagues 
(Milat, 2012).  
The textile industry is only one drastic example of the setback Croatian 
economy suffered in the post-1989 era. In the pre-transition period, Croatia (as one of 
the Yugoslav republics) was among the top ten newly industrialized countries in the 
world, according to the method and criteria of the UN (Kokanović, 1999). Back in the 
1960s Yugoslavia aspired to become one of the core industrial economies of Europe; 
however, the crisis of the 1980s followed by the 1990s breakup destined the states that 
succeeded it to re-peripheralization (Schierup, 1992). In the case of Croatia, according 
to Kokanović, it was a consequence of many mistakes made in the process of 
privatization, which encouraged bad business practices and the creation of 
monopolies and oligopolies, contributing to an environment with ‘numerous 
deviations (…) ranging from corruption and small crime to organized crime at all levels 
and in all sectors of the economy and of society’ (1999: 205). Bohle and Greskovits 
explain Croatia’s ‘weak state capacity’ as a ‘combined effect of an unbalanced 
nationalism, war and its aftermath, and the semiauthoritarian nature of the Tudjman 
regime that undermined an originally capable state’ (2012: 194).  
Inadequate privatization decisions, political clientelism and weak state capacity 
have characterized the climate in which Croatian industrial workers have been trying 
to preserve their economic and social rights inherited from the Yugoslav period. For 
decades they have been not just workers, but self-managers of socially owned 
property; the whole socio-political system of Yugoslavia rested upon their shoulders 
(see Musić, 2011). The values and rules of self-management did not survive the 
transition to the neoliberal system; as Grdešić (2015) points out, workers are now seen 
merely as somewhat annoying relics of the past with no power or importance, their 
lingering rights standing in the way of business development. As de-industrialization 
progressed and new economic environment shaped without workers as important 
constituents, the unions started losing significance too; became smaller and 
disintegrated. Membership rates have been in constant decline, particularly in the 
private sector, with sporadic joint actions of limited success (Grdešić, 2008; 2015). 
The necessity for the unions in Croatia to get a grip, strengthen their capacities, bridge 
the differences and put up a fight for retention and expansion of the rights of workers 
has been voiced over and over again (Grdešić, 2008; 2015; Kokanović, 1999; 
Kubicek, 2004).  
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Although the work of unions might not be sufficiently organized and effective, 
workers keep fighting their battles. Ivančić and Livada (2015) have given a rather 
detailed overview of the forms the labor struggle in Croatia took since the beginning of 
1990s. These include occupation of companies, wildcat strikes, prolonged actions 
aimed at preventing bogus privatizations (known as Stožeri—Headquarters), 
cooperation between craft unions, efforts to empower, educate and involve rank-and 
file-workers, and joint actions with civil society organizations. The last one is a rather 
novel idea, with Croatian non-governmental organizations (NGOs)2 starting to show 
deepened interest in labor struggle only in 2010. The motif was the strike of 
Kamensko Textile Industry workers who protested in hope of retrieving their salaries 
and preventing closure of the factory, which was likely set up for bankruptcy in order 
to be torn down and its land used for the new real-estate development. As NGOs 
Pravo na grad (Right to the City) and Zelena akcija (Green Action) aim to prevent the 
takeover of the public space by private capital, their interest aligned with those of 
workers and they joined the protest, extending substantial technical support to 
workers in the process. Since then, non-governmental sector became rather active in 
advocating the workers’ rights (Ivančić and Livada, 2015). However, that is not the 
only novelty the Kamensko strike helped bring to labor struggle in Croatia. The other 
one is Kamensko Opened, the first non-governmental organization in Croatia 
founded and led by industrial workers. Organization funds its activities by doing 
tailoring and sewing work and advocates for Kamensko workers, whose rights have not 
been honored even five years after the factory was closed. What exactly is the 
difference between workers’ NGO and workers’ union will be discussed in a moment. 
For the start it will suffice to notice that forming an NGO opened a space for action 
previously inaccessible to these workers. Can new models of civil organizing such as 
this help further the interests3 of industrial labor in Croatia? If yes, to what extent? I 
will explore these questions by analyzing the case of Kamensko.  
Prior to taking a closer look at the case study, it is important to determine the 
motivations behind civil and union organizing, and how both of them are, or can be, 
perceived in the post-socialist context. Kubicek (2004) provides an analysis of the 
position of unions within the civil society of post-communist states. He notes the 
prominent role assigned to the civil society in the process of democratization, which it 
should be using to promote and guard common interests. Unions are by all means 
part of civil society, but with a purpose of taking care of their particular concerns, 
which do not necessarily have to be aligned with those defined as common—those that 
are, again, composed of various and not necessarily corresponding interests of various 
civil organizations. Unions are also political organizations, taking an active part in 
political negotiations and decision-making. Belonging to both civil and political camp 
makes unions imposters in both of them. To complicate matters further, unions are 
																																																								
2 Throughout the paper I will use “Civil society organization” and “Non-governmental organization” as 
synonyms.  
3 These interests include enforcing the labor law, increasing visibility of industrial workers and the 
problems they face, lobbying with the state institutions and political parties for the extension of labor 
rights, helping in servicing workers’ economic needs. 
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loaded with the baggage of socialist past which new democracies, as Grdešić (2015) 
notes, would rather not be reminded of. Kubicek concludes (2004: 12): ‘Civil society 
as a whole, with all its normative assumptions included, is lauded. Unions are, to put it 
mildly, another matter—groups that need to be beaten or subdued if democratic 
consolidation and marketization are to have a chance.’ This difference in how 
interests and activities of unions are perceived compared to the rest of civil society is 
basis for the differentiation between the unions and the NGOs that I make in this 
paper. 
The evidence of declining membership and relevance of the unions is 
overwhelming. As a way of overcoming these problems in post-communist Eastern 
Europe economies, Ost (2002) suggests that unions turn towards economic unionism 
model, where servicing the needs of their membership would be the priority. He 
emphasizes the importance of history of contemporary unions, tied to communist past 
and broader social movements which often clouded the importance of particular 
workers’ interests in the workplace. These particular interests, Ost argues, need to be 
revived and prioritized in order for unions to attract new members and regain 
influence: ‘What successful unions are beginning to do differently today is make clear 
that they seek to represent labor’s particular interests in capitalistic society, not lead a 
social movement fighting a former kind of society’ (Ost, 2002: 48). He does not 
neglect the importance political and social movement unionism can have, but argues 
for economic unionism to be at the core of all unionized activity. With this in mind, I 
want to try to examine if workers’ can organize around their shared interests outside 
the union—that is, circumvent its bureaucracy and burdened history—and successfully 




To answer the questions posed, I will analyze the case of Kamensko workers as a 
specific example of labor action in Croatia, bringing the non-governmental 
organizations’ activism and the labor movement together. The press material that 
covered the case was used for the first level of analysis, as a primary source which 
provided me with the information necessary to understand the case and position it 
within the Croatian context. In order to learn about workers’ experiences and their 
own perceptions of the action they took up, and to answer the questions on how this 
action might influence the Croatian labor movement, I interviewed nine former 
workers of Kamensko factory. Eight of them were women, as the textile industry 
employs predominantly female workforce. I met Djurdja, Štefica and Biserka at the 
office of their new organization and got the contacts of the other six interviewees - 
Bega, Mara, Marija, Suada, Božica and Damir—by snowball sampling. Interviews took 
place in January and February 2015. All of the interviewees were in their 50s or 60s, 
long-time employees of Kamensko, who spent 10 to 34 years working for the 
company and were or were not involved in the work of NGO formed after the factory 
was closed. Once the interviews were done, I spent three afternoons in Kamensko 
Opened workshop, using this opportunity to observe them doing their job and see 
how the community that uses their services interacts with them.   
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The interviews were semi-structured, with questions designed to examine how 
the changes in their factory and their reaction to these changes influenced their lives, 
their community and their understanding of the issues industrial workers face in 
Croatia today. All interviewees were asked about (1) the way in which factory work was 
organized (2) the relationship they had with the collective and the management, (3) 
the process of decision making in the factory, (4) the methods used to advocate for 
their rights while they still had a job, (5) the process of NGO formation and (6) the 
activist work. By creating this long overviews of interviewees’ careers I was able to 
identify the issues at the workplace and within the society that influenced workers the 
most and led them to first disobey the managers, disregard the union and try and save 
the factory from closing, and then to create an NGO in order to continue the fight for 
their rights. 
What follows is the detailed account of the process in which Kamensko 
workers lost their factory jobs, fought for their legal rights, gained allies, and 
established non-governmental organization as a continuation of their factory collective.  
 
3. Losing the Factory   
3.1 History  
 
Kamensko was founded in 1949, by the Yugoslav government, with the aim of 
producing clothes for the army. During the 1950s it started exporting, first to the 
Middle East and later to several European countries. During the 1960s two new 
factories were opened in other parts of Croatia, in Grižani and Gračac. At the 
beginning of the 1970s the expansion of the main factory in Zagreb (Picture 1) was 
finished, giving the building the form it has today. In the period from the 1952 to the 
1973, the space that factory occupied increased eight times.4 
 
(Picture 1 here)  
 
The company was licensed by Piere Carden in 1990 to produce garments for men 
and women and continued production for export as well as for the Croatian army 
during the civil war in Yugoslavia. In 1993 it was turned into a shareholders’ company. 
Workers were given an option to buy shares first and become owners of the company 
themselves, which was accepted by the majority. This was not the prevalent model of 
privatization in Croatia, as the government’s general inclination was towards privatizing 
through public auctions and direct deals and retaining control over who could the 
future owners be (Grdešić, 2008), which resulted in numerous failed processes and 
corruption affaires, and contributed to economic downturn. By buying the shares 
Kamensko workers managed to keep the ownership of the company, but not for long. 
Low earnings and the crisis that spanned through 1990s pushed them to trade shares 
within the company, leading to smaller number of workers and managers owning most 
																																																								
4 Kamensko Company (2004) A Simplified Prospectus for Listing the Shares of the Issuer Kamensko in 
the Stock-Exchange 
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of company’s shares and transferring them to a third party after the stocks became 
listed for public trading in 2004. By this time all the production facilities outside of 
Zagreb were closed, due to the lack of business and physical damage suffered during 
the war, which additionally lowered the value of Kamensko.  External buyers gradually 
became majority owners and installed their own managers. Several interviewees refer 
to the moment when ‘the people from the outside’ became managers as the moment 
when the factory started declining. Božica, who used to work as a supervisor, claims 
the new management had no real concern for the workers, or the factory: ‘They 
would yell and insult us. They had no understanding for the process of production.’ 
The number of people at the managerial positions started increasing—controllers, 
supervisors, administrators—while the workforce involved in the actual production 
declined in numbers and worked under a lot of pressure, trying to achieve demanding 
norms. Štefica and Biserka, now active members in the NGO, pointed out the 
importance of stability, and how in the previous decades of their work at Kamensko 
directors and managers would change only when the time came for them to retire. 
These sudden and frequent shifts during the period from 2005 until the closure in 
2010 contributed to the feeling of disorientation among workers and hostility towards 
the new management, but it might have strengthened the ties within the workers’ 
community as it became obvious they no longer share history, values nor interests with 
those in the managerial positions. This relationship was very important during the era 
of self-management; as Musić notes, workers’ alliance with company managers rather 
than the Party representatives was one of the distinct features of the Yugoslavian 
model of socialism: ‘Solidarity with the technical and managerial cadres, who were 
close to the producers inside the enterprise and contributed to the total income of the 
work collective, seemed to make more sense than political alliances with the distant 
and unaccountable government bureaucracy’ (Comisso, 1979: 47). Hence, the 
disruption of this inner-company cooperation was even more troubling for workers 
than in would be without the self-management heritage.  
As opposed to the new and ever-changing leadership, workers of Kamensko 
knew each other very well. Apart from working together for years—often even 
decades, what connected them were similar socio-economic and educational 
backgrounds. The company data from 2004 show that 533 of the total of 1703 
employees had secondary school education—probably related to the work with textile, 
while 1083 had lower qualifications. Most of the workers interviewed for this research 
came to work in Zagreb when they were young, from one of the surrounding towns or 
villages. Their experience illustrates the trends of urbanization, with young people 
pulled towards industrial centers in pursuit of opportunities to master a skill and get a 
job (Bonfiglioli, 2012). Women’s emancipation through access to labor market was an 
important part of Yugoslav project. In order for women to keep the position of the 
main caretaker while at the same time participating in labor force the ‘working 
mother’ gender contract was established: ‘Working women gained access to free 
healthcare, free abortions, free education, extended paid maternity leave of up to a 
year, canteens and childcare facilities in the workplace, and could benefit from shorter 
working hours to take care of small children (although all women did not benefit from 
these possibilities in the same way due to the uneven development of welfare services 
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throughout the country)’ (Bonfiglioli, 2013: 6). Workers of Kamensko benefited from 
such provision, which made their living situations all more difficult when this system 
fell apart (Baševska, 2015). Being working women in self-management system did not 
protect them from gender discrimination at work either; as Biserka remembers: ‘Most 
of managerial positions were occupied by men. They climbed the company ladder 
faster than us, they were promoted much sooner than we’. Men were also doing the 
work in the warehouses and in machinery maintenance, but the women were the ones 
who had to do difficult and stressful labor of sewing on the norm. These shared 
experiences made a strong basis for the development of compassion and solidarity 
among predominantly female workforce of the factory. An experience workers shared 
regardless of gender was union membership, which was treated as obligatory and paid 
for on monthly basis. One of the benefits union provided during socialist times was an 
affordable summer vacation at the company’s summer resort in Crikvenica, at the 
Croatian coast, where workers and their families would often spend their summer 
vacation together.5  
Before privatization, workers participated in managing the factory through 
workers’ councils—another institution characterizing the era of self-management 
which, according to Grdešič (2015) gave the workers a sense of empowerment and 
entitlement. Members of these bodies were chosen by their working units; they held 
meetings regularly and the management was obliged to inform them on how the 
company was doing, while they could take part in suggesting solutions and making 
decisions. Some form of this body was kept after privatization for a while, as now 
workers were the shareholders and preserved the right to have a say in how their 
company is doing business. However, this did not last for long—multiple interviewees 
suggested the councils were shut down because they often opposed managerial 
decisions.  
At the end of 2010, Kamensko was left with 426 workers. Talking about the 
closure, Bega says: ‘Younger people sought other jobs and left if they found any. We 
had to stay, as we had nowhere to go: if you are 50 years old, you’re too young to 
retire, but too old for anyone else to want to hire you.’ This is another symptom of 
how women have been gradually losing the rights gained during state socialism era. 
‘Due to traditional and renewed forms of gender discrimination in the productive and 
reproductive sphere, women have been more vulnerable to unemployment and 
poverty, and have often been pushed to the margins of the labor market as well as into 
the informal economy’ (Bonfiglioli, 2013: 25). As witnessed by several interviewees, 
many Kamensko workers suffered chronic illnesses, lacked good healthcare and 





5 Benačić (2014) Intervju o nekim drugim vremenima: znate li da su nekoć naše radnike tjerali da se 
odmaraju na Jadranu? 
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The closure of Kamensko was preceded by seven months long period during which 
the workers were not paid at all. Working days and shifts were organized as usual, but 
the salaries kept being postponed ‘until tomorrow.’ Bega admits that it is difficult to 
understand why someone would keep working under these conditions: ‘I used to say 
that people should not work if they are not paid—if they don’t get the salary for one 
month, they shouldn’t just keep working. But it’s different when it happens to you, 
you keep hoping. Besides, you don’t have anywhere else to go and work, there are no 
other options.’ The situation went so far that the controllers for the public 
transportation started remembering the ‘Kamensko gals’ and let them ride without a 
ticket, expressing in this way their solidarity and hope that the workers would soon get 
their money and be able to pay for the ride. Working for months without pay while 
hoping the conditions will improve is not unusual in Croatian factories, nor in other 
post-Yugoslav countries.6  
After the seventh month without the pay had passed, in September 2010, group 
of 20 workers started the ten days long hunger strike in the park in front of the factory. 
Many coworkers supported them, but could not join due to legal restrictions 
concerning public gatherings. They slept in the park, worked their shifts and 
demanded to be paid, but also aimed to draw the public attention to their problems 
and struggles of Croatian textile workers in general. One of the Croatian online 
magazines wrote a supportive story about the strike, but ended it with a note on how 
ordinary it is to see workers of some fallen factory protest in Zagreb and how sad that 
the protest of Kamensko will only have the usual five minutes in the spotlight and then 
disappear from the public eye.7 That is the sense of hopelessness that even the 
participants of the protests had, aware that their stories are far from unique and that 
the wider community seldom has the time or interest to invest in supporting their 
cause.8 The support, however, arrived spontaneously: first the neighbors living in the 
buildings close to the factory joined, then came university students (who at the time 
were fighting their own battles against privatizing the education) and Red Cross. 
Citizens signed the book of support, while media covered the strike extensively. 
Although this experience was physically and emotionally exhausting, the worst 
memory of the strike for Bega was a visit paid to the workers by the director of the 
factory, few days after the protest started. He offered to buy them some ‘ćevapi’—
traditional, sausage–like grilled meat, popular fast food in the Balkans. This was an 
insult to the workers who opted for hunger strike because they could not sustain 
themselves after working without pay for months. However, no one was surprised: 
such behavior was another indicator of the degree to which new management was 
unable to empathize with workers. The union did not support the strike and advised 
																																																								
6 In her study of a case in Leskovac, Serbia, Bonfiglioli (2013) notes how the local textile workers worked 
without salary for two years, from July 2001 until July 2003. 
7 Bačić and Opačić (2010) Glad i bijeda radnica Kamenskog 
8 Grdešić, (2015: 7): ‘Although strike and protest levels appear to be moderately high, it should be 
mentioned that they occur in a public climate and political environment that shows little interest in 
worker struggles.’ 
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workers to enter negotiations with the company; according to Djurdja, one of the 
leaders of the strike, this was not accepted as workers no longer believed the 
management would honor any potentially reached agreement. Public statements later 
released by both the workers and the Textile Workers Union (TOKG)9 have shown 
mutual distrust, personal disagreements and, overall, inability of workers and the 
union to work together.  
Ten days after the protest began, no solution was found. ‘We had to make a 
decision: we could either die of hunger and exhaustion in the park, or we could 
continue this in some other form,’ says Djurdja, Workers moved inside the factory 
and started organizing daily protests by walking from the factory to the city center and 
back (Picture 2), accompanied by sympathetic citizens, students and the media.  
 
(Picture 2 here) 
 
Workers felt that the especially important support to their cause came from the two 
representatives of an Italian company which was one of Kamensko’s main foreign 
customers. They walked with the protestors and encouraged the management to find a 
solution, offering assistance in restructuring the factory. Božica claims this company 
offered to rent the factory space for two years and continue production by keeping at 
least half of the workers employed. This suggested alliance between the foreign 
customer and the workers of Kamensko reveals two particular interests: the 
willingness of foreign company to invest in keeping the low-paid workers to whom 
they have been outsourcing the sewing and finishing phases of work with textile, and 
workers’ interest in any sort of arrangement that would help them keep their jobs. 
Workers main preoccupation is to keep working and get paid: they are not necessarily 
interested in improving and changing the system in which they have been exploited 
and underpaid. This comes as no surprise; as Grdešić writes, this is typical of labor 
struggle in Croatia: ‘Workers have either demanded that their back wages be paid, 
that corrupt privatization be stopped or that their rights in collective agreements not 
be cut further. Very rarely have workers gone on the offensive and attempted to 
expand their rights and influence’ (2015: 8).  The proposal by the Italian company was 
never publicized or acted upon, even if it might have been a real possibility. Instead, 
the factory soon closed for good. Mara remembers: ‘One Saturday, the supervisor 
came and gave us our documents, informing us that we will no longer work as the 
factory is closing. He told us that we should go to the Unemployment Bureau. It was 
awful when on the following Monday more than 400 of us gathered in front of that 
office, it was sad. I have never been to that place before in my life. The job at 
Kamensko was my first and only job.’ Workers were forbidden to return to the factory 
premises. The protest walks stopped, as it became clear they will not help in trying to 
reopen the factory or get the money.  
The newspaper have written about Kamensko filing for bankruptcy at the 
beginning of October 2010, following the request for the debt payment filed by one of 
																																																								
9 TOKG (2011) Istina je samo jedna 
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the foreign creditors.10 Less than two months later, on November 26th, the factory 
was closed. Some of the economic analysts explained the end of Kamensko by 
suggesting that the closure was an inevitable result of the company’s low productivity 
and inability to compete with low–cost garments of international clothing chains, 
arriving to Croatia together with the market liberalization.11 This, however, is not a 
satisfactory explanation: according to workers’ testimonies, much of Kamensko 
production was done for the export, which makes it less exposed to the competition in 
the domestic market. The low productivity was an indicator of poor management 
decisions, also recognized by the workers as increased pressure and borderline 
harassment they started experiencing at work in the period leading up to closure. 
Further evidence of the managerial abuse of power can be found in the fact that 
multiple members of the board of directors were prosecuted by the state because of 
the misconduct of the bankruptcy procedure and misuse of the company’s funds. In 
2011 the Commercial Court found that Antun Crlenjak, the former director of 
Kamensko, was guilty; he was sentenced with approximately 3.000€ in fines. In a 
separate processes, members of the managerial and supervision boards were sued by 
the workers, with the NGOs Right to the City and Green Action supporting them and 
providing the necessary technical guidance.12 Since then several managers and 
supervisors of Kamensko have been indicted for different crimes related to financial 
fraud and speculation and have spent time in prison13, but none of these processes 
has been brought to an end yet—another showcase for the inefficiency of the judiciary, 
if not even its bias. For now, there seems to be strong evidence that people leading the 
factory through its final years have had ties with companies and individuals involved in 
real–estate speculation in Zagreb, and would benefit from shutting down the factory in 
order to build in its attractive location.  
Concerns about the possible takeover of the land belonging to Kamensko by 
the real-estate speculators has been a trigger that started the cooperation between the 
protesting workers and the NGOs invested in protecting the public space. Factory 
building is located in the wider city center area, across the street from a beautiful 
public park (Picture 3), and hence suitable for new luxury developments.  The idea to 
relocate the industrial activity from this area has been around for more than a 
decade14, and plans were made to buy a new piece of land and move Kamensko to 
the suburbs. The workers were familiar with this idea, but did not believe it would 
come through—Božica explained they were aware of the factory’s bad business 
performance and the lack of money to buy the land and build the necessary facilities. 
The production was never moved; after it got closed, the factory was locked and put 
under guard of a private security company.  Part of the complex has been torn down 
																																																								
10 Kuskunović and Milovan (2010) Hrvatska će biti gladna 
11 Bošković (2012) Nisu htjeli promjene. Zaduženi i bez pomoći bili su lake žrtve krize 
12 Gaura (2011) Bivši čelnik Kamenskog kažnjen sa 22 tisuće kn 
13 Hina (2014) Slučaj Kamensko: počinje suđenje za aferu Kobilje mlijeko 
14 Renić (2010) Lenucijeva potkova 21. stoljeća 
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in July 2015 (Picture 4), presumably to make space for a new mixed–use building that 
is supposed to be built in place of an old Kamensko shop.15  
 
(Picture 4 here) 
 
The implementation of a new redevelopment project for the whole area, named 
Integrated City and heavily promoted by the city government, is supposed to start 
soon16. It entails relocating the railway and tearing down whole blocks, then building 
from the scratch. The plan has been criticized by the experts in the field17, activists 
and citizens as exclusive, secretive, dismissive of the city’s history and Kamensko 
workers while benefiting real–estate speculators. As Mucko (2012) writes: ‘The 
planned translocation of the factory, the recommencement of production, and the 
payment of delayed salaries seemed marginal in terms of the market, unimportant and 
burdening compared to signifying the factory space as reduced to its essentials—as 
real–estate. (…) Endorsement of the interests of gross capital and the systematic 
destruction of Kamensko are parts of the same process.’ The stance local government 
took by ignoring the legitimate concerns citizens voiced and excluding the social 
groups such developments might affect is illustrative of the neoliberal policies of urban 
development Croatia adopted. Harvey (2007: 9) describes such stance thusly: ‘The 
municipal government was no longer about benefiting the population, the municipal 
government had to address creating a good business climate. That was the goal, create 
a good business climate. And if there is a conflict between creating a good business 
climate and the wellbeing of this or that segment of the population, then to hell with 
this or that segment of the population’. By not ensuring that transparency of planning 
process and supporting the project that would ultimately hurt the workers of 
Kamensko, the local government became a common enemy that brought the workers 
and NGOs Right to the City and Green Action together. A lot of support that came 
from citizens, activists and artists seems to be inspired by their disproval of how the 
governing structures encourage dubious business projects. The relationship between 
shady privatizations and real estate developments has usually been disastrous for 
workers of the privatized factories, leaving them jobless more often than not. This has 
recently been pointed out even by a popular Croatian punk rock band Hladno Pivo. 
In the video for their song Firma (Company), which is a tribute to the industrial 
workers, several Kamensko workers appear and share bits of their stories. 
 
4. Kamensko Opened: A new Approach  
4.1 Let’s stay together 
 
After the factory was closed and the protests stopped, workers appealed to the court in 
hope of getting the money they earned. The group was advised by a lawyer who, as 
																																																								
15 Pandžić (2015) Ruše Kamensko: na mjestu uništene tvornice niču stanovi 
16 Simić (2015) Projekat uređenja Trga Franje Tuđmana 
17 Milas (2010) Zaustavite Fabijanića: Protest protiv gradnje na Trgu Francuske Republike 
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Mara remembers, suggested forming an NGO that could represent all the workers in 
the process. Some of the students who joined them during the protests had the same 
idea in mind; although they did not know how to lead such an organization, workers 
accepted and a group of them registered an NGO in 2011 under the name Kamensko 
Opened (KO) and with a goal to help the group cope with the new circumstances of 
joblessness and uncertainty. This was an attempt to provide some space and continuity 
for the community created at the factory, to keep the mutual, internal systems of 
support as the external ones - the union, the company and the state institutions—were 
proving to be unreliable. Djurdja, appointed president of KO, estimates the 
organization has somewhat more than 100 members.18 New challenge was to find a 
place where the organization could gather regularly, which could be turned turn into 
an office, a sort of Headquarters from where future actions could be planned. While 
acknowledging that some organizations offered them their offices for limited use, 
Djurdja admits they wanted to have their own space. By utilizing media attention and 
contacts obtained during the protests, KO managed to exercise some pressure upon 
the local government and the mayor himself and got to use an office space owned by 
the municipality, with affordable costs of rent and utilities (Picture 5). 
 
(Picture 5 here) 
 
As they were out of work, members of the organization started a campaign to obtain 
tools and materials necessary for a workshop that could function within the NGO, and 
maybe make some income by fixing old and making new clothes for private 
customers. They used the media spotlight, which their story still attracted19, to inform 
the public about their plans and to ask people to donate the old sewing machines, or 
cloth and other materials such as cotton and buttons.20 ‘Donations came from all 
over Croatia. People’s support made our work possible,’ says Djurdja. The relevance 
of Kamensko story was also kept from fading away by their public performances, such 
as the one Croatian theater director Lenka Udovički organized with several workers 
and professional actresses (Picture 6), titled The Unbreakable Threads, on the topic 
of hardships the women of Kamensko suffered after losing their jobs.21 
 
(Picture 6 here)  
 
Gradually, the NGO expanded: in an improvised sewing workshop, using old 
machines and donated materials, former Kamensko workers started making their own 
designs, which they presented to a broader audience in a runway show (Picture 7) 
																																																								
18 Although it advocates for the right of all former workers of Kamensko, not all of them were eager to 
become members of the NGO. Of the workers interviewed for this research, Mara and Božica were not 
affiliated with the organization. They chose not to be because the closure of factory was so traumatic that 
they want to leave everything related to it in the past. 
19 Majdandžić (2011) Sutra obilježavanje godišnjice gladovanja radnica Kamenskog 
20 Tportal (2013) I vi možete pomoći radnicama Kamenskog 
21	Tportal (2011) Performans o socijalnoj propasti Kamenskog 
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organized in September 2013, with the support from the local government.22 This 
was a way to mark the date when the factory filed for bankruptcy, and to have a 
conversation about the problems of employment for women.  The organization 
started getting orders from other NGOs, small Croatian boutique businesses and even 
political parties—the last presidential campaign of the former Croatian president Ivo 
Josipović had the jackets for the campaign made by Kamensko Opened.23 They 
managed to rent another, bigger space beside the one they already used, where they 
permanently set up the sewing machines (Picture 8). The old space in now an office 
equipped with a computer, a printer and a scanner—all second–hand devices donated 
by the mayor’s office, Djurdja explains. The public support Kamensko Opened 
amassed in the meantime, with theater performances, fashion shows and the story of 
‘losers of transition taking matters into their own hands’ helped a lot in negotiating 
with the local government, as it gave workers the media platform to use and express 
their grievances. It is important to note the change in workers’ position: from a 
collective of more than 400 unsatisfied workers demanding their earned salaries and 
their factory to be spared from real-estate speculators, they became a small NGO 
(pacified part of civil society, one that does not ‘break any windows’—Kubicek, 2004) 
that still demanded their earned salaries and sued the speculators, only this time they 
could make the local government look good for providing a couple of used 
computers. The same group of workers was treated differently when they wanted to 
claim their rights as industrial workers and when they asked for support as an NGO 
with entrepreneurial aspirations.  
 
(Picture 7 here) 
 
To generate more income, KO started organizing courses where they teach sewing, 
tailoring and knitting, driving a lot of interest from mostly women, young and old, 
wanting to learn these skills and support troubled workers. At the time of interviews, 
organization employed eight women and engaged several volunteers, including the 
president and the accountant, who were both retired—hence, receiving a pension and 
not in urgent need of an additional monthly income. The accountant is not a former 
worker of Kamensko, but a woman who found out about workers’ struggles and 
activities from the media and who offered her services for free in order to support the 
organization. 
 
(Picture 8 here) 
 
4.2 Building Community  
 
So far, the noted effects workers of Kamensko achieved by turning to NGO activism 
have been as follows: increased media presence, widened network of public 
supporters and business partners, better cooperation with local government, and jobs 
																																																								
22 Gradske vijesti (2013) Zagreb za Kamensko 
23 Špoljar (2014) Josipović posjetio udrugu Kamensko 
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for eight women (out of 426 people who lost work when the factory got closed). It is 
difficult to speculate what would have been the outcome were the other methods of 
struggle employed—if cooperation with the union was better, or if workers occupied 
the factory. Having in mind the state of Croatian economy, government and unionism, 
and the fact that factory closures and workers’ protests are mostly treated as ‘business 
as usual’ by the public, it’s safe to say that Kamensko workers managed to grab the 
attention and make some difference. Apart from becoming a framework in which 
eight workers can provide the means of subsistence, Kamensko Opened also became 
an important informal community center. Benefits of KO as such center manifest in 
three ways.  
First, it informs the former workers of Kamensko who are not involved in 
organization’s daily activities about the court proceedings and news related to workers’ 
claim of their salaries and severance pays. The organization also uses its visibility to 
help in solving economic problems of the former colleagues. Damir, who used to be a 
warehouse worker and is only male employee of Kamensko participating in this 
research, is thankful for the organization’s help in providing wood for heating his 
home over the winter, which he could not afford as he does not have a regular job and 
receives unemployment benefits of only 700 HRK (around 90€) a month. 
Second, the organization presents the case of the Kamensko workers to the 
general public through the media channels, keeping the story compact and focused, 
hence easier to understand and empathize with. If there was no such organization, 
individual stories of Kamensko workers would likely dissolve and disappear among 
the multitude of similar records of former industrial workers of Zagreb. This benefits 
all the former workers who are waiting for their money, as there is a sense that not 
only the former employees, but the general public as well are waiting for the epilogue 
of this case and expect it to be fair to the workers. It might, however, result in the story 
becoming somewhat simplified, deprived of details about particular cases and 
individual struggles, as well as oriented more towards the short–term relief that belated 
severance pay would bring to the workers than to the need to evaluate, criticize and 
change the system which left workers in this position in the first place. Kamensko 
Opened makes no secret of the fact that their primary goal is to retrieve the money 
the factory owes them. Still, organization participates in public events and 
conferences24 where their representative, most often their president Djurdja, speaks 
about the need to support workers, protect them from possible manipulations by 
employers and help them get timely law protection. While KO is visible and active in 
supporting the workers’ and women’s rights, they do not support any political party in 
Croatia. ‘We cannot support anyone who contributed towards creating the system in 
which we now cannot get justice, even though we have been actively fighting for it for 
almost five years,’ Djurdja says. Social Democratic Party supported their cause and 
																																																								
24 European Commission Office in Croatia (2014) Žene, ekonomsko nasilje i stakleni strop u Hrvatskoj 
(Women, Economic Violence and the Glass Ceiling in Croatia). March 14, Zagreb.; FemCities 
Conference (2015) Uticaji ekonomske krize na zapošljavanje žena u europskeim gradovima: Sličnosti i 
razlike. Smjernice za gradove (The Influence of Economic Crisis on Employment of Women in 
European Cities: Similarities and Differences. Guidelines for Cities). June 1-2, Zagreb. 
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Kamensko Opened made some promotional material for their presidential candidate, 
but did not endorse them: ‘We did business with them. Supporting us is nice, but it 
doesn’t solve the problem. We need systemic failures to be fixed, and there seems to 
be no political party in Croatia who is committed to doing that now.’ 
Third, Kamensko Opened does not limit their activities to helping only to the 
other former workers of Kamensko. Djurdja admits this is something they decided 
after discussing it at length, as involving other people in their work would mean 
devotion to goals not tied specifically to their shared history and their main objective. 
At the end of 2014, organization hired a woman who is a trained tailor and a domestic 
abuse survivor, in need of a job so she can provide for herself and her kids. ‘Others 
rejected her over and over again. She was a woman in trouble and we had to find a 
way to help. Now she works with us and everyone is very content with her 
contributions to our workshop’ says Djurdja of the only KO employee who is not a 
former Kamensko worker. 
While I observed organization at work, they had two visits, both of them 
illustrative of how the local community perceives Kamensko Opened. One was by an 
older man whose wife recently passed, leaving behind many hand–made pieces of 
clothing and a lot of textile materials. He brought these as a donation, to support the 
women’s work in honor to his wife’s memory. The other visit was by a young woman 
with a master’s degree in textile design, who was searching for an opportunity to work. 
‘All the ads for jobs that I see through the Unemployment Bureau are fixed for 
someone in advance, and there is not many of them anyway. I was hoping I would 
find something here,’ she explains. Djurdja instructs her to apply for a paid internship, 
funded by the state, available for young professionals of all profiles and done in one of 
many companies or organizations around the country who decided to participate in 
this government–sponsored training. Kamensko Opened has already had several such 
interns—young people with broad theoretical knowledge would come to acquire some 
practical skills in working with textile. ‘It is nice to be a teacher,’ says Štefica. 
Participation in programs such as this shows how Kamensko opened, as an NGO, got 
its members plugged in the system in a completely new way. They were now providing 
the training for youngsters similar to the one they received at the factory decades ago, 
only in a much different, uncertain and precarious environment which these young 
people are now entering.  
By engaging in community life and providing services for former, current and 
future workers, Kamensko Opened found a way to engage in activities that support 
their peers, while at the same time investing in community building. What they are 
doing might be both servicing the workers and going beyond the factory gates, in Ost’s 
terms (2002)—finding the balance between economic and political engagement, 
although on a very small scale.  
 
5. Conclusion: The Unlikely Activists 
 
The case of Kamensko and its successor, Kamensko Opened, is an interesting 
example of industrial workers’ collective searching for its place in a new, uncertain 
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capitalist environment. I used it to examine if the new models of civic organizing in 
post-socialist Croatia—such as non-governmental organizations—can be used in 
furthering the interests of industrial labor, abandoned and almost unnecessary in the 
new, largely de-industrialized economy. After studying how the workers’ NGO 
attracted and sustained public attention over the time of almost five years, advocated 
for the rights of all former Kamensko employees, connected with the community, 
created alliances with other civil society actors and started its own economic activity, it 
is tempting to say that yes, it is possible to improve the condition of industrial workers 
by encouraging them to get involved with the public in a new, organized and possibly 
non-unionized way.  
Why is it important that Kamensko Opened is an NGO and not a union? As 
explained earlier, unions have fallen from grace in the post-socialist period, largely 
unable to gather strength and assert their importance to either their members or the 
employers. According to Hymen (2003), unions in Europe became increasingly 
dependent for their survival on institutionalized internal routines and formalized 
external relationships, which puts them in danger of losing contact with those they aim 
to represent. This is largely true for Croatian unions as well. Rigid and out of touch, 
could these institutions find inspiration in a smaller, yet formalized and organized 
workers’ actions such as Kamensko Opened? It depends.  
It is important to consider the limitations. Workers who run Kamensko 
Opened have lost their factory jobs, so they had the strongest motivation to find a new 
way to provide means of subsistence, while protesting over their breached labor rights. 
Although they are advocating for the rights of more than 100 former co-workers, they 
are a small organization, which simplifies managing and decision making processes. 
They have been active in the community, but they have never aspired to become 
activists—merely to survive and publicly state their problems while waiting for the 
money that factory owners still need to pay them. They have learned a lot in their new 
endeavor, but this emancipating potential has been mostly limited to a small number 
of workers involved in the organizations’ day-to-day activities. Many of their friends 
and colleagues are either unable to work due to health issues, like Marija, or trying to 
make ends meet by doing low-paid jobs in the black market, like Bega and Suada. 
They are aware that they have not made any big difference, and still consider their 
position to be in a sort of waiting space until their belated money arrives, or they get 
old enough to retire.  
Kamensko Opened, however, is surely not insignificant. It operates on a small 
scale and manages to give little but important contributions to the community, while 
developing its own capacities in the process. The biggest lesson the rest of the 
Croatian labor movement could learn from its experience is the importance of this 
small, human scale. By choosing to encourage grassroots action, build connections 
and concentrate on small problems, unions and their allies might eventually get strong 
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Picture 1: Factory building of Kamensko in Zagreb. Photo: Author 
Picture 2: Protest of Kamensko workers; Photo: G. Mehkek 
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Picture 3: Park and a parking lot across the street from Kamensko factory. Photo: 
Author 
 
Picture 4: Tearing down parts of the Kamensko complex, photo: T. Kristo 
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Picture 5: Office of the Kamensko Opened. Photo: Author 
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Picture 7: The first runway show of the Kamensko Opened organization, Photo: S. 
Jandjel 
Picture 8: The workshop of Kamensko Opened. Photo: Author 
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The paper offers a critical reading of Eurocentrism and Western 
hegemony of social thought by highlighting the essential similarities 
between the African and post-1989 Eastern European experience. It 
argues that Eastern European local knowledge and difference should 
be addressed in new ways, which take into account our neo-colonial 
negation and subjugation. The reorientation of what I call an 
essentially orientalist discourse in Eastern Europe can come from 
renewed engagement, after a nearly thirty-year gap, with African 
political theory, labour activism, and resistance movements. The 
article offers a discussion in what ways the African experience can be 
paralleled with the Eastern European peripheral integration into the 
global capitalist economy and it argues that African social thought, 
which has been hitherto largely neglected in post-socialist Eastern 
Europe, can, indeed, have illuminating insights into a history of global 
marginalisation. Further, I argue, that in that sense, African social 
thought can be an inspiring source in order to reorient current 
Eastern European histories, which have been developing self-
defeating, self-deprecating and self-orientalising tendencies since at 
least 1989. Afrikanizacija, a grand metaphor for our region’s descent 
into a world of neo-colonialism, should also mean that we recognise 
the liberating and emancipating contents of African social thought 
especially in the fields of labour and feminism when we look for ways 
to fight Western hegemony. 
 
Keywords: African Labour, Afrikanizacija,  Nigeria, Academic Identity Politics, Eastern European 
Epistemologies.
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In this essay, we first address the riddle of how, under conditions on de-
industrialisation, organised working class struggle is more and more relevant in the 
early 21
st
 century in Africa. In Eastern Europe, de-industrialisation has not reached 
African levels (in most places) but organised labour and Marxian theory has arguably 
become even weaker in our region than in Africa. We then go on to offer a metaphor 
for Eastern Europe’s neoliberal descent into its current conditions. The term 
Afrikanizacija is drawn from the Yugoslav experience of the mid-1990s but in this 
essay we argue that its application goes far beyond Eastern Europe’s war zones and 
pockets of third world underdevelopment: the retreat from social services by the state 
has made Afrikanizacija, the convergence with Africa’s peripheral economies, a 
region-wide reality. In the African context, flag independence from the 1960s usually 
coexisted with neo-colonial systems. Those systems allowed for some limited 
development in the 1960s and 1970s, but deteriorated in the 1980s and the 1990s, 
creating in Africa numerous military dictatorships and unliveable hell-holes, while 
maintaining extraction economies for the benefit of the global capitalist order in 
tandem with local compradors. Today, wars in the former Soviet peripheries, 
autocratic systems in different parts of Eastern Europe, and also anti-immigrant 
hysteria all point to a replay of 1990s Africa in the Eastern European theatre of global 
capitalism.  
Naturally, Eastern European academics are not in the position to single-
handedly re-build the moribund trade unions, or to revitalise the workers’ struggle in 
the region. What we may do, and should do, is that we should build theory on which 
eventually, activisms might be built in the future. It is with this in mind that in this 
article, we offer uses for the re-engagement, after a 30 year gap, of African Marxist 
social and political theory. Eastern Europe before 1989 did furnish Africa with 
genuine transfers of technology, credit, and know-how (including the know-how of 
building Bolshevik type vanguard parties). Today advice must flow the opposite way. 
It is my conviction that African social scientists’ experience with Western domination, 
extraction of resources, super-exploitation of the work force, the necessity of 
emigration for professionals, the emergence of right wing radical rule and de-
industrialisation, will make it worthwhile for Eastern European social scientists to 
study the works of Africa’s theorists exactly to gain ideas on how to analyse and 
address those negative phenomena.  
This essay then goes on and argues for academic identity politics in the Eastern 
European region. Instead of offering morality tales for the West on why their political, 
economic and social systems are always best; and instead of offering caricatures of our 
own historical failings, we should learn pride from Africa’s radical minds from Fanon 
to Madunagu, when we want to face up to Western condescension. This is done here 
with the help of Ramon Grosfoguel’s refutation of universalistic notions of Western 
philosophy of knowledge, and the recognition that Eastern Europe has had 
indigenous achievements that merit historical pride.  
It is difficult to build historical pride in a region that sees itself in light of its 
current colossal failure and through the eyes of its incumbent neo-colonial masters 
before it can realistically weigh itself on the scales of history. Pride in fields of the 
human imagination is not very easy in Eastern Europe to develop as the region has 
not been the cradle of world religions or philosophies. However, beyond practical 
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historical achievements, Eastern Europe has built systems of thought that we may be 
proud of (from Leftist thinkers to the pockets of paleo-conservatism that hassidism 
represents). In the Central-Eastern European sub-region, a British historian and 
commentator notices extremely pertinent ways in which the region’s history hinders its 
healthy development and self-image. This is contrasted with theoretical approaches by 
thinkers such as Hobsbawm and Gellner to present how Central-Eastern Europe, 
despite its tragic history, has also having been something of a laboratory of thought, 
ideas, nationalisms, and their discontents. My essay ends with a warning that if we fail 
to uncover objectively, our own condition and let Eastern Europe’s political elites 
subjugate the region to the ever-growing demands of international capital then further 
economic and epistemic decline is inevitable, and Eastern Europe’s trajectory will 
eventually converge with that of the super-exploited economies of West Africa.      
 
New vistas in the field of African Labour  
 
The unique role that the African workers’ movement plays on that continent has 
recently been noticed once more and completely re-evaluated after decades of 
academic neglect especially in the Atlantic countries. Pnina Werbner’s The Making of 
an African Working Class, Immanuel Ness’s Southern Insurgency: The Coming of 
the Global Working Class, Zachariah Mampilly’s Africa Uprising and Rebel Rulers: 
Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War, are all in print and they all point 
to a massive and sustained, renewed interest in African rebel movements that form 
and operate on the basis of class and not on the basis of ethnic politics, that vicious 
darling of mainstream narratives.  
It has now been widely recognised that ethnic and ethnicist explanations often 
serve to explicate the neo-colonial master and to implicate the victim. After scores of 
proxy wars fought out for international corporations from the Congo to the Central 
African Republic that in aggregate have killed millions in the last two decades, and 
after fundamentalist fanatics have launched Salafist insurgencies and triggered US 
televangelist style Protestant ‘awakenings,’ with literal witch hunts, and inter-religious 
warfare all over the African continent, it is time that academia recognised how 
embedded its mainstream liberal explanations and ideas are in the ‘mainstream’ web 
of global corporate interests. It is indeed high time that academia move beyond an 
unwitting service to those interests through its own indirect ways. It is now important 
to assess possibilities of an entire plethora of genuine emancipatory theory from (post) 
industrial working class activism to radical feminist takes, as well as addressing 
questions of how progressive kinds of ‘identity construction’ (in this case mainly class 
and gender) may actually serve emancipation.    
Within the Central-Eastern European context, author Zachariah Mampilly was 
recently invited to deliver a lecture at Budapest’s Central European University – a sign 
that our region has picked up on this major global academic trend. Mampilly’s activist 
links allow him access to a number of rebel leaders, civil society organisers and labour 
personalities (sometimes by clandestine means). His analysis is a radical departure 
from the Security Studies dominated North American/West European discourse on 
African rebel leaderships: Mampilly constitutes some of them as part of a potential 
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long term solution and not as security threats. With the US Africa Command now 
getting more and more entangled in local conflicts on the African continent, it is vital 
that voices independent of the US security architecture are also gaining recognition 
within global Africanist circles, and that their authentic voices are recognised even in 
Central-Eastern Europe. 
Another important representative of labour oriented Africanist scholarship is 
London’s Leo Zeilig: labour organiser, academic, writer, socialist, and prolific author. 
With especially Zeilig’s fantastic recent works such as Lumumba: Africa’s Lost 
Leader, The Congo: Plunder and Liberation, and his very own new take on Frantz 
Fanon, the Africanist community has again reconnected with 1960s and 1970s radical 
icons. Leo Zeilig’s oeuvre has gone beyond such reconnection though. It has also 
been pivotal in explaining how under de-industrialisation, labour movements can still 
mount massive coordinated strikes that influence major political developments in 
Africa. In his Revolt and Protest: Student Politics and Activism in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
and in Class Struggle and Resistance in Africa, major explanations are offered as to 
how strikes are gaining in organisation and strength despite the systematic 
dismemberment of manufacturing industries under structural adjustment programmes 
(ongoing since the early 1980s along with privatisation and the elimination of 
parastatal companies in African states). It is crucial to understand that African labour 
thrives under conditions of de-industrialisation, while urbanisation itself marches on. 
This has created serious difficulties even for Marxist analysts of African societies: 
Mike Davis’ Planet of Slums is testament to that. Leo Zeilig, in disagreement with 
Davis, explains how a lumpenised urban mass in the context of de-industrialisation 
still does not mark the end of labour resistance in Africa:  
 
(...) to see ... instances of protest as simply spontaneous explosions of a slum 
dwelling multitude is nonsense. More often they are organized or semi-
organized expressions of political dissidence... (...) Writers doubted whether 
bonds of solidarity and consciousness were strong enough for a ‘real’ working 
class to bring about social transformation, and suggested that the so-called 
working class was in any case excluded from other groups in society as ‘an 
aristocracy of labour.’ It is undoubtedly true that the formation of the working 
class has been characterised by a complex and often heterogeneous process of 
‘proletarianisation’ in most parts of Africa in the nineteenth and twentieth 
century – from migrant labour in the mines in Southern Africa from the 1900s 
to labour in oil extraction and processing in the Niger delta from the 1970s. 
(Zeilig, 2002: 15)  
 
Following this general discussion, Zeilig brings into the discussion the concrete 
example of Soweto in South Africa: 
 
(...) the effects of mass unemployment – typical of the de-industrialised urban 
life in the South – have created a new class of the wage-less poor, excluded 
from the world of work. The working class seems now, by implication, a tiny 
and privileged group, many of whom live outside the township slum and have 
interests separate from the majority of the urban poor. However, a closer look 
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at the statistics reveals something quite different. If we examine the household, 
we can see extraordinary mixing of the different and seemingly divided groups 
of the poor. (...) There is no ‘wall of China’ between work and unemployment. 
(...) the potential for a similar crossover exists as regards popular protest and 
social dissidence. (Zeilig, 2002: 15-16) 
 
What is important to realise in connection with Zeilig’s argument is that a single man 
or woman in formal employment may be directly responsible for the physical survival 
of up to ten people who live in the same compound as the employee, or who receive 
from him or her remittances, and that the latter’s own revolutionary potential will 
reflect very closely, the influence of their luckier brethren.   
We should extrapolate on Zeilig’s important point by bringing to the table the 
revolutionary potentialities of Europe’s young precariate. Arguably, our own Eastern 
Europe’s semi-peripheral precariate already lives on the very edges of physical survival 
if it does not emigrate. (Dale, 2011) Pointing out structural parallels between the fate 
of Africa under de-industrialisation, and Central-Eastern Europe under simultaneous 
dynamics of de-industrialisation and subaltern (neo-colonial) re-industrialisation will 




In works that focus on de-industrialisation, or the critique of NGO paradigms of 
meaningless ‘empowerment’ and specifically also the failings of micro-credit systems 
in the former Yugoslavia, the term ‘afrikanizacija’ was introduced early on in the 
1990s. ‘Afrikanizacija’ (a Serbo-Croat word that is frequently misspelled ‘africanizacija’ 
in Western literature) is a technical term for how a ‘society in transition’ (most 
especially one that had been based on a socialist economy before) is transformed 
relying on the informal sector of kiosks, street stalls, rehashed subsistence farms, (Lal, 
2013: 156) and we may add, on widespread prostitution and criminalisation of its 
socio-economic and political life. Kiosk economies, informal economies, outright 
criminality and ubiquitous sex work characterised the 1990s all over Central-Eastern 
Europe, the former USSR, and the Balkans. They remain embedded in countries 
such as Ukraine, Bosnia, Macedonia or Moldova. (An interesting case study of 
Moldova is supplied by Keough, 2016). Relatively luckier new EU member states 
such as Hungary, with their growing geographical regions and pockets of 
Afrikanizacija, are also transmogrifying into neo-colonial style remittance economies 
(because of massive flows of intra-EU emigration). The wholesale supplying of low 
skilled physical labour by men and also physical and emotional labour by women (as 
nurses, caretakers, sex workers etc.) to the economies of the global centre brings to 
mind parallels with the Philippines and its similar role vis-a-vis the US, but also, 
parallels with economies such as that of Ethiopia (another well known source of 
nurses in the global market for emotional labour, in this case for the Persian Gulf). At 
the same time, while subsidiary re-industrialisation is considered a panacea by ruling 
elites, Afrikanizacija grows in relevance in sub-regions that are left out of that process.   
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In some ways however, Afrikanizacija stamps more than just Eastern Europe’s 
under-researched, desperately poor hellholes. It may be said to characterise aspects of 
our entire developmental model. The near complete lack of unemployment benefits 
in Eastern Europe, the way in which tertiary education and secondary education 
expenses are cut back, the state of healthcare, and the wholesale destruction of entire 
segments of the middle class in our region (Atal, 1999; Dale, 2013) underline that 
Afrikanizacija has not been just a transitional phase: indeed that it should appear 
among the defining grand metaphors for our socio-economic system today. It is also 
here to stay. Understood this way, Afrikanizacija would not mean a return to some 
idyllic folk capitalism of the African jungle (a much touted but nonexistent historical 
phenomenon anyway) but the specifics of economic life in Africa after the brutal neo-
liberal restructuring of the 1980s and the 1990s (and in some cases still ongoing) that 
artificially rid the African continent of much of its potential for growth and cemented 
its international economic role as a supplier of raw materials and super-exploited 
labour power.  
Naturally, this is not to suggest that current skills levels in West Africa 
approximate skills levels in Eastern Europe or specifically in Hungary (skills levels in 
de-skilled and de-educated West Africa are startlingly low); but it is to suggest that 
these two distinct groups of economies are similar in that they cannot accommodate 
their very own highly skilled professionals any more – and neither can they 
accommodate their skilled workers. There are more Nigerian medical doctors 
practicing in the United States than there are within Nigeria (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 
255). Trends in Hungary are similar: our medical doctors and nurses are leaving, 
along with our welders. Africa’s structural adjustment programs and Eastern Europe’s 
disastrous post-1989 transition have both resulted in the establishment of distinctly 
neo-colonial systems; and they both resulted in the destruction of entire embedded 
life-worlds, including much of the life-world of the urbanised Central-Eastern 
European intellectual that we ourselves as a sub-class so much cherish. 
It has perhaps been easiest to notice the nature of (neo-) colonial rule in regions 
where legal sovereignty was also taken away, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina (an EU 
protectorate in name and substance). The highest political authority in that country is 
the foreign ‘High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina,’ the chief executive 
officer for the ‘international civilian presence’ (i.e. the Western colonial authority) in 
the country. Since 1995, the High Representative has been able to bypass the elected 
parliamentary assembly, and since 1997 has been able to remove elected officials. The 
methods selected by the High Representative have been criticised even in mainstream 
media as blatantly undemocratic. International supervision is planned to end when the 
country is deemed politically and democratically stable and self-sustaining – i.e. this is 
a typical colonial mandate (Hayden, 1998). 
The BiH protectorate is also a textbook case of how the North-Western 
European core treats its South-Eastern European periphery: through de-
industrialisation, privatisation, austerity; another well known example is Greece. It is 
not in the least surprising then that it was exactly in Bosnia that the most visible and 
most crucial multi-ethnic social revolt of the former Eastern European region has 
happened so far. The 2014 revolt started in Tuzla and spread to Sarajevo and Bihac, 
and was characterised by inter-ethnic inclusion and a complete lack of the supposedly 
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paramount ‘ancient hatreds’ that are thought to characterise the peoples of the region 
in the minds of the (neo-) colonial ruling authority. The demonstrators’ anger 
focussed on the (indigenous) political class. Although home grown, that class clearly 
represents no one, it maintains an apartheid (ethnically constructed) system, it is 
complicit in the destruction of industry, and it functions in complete disconnect from 
ordinary people’s lives as much as any similar colonial authority (such as warrant 
chiefs in the British colonial system a century ago) (Robertson, 2014). 
Elsewhere, as in Hungary or Poland, legal sovereignty made the recognition of 
a neo-colonial political economy extremely difficult, although of course, there exist 
some (mostly marginalised) critical thinkers. While on the other end of the spectrum, 
delusional conspiracy theorists (distinguished also by their university positions and 
academic titles too in Eastern Europe) envision dark schemata of unspeakable ferocity 
and drama to great popular acclaim, the obvious reality of Hungary’s economy as 
characterised by neo-colonial assembly plants that produce profit for German firms, is 
blurred by the ongoing ‘high politics’ entertainment show that is played out with the 
European Union.   
The idea that there is a necessary analytical link between conditions that prevail 
in Africa and Eastern Europe does not rest on superficial parallels but on real 
commonalities between the lives and conditions of Central European migrant 
workers, its precariate and its fourth estate on the one hand, and with the Fourth 
World of Africa’s destitute (including their migrants) on the other.  The destruction of 
life-worlds, as an important element in understanding social change, is emphasised by 
Karl Polanyi when he discusses how colonialism uprooted traditional communities in 
Africa thus: 
 
(...) institutions are disrupted by the very fact that a market economy is forced 
upon an entirely differently organized community; labour and land are made 
into commodities, which, again, is only a short formula for the liquidation of 
every and any cultural institution in an organic society. (...) Who for instance 
would care to deny that a formerly free people dragged into slavery was 
exploited, though their standard of life, in some artificial sense, may have been 
improved in the country to which they were sold as compared with that it was in 
their native bush? And yet nothing would be altered if we assumed that the 
conquered natives had been left free and not even been made to overpay the 
cheap cotton goods thrust upon them, and that their starvation was ‘merely’ 
caused by disruption of their social institutions. (Polanyi, 2001: 167)  
 
In this centrally important passage, Karl Polanyi battles the idea that exploitation is 
merely a fact of numbers, prices, and nominal incomes. Similarly, Eastern European 
societies before 1989, in their ways of preserving pre-modern solidarities and in 
maintaining enforced (state run) ones, social and economic factors sometimes allowed 
for a more humane existence than (semi-)peripheral capitalism does in the same 
regions today: an obvious statement of fact but one that still carries shock value in 
Eastern European periodicals. It would of course be foolish to suggest that Eastern 
Europe’s state socialist societies were organic societies a la Polanyi in any sense – but 
then again, neither were acephalous African Igbo village communities really ‘organic’ 
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in any other sense than not being subjected to the diktats of capital. It is also obviously 
the case that people in gainful employment earn much more today in dollar terms 
than in 1986 in Hungary (although they do not necessarily do so in Bosnia). However, 
numbers alone tell nothing of the system at work. ‘It is the absence of the threat of 
individual starvation which makes primitive society, in a sense, more humane than the 
market economy, and at the same time less economic,’ continues Polanyi, describing 
pre-colonial economic systems that relied on solidarity and shared food resources as a 
way of life (Polanyi, 2001: 172). Indeed we must realise that it is completely 
impossible to make sense of the Nigerian economy even in 2016 and even in its most 
urbanised realms such as Lagos, without the knowledge that identity communities 
support their members, neighbours support neighbours, blood relations and co-
workers support relatives and comrades in ways that are absent from the West, but 
somewhat still familiar from the ‘vertical villages’ of socialist housing blocks of 1980s 
Bulgaria or 1960s Hungary where the wider sharing of food was still a socially relevant 
phenomenon. With the arrival of Eastern Europe’s peculiarly vicious version of 
unregulated capitalism after 1989, such solidarities were eroded by economic 
rationales and global hegemonic morals reinforcing each other: making Hungarian 
immigrants in the West one of the saddest, most individualised groups that do not rely 
on comforting (pre-modern) group solidarities much.    
In the 1970s, epistemic communities established important links between 
Eastern Europe and Africa, where the latter largely, was the recipient of technological 
transfers and also of ideas such as Marxism-Leninism, Trotskyite analysis, and state 
socialism. Lake Balaton’s chief architect Polonyi went and designed Nigeria’s 
Calabar’s entire urban layout. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana employed two Hungarian 
economists (Nicholas Kaldor, Jozsef Bognar). Corvinus’ own Tamas Szentes, who 
worked in Dar-es-Salaam was an inspiration for an icon of African Marxian political 
economy, Walter Rodney himself. Bulgaria built the National Theatre in Lagos. More 
importantly still, the USSR financed and underwrote labour movements for decades 
in African countries (I narrate a case of this phenomenon in my upcoming book on 
Naija Marxisms: Revolutionary Thought in Nigeria) (Mayer, 2016). In this article, I 
claim that it is time for Eastern Europe’s social scientists to acknowledge and engage 
with African social science: especially Walter Rodney (How Europe Underdeveloped 
Africa), but also with Bade Onimode, Edwin Madunagu, and others who have 
important insights into how neo-colonial economies function, along with the kinds of 
humiliations that people who live under neo-colonial systems have to endure when it 
comes to their welfare, culture and identity. Bade Onimode, an economist, wrote 
classical economic histories and studies on political economy in the orthodox Marxist-
Leninist, East-European fashion, when he analysed Nigeria’s development. His 
voluminous oeuvre is testament to the fact that such an approach, despite its obvious 
shortcomings, was not at all without value in the African context. The more heterodox 
Eskor Toyo, although a Polish educated economist himself, showed more sympathy 
towards Maoist solutions, the peasantry as the bearer of revolution, and alternative 
Marxian cultural criticism, based on an understanding for the need to decolonise 
thought, before decolonising economies. Edwin Madunagu went even further and 
explored Trotskyite options, set up a New Left style rural commune with his 
comrades in the jungle, and wrote extensively on the effects of the neo-colonial 
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condition on a Fanonian basis, with corresponding rage. Although rage itself might be 
a double edged sword for an analyst, it might create an entirely new vantage point. I 
claim that in Eastern Europe, treating our own regional identity and our own 
academic history as an exercise in failure and a morality tale for the West on how the 
Other is always wrong, is slavish, self-negating, and ultimately, degrading. It is only 
through a critical re-engagement with our own tragedies and successes that Eastern 
Europe might hope to overcome its apathy.    
 
The necessity of academic identity politics 
 
Ramon Grosfoguel of UC Berkeley (who seems to be acquiring some of his co-author 
Immanuel Wallerstein’s towering global credibility within World Systems Analysis 
circles today) has drawn academia’s attention to the importance of decolonising 
Southern epistemologies and also to the impossibility of the detached, universal, 
Western God’s eye view: the recognition that mainstream social science is gendered 
and that it has geographical and racial underpinnings. The triumphant Westerner in 
Grosfoguel’s narrative exterminates not only people and peoples (as in South and 
North America, Africa, Asia, Australia and Oceania) but also entire indigenous 
knowledge structures, right after it subjugates a geographical region (Grosfoguel, 
2011). The full subjugation of our own region to transnational capital happened only 
after 1989: the regression in our region in the field of Humanities and social sciences 
is palpable ever since then. 
This statement must be tempered with the knowledge that before 1989, Eastern 
Europe was obviously not free either: most of the region lived under the thumb of 
Soviet state socialism. I consciously avoid discussing the ideological question whether 
the USSR was socialist or state capitalist: I do tend towards a version of the former 
opinion and thus employ the formula of state socialism. Slovak social scientists 
Dobrota Pucherova and Robert Gafrik presented an engaging collection of essays that 
focus on Eastern Europe’s flight from under Moscow’s iron fist in Post-colonial 
Europe? Essays on Post-Communist Literatures and Cultures, a very interesting 
compilation that merits discussion (Pucherova, 2015). The basic problem with the 
editors’ thesis however, seems to me their lack of discussion on the political economy 
of Soviet empire. It is well known that the USSR controlled tightly, the kinds of 
domestic political economies that were tolerated or encouraged within its orbit. 
However, it is also well known that resource extractive classical colonialist/neo-
colonialist methodologies were lacking to such an extent that the cost of maintaining 
Soviet Central Asia, or Central-Eastern Europe under COMECON, was a major 
reason behind the dissolution of the empire and the state itself; in other words, not 
only did the USSR not exploit most of its colonies economically but it usually lost 
resources on them. This is not to say that the colonial or post-colonial paradigm 
cannot be used in relation to our relationship with the Soviet Union; there may be 
reasons and parallels that warrant such treatment. However, what is entirely lacking 
from such a discussion is the realisation that in the economic sense, 1989 actually 
opened up Eastern Europe’s economies, through shock therapies and brutal 
privatisation schemes, to Western capital, this time as a really integrated semi-
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periphery/periphery, and that 1989, despite its calls for emancipation even for 
workers, was hijacked by neo-liberal elites and ended up transforming Eastern Europe 
into a neo-colony in the economic sense.1 The region’s case is special as the 
realisation of how legal sovereignty appeared exactly at the time when economic 
sovereignty was withdrawn, and that this fact made widespread realisation of what was 
happening very hard. It prevents still, a cultural awareness among elites and 
intellectual strata, of the region’s neo-colonial condition, startlingly even when signs 
that point to neo-colonial realities are closest to researchers. Madina Tlostanova’s 
exceptionally brilliant thesis in ‘Can the Post-Soviet Think?’ shows exactly this kind of 
realisation, where she not only talks of the subaltern position of post-Soviet 
researchers but the effects of double coloniality (Tlostanova, 2015).  
Gabor Eross has focused on how sociology assumed a mere data provider 
function in Eastern Europe upon 1989 in an important article in Intersections – and I 
find this should be saluted (Eross and Bartha, 2015). In the field of History, raw data 
collection does not operate as a field independent of the conceptualisation of results; 
hence, entire self-orientalising narratives arrived after 1989 with intellectual mimicry, 
as modalities of individual survival for researchers. Eastern European social thought 
has to recognise that there can, and there should be, epistemologies specific to the 
region, which are markedly different from Western perspectives. We in Eastern 
Europe, and especially Central-Eastern Europe, including social science researchers, 
physically look like members of the dominant groups in Western academia, hence 
academic identity politics has been slow to emerge. It is possible for Hungarian 
historians to assume a quasi Western, American academic persona and identity. In 
such cases however, the authenticity of the voice might be questioned (Szalai, 2015). 
There have been cases where former celebrity historians of the region became 
unabashed apologists for the most triumphal US centred narratives. A disturbing 
example is Ivan T. Berend’s trajectory: his last publication stressed the positive role 
that US companies had played in the rebuilding of Western Europe in openly 
celebratory ways – a real disappointment after his former well earned fame as an 
independent Marxist voice regionally (Berend, 2013). 
The Eastern European Humanities scholar/Historian as academic migrant in 
the Atlantic world might, if he/she so chooses, build an entirely new intellectual 
persona and engage in what Rene Girard, the philosopher, calls ‘acquisitive 
mimesis/appropriative mimicry:’ not only in the sense of appropriating a better salary 
(an enticing prospect no doubt), but also of appropriating a vantage point, a tradition, 
a manner of weighing issues originally alien to the migrant academic. Girard warns us 
that mimicry is a violent process; in this case, most of the violence is done on the 
scholar’s very own self.  
Academic identity politics is not something that Eastern European Humanities 
and social sciences had to focus on formerly: regional output satisfied regional 
demand, and most of it remained within the region, or even within national discourses 
that happened in national vernaculars. However, academic globalisation that brought 
enhanced bonuses for publication in English versus national tongues, is forcing 
Eastern European analysts to face entirely new pressures of asserting group identities 
                                                        
1 
See. e. g. Gowan (1995) 
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within global linguistic mediums and discourses. The dynamic that in the 1970s 
started to characterise US academia (the increasing importance of academic identity 
politics from New Left to feminism, from Black approaches to Latino self assertion, 
from working class credentials to in-the-face religious statements) is today a global 
phenomenon. An academic persona today exists in a contested space where local and 
regional discourses interact with, but ultimately are also judged by, global hegemonic 
discourses in the Gramscian sense. No one will have the luxury of revelling in locally 
or regionally constituted discourses without being scaled by the watchful eye of a 
brutally competitive international discourse where unasserted regional standings do 
not carry currency except if they manage to make their mark on the global whole. 
Eastern European identities are as much historically constituted as most other ones: 
however, our physiognomy’s similarity with Western academics’ makes it difficult to 
revert to fashionable biopolitical explanations and racialist/ethnicist foci, when 
introducing our own difference. In our case, our identities as Eastern European 
researchers have to be based on what it is that we say, especially about our own 
history, and how we can move away from the slavish criminalisation of our own past 
that characterises Western scholarship about our region, and deal instead with our 
significant unsaid, our state socialist legacy in a critical and meaningful way as it offers 
insights into understanding universal questions. Following Grosfoguel, I claim that we 
must understand this: Our viewpoint may not be a God’s eye view of universal 
rationalism – but neither are Western dominated universalisms really God’s eye views 
– as epistemological universalism is today a blatant impossibility (Grosfoguel, 2011). If 
we assert the relevance of our regional historical experience instead of simply copying 
Western externalisations and orientalisations of it, we may do global discourse great 
service. From the Yugoslav experience on workers’ self government to 1956’s similar 
experiments, from state sponsored socialist feminisms to the way how pre-modern 
peasant identities enriched Eastern European cultures under state socialism and 
beyond, from the region’s historical presence in Africa to the organised experiment at 
building a workers’ state in the early USSR; all are achievements that Eastern 
European researchers and academics can be proud of and use when considering 
today’s pressing social problems within and without, the Eastern European region. 
Our current status as providers of morality tales on how the West is always right, and 
how we ourselves are inferior, is an obvious cul-de-sac of thought.   
What the dominant, hegemonic discourse does when it orientalises and 
ultimately dehumanises us Eastern Europeans played out for all eyes to see from 
around August 2015 in the region’s refugee crisis, when instead of explaining how 
local political classes used the crisis to their own benefit (and as Gaspar Miklos Tamas 
points out [2015], as a misguided attempt to safeguard the sub-region’s potential to 
export our labour to the West), academic heavyweights and light hearted media actors 
alike, portrayed Eastern European peoples and cultures as vicious, bigoted, ungrateful 
and evil: exactly the late 19
th
 century image of ‘the ungrateful savage of the Congo.’ 
Participants in academic sub-rational discourses such as the ‘Why We Study Eastern 
Europe’ closed group on Facebook saw such opinions being promoted and played 
out, as when a British participant there ‘joked’ that ‘Hungarian intelligence’ was ‘a 
contradiction in terms’: a type of joke that after the civil rights movement in the mid-
1960s in the United States, academics would never crack about African countries, and 
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naturally so. The regional governments’ buffoonish reactions to these insults as they 
reached the region through mainstream media, were equally vindictive but missed 
entirely, the point of origin of this blame game; which is the bloated general 
superiority complex of Western (non-radical, capitalist) mainstreams vis-a-vis us 
‘Ossies,’ and our recurring constitution in their eyes as (neo-) colonial sub-humans. 
The ungrateful colonial subject is particularly interesting here as it echoes exactly, 
established Western opinions on their own victims before about the Second World 
War in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Although it is obvious that Western 
corporations make much more money in Central-Eastern Europe than what the sub-
region receives through structural funds from the EU; and thus that it is us that aid 
Western development and not vice versa, the (neo-) colonial Western (academic) 
mind seems to require the notion that its inferior should exude gratefulness for his/her 
fate.     
It is important to note that although Western condescension, dismissal and 
discrimination against Eastern Europeans has been a major culture shock for most of 
our new immigrants in the UK (including workers and academics), those phenomena 
are not new at all: so much so that when Agatha Christie herself wanted to describe 
shoddy architecture, she made mention of a Hungarian hunting lodge. Bulgarians in a 
profoundly self-deprecating manner speak of ‘bulgarskata prostotiya,’ ‘Bulgarian 
simplicity’ – as if anyone could offer proof that the ‘average’ Dane or Briton is more 
‘complex’ than the average Bulgarian (if such concepts have any meaning at all in the 
first place).   
However, what is important here is not to advocate cultural neurosis, or a 
regional spin on anti-Western resentment and nationalism. A truly authentic answer to 
Western disdain or our own self-orientalising tendencies would be the celebration of 
our own difference from what constitutes the North-Western European mainstream, 
by way of embracing a multifaceted critical attitude to our own historical heritage. This 
should allow for solidarity with every single actor of good will in the West and would 
also allow us to present ourselves with a pride that has been lacking to a large extent in 
the last thirty years. Pride in suffering and oppression is naturally something that Black 
thinkers know much about: hence my insistence that the African experience is very 
relevant for us.   
 
Radical History as an identity builder in Eastern Europe 
 
Eastern European epistemologies with wider and especially global influence have been 
few and far between. Successful meta-theories or popular commentaries on the 
human condition that emanate from our region have been truly rare. Eastern Europe 
has not been the ground source for major world religions, and has not generally 
excelled in philosophy (our record is better when it comes to the hard sciences, and 
also literature, music, and art in general).   
An obvious exception to our relatively inconspicuous existence in the global 
history of ideas has happened at the intersection of Marxist theory and practice: 
Lenin, Trotskiy, Dunevskaya, Lukacs, Djilas have not only managed to alter the 
course of history within Eastern Europe but also provided the impetus for global 
 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 2 (1): 54-73.   
MAYER, Á.: AFRIKANIZACIJA: EASTERN EUROPEAN EPISTEMOLOGIES AND AFRICAN LABOUR 
66 
applications of the vanguard (Bolshevik) party (from the PRC through North Korea 
and non-Communist South Korea to Taiwan at least as an organisational principle for 
parties such as the KMT), and Eurocommunism and Western Marxisms (in the case 
of Lukacs). Original liberal, libertarian and conservative thinkers have been less 
numerous in the region, and even ‘perennialist philosohies’ of the ultra right that are 
so fashionable in today’s Eastern Europe, originated in France, Switzerland and Italy 
(Rene Guenon, Frithjof Schuon, and Julius Evola are to blame for Putin’s court 
philosopher Alexander Dugin and the Jobbik-enamoured ‘perennialist thinkers’ that 
hail from Debrecen in Southern Hungary today). In a curious way, no major new 
religion ever sprang up from our wider region: Hussites or Transylvanian Unitarians 
have not become important players in spiritual fields of human imagination, and 
Eastern Orthodoxy had also been largely a Byzantine invention.     
A notable recent exception to that general rule has been the world of the 
Satmar rabbinical dynasty that grew out of a minute community under Rabbi Joel 
Teitelbaum and has managed to attract a significant following in the US with its 
message of celebrating both age old Judaic tradition and the world and customs of 19th 
century pre-industrial Satmar. This is an example of an ossified knowledge structure 
that consciously disengages from its immediate environment but one, which has 
provided solace for victims of specifically US kinds of social and psychological 
alienation for its followers. I claim this as most of Joel Teitelbaum’s hassidim in the 
United States were not survivors of his own original kahal in Satmar but baal tshuva, 
new converts, from various secularised and semi-secularised strata of US Jewry (most 
with some links to the Eastern European region though).  
Eastern Europe’s sometimes insular epistemologies and exclusivist public ethos 
has come to light recently with the refugee crisis and the Hungarian, Slovak, Slovene, 
and Polish reaction to it – also highlighting the dangers implicit in historically focussed 
world views. History and historical world views are thus capable of exerting both 
benign psychological influence amid the terror of global capitalist accumulation and its 
onslaught on human integrity (as in the case of Satmar in the US that provides 
comfort and identity amid a hyper-competitive and thus dehumanised environment – 
as a matter of fact Satmar is also well known for its kindly gestures towards 
Palestinians everywhere) or, as harbingers of extreme inhumanity politically (as in the 
case of the use of history in the region’s refugee crisis by the region’s governments in 
2015).  
Simon Winder’s Danubia is probably the most accessible popular work on 
Central and Central-Eastern European (Habsburg) history that appeared in print in 
this decade. Winder sums up the dangers of History in CEE thus:  
 
The extraordinarily toxic legacy of the Empire’s obsession with linguistics, 
archaeology, ethnography, sigillography, numismatics, cartography and so on, 
makes me feel in my darker moods, that the spread of these subjects and the 
use to which they were put was nothing but a disaster for Central Europe and 
that academics more than anyone else are (with help from priests) one of the 
greatest villains. Indeed, in comparison with academics, the politicians and 
military men were mere puppets, with even Hitler simply a disgusting by-
product of various Viennese nationalist and scientific teachings. / The stakes 
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have been so high because each linguistic group has obsessively picked over its 
past not merely out of a wish to entertain itself with fancy-that facts about 
ancestors, but to use it as the key weapon in establishing its ascendancy over 
other groups (Winder, 2013: 5-6).  
 
Winder seems somewhat naive, or averse to theory, when he ascribes such powers to 
the ancillary subjects of History or to History itself. After all, Eric Hobsbawm and 
Ernest Gellner spent significant parts of their respective oeuvres on explaining the 
structural causes for why fervent nationalisms had to appear exactly in CEE (and why 
History and historians often had to be conjurers of myths) (Hobsbawm, 2012; 
Gellner, 2008). 
However, although it is hard to neatly tell apart and separate narratives from 
myths (if not on the basis of forensic factual truths), and although our former 
convictions have waned in the sense that the ‘scientific method’ may be demarcated 
easily from myth-making due to classical Marxist understandings about the nature and 
laws of History; and although our general positivist outlook has been shattered and 
questioned by numerous post-modernist takes, it is still important to recognise that all 
narratives are not equal in their causal strengths, in their intellectual outlook, and in 
their capacity to act as tools, especially in relation to any praxis that takes as its 
reference point, the disenfranchised. Few historians in Eastern Europe have retained 
any interest in the fate of working class people, agricultural labourers, (especially lower 
class) women, the unemployed and the precariate in our region after 1989. Pride in 
striving, effort, and suffering is more difficult to achieve than pride in the glitzy past of 
regional capitalism but ultimately, it will be more rewarding and decidedly more 
realistic.   
 
Corporate tyrannies and the global imperative to avoid them 
 
I claim that in order for Eastern European epistemologies to revitalise and regain 
strength, it is central to reconnect with conceptions of class as well as any other 
conceptual framework that may be of use to agendas of emancipation, as opposed to 
‘weapons establishing ascendancy.’ In a new kind of humility, it may be important to 
reconnect with African labour movements and with the social science that explains 
them, but in this case in the new and unfamiliar role of recipient. African social 
thought has largely been triggered by the colonial and neo-colonial condition with its 
economic, social, political and cultural implications. Their insight into how 
colonialism works may enrich not only social science but also social action and 
activism. 
The historical focus that characterises our own Eastern European 
epistemologies and world views, may furnish us not only with narrative strengths in the 
sense of art, as in the case of high literature, but also with analytical tools to address 
problems of social change. The first source, as always, should be closest to home: it 
should pour from our own historical experience. Africa’s neo-colonial past and 
present may offer us a parable on how corporate capitalism destroys societies: indeed 
as Africa’s extraction economies and low skilled industries thrive under systems of 
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corporate tyranny, governments there act as literal agents of the representatives of 
transnational capital. This landscape may act as potent warning to the historically 
conscious: corporate tyranny is one possible scenario for the future of Eastern 
Europe.  
Examples that draw exactly such a startling picture of the future abound already. 
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, which has been in the news for 
months in early 2016, is thought to include the possibility of corporations’ suing 
national governments when the latter’s regulations harm the former by incurring ‘lost 
profit.’ Such a right, when given to corporations, would undermine the ability of 
national governments, intergovernmental organisations and also the EU’s 
supranational agencies to resist the diktats of capital, as is the general rule in Africa. 
Thus, I claim that it is not in some distant or remote future where a structural 
convergence of Central-Eastern Europe’s largely semi-peripheral economies and the 
peripheral economies of Africa may occur. Given the accelerated rate of change 
associated with the 21
st
 century, this may happen much sooner than we are wont to 
think. Studying African social thought of the 1980s or Gramscian African thinkers of 
the early 2000s (such as Usman Tar) should not be viewed as a weird antiquarian 
occupation or an exotic indulgence: it should have direct implications for our very 
own social theory.   
Endre Sik
2
 (Shiik)’s scholarship on Africa has been much ridiculed recently in 
Eastern Europe and beyond, for serving an obvious ideological purpose as it had set 
the tone for Soviet African Studies for generations – as if the Cambridge History of 
Africa served no ideological purpose beyond the love of knowledge for knowledge’s 
sake... However, expository, exotic and antiquarian interests that manifest in superbly 
meticulous studies are also there for us to celebrate and build on, as immediate 
forerunners of a possible new Eastern European Africa scholarship: in Hungary 
Gabor Bur, Istvan Kende, Gyozo Lugosi, and Mihaly Sarkany’s works on History, 
Security, and Social Anthropology in Africa have provided ample exposure to 
movements of emancipation already, on the African continent. On that basis, it would 
be a befitting and rather grand task for today’s generation to show how in the brave 
new neo-colonial world of global capitalism, ‘the bell tolls also for us’ – while 
providing us with tools that in the Marxian sense, might help us shape our own 
identity, and form our own consciousness.  
 
A note on our current state of knowledge 
 
Naturally, all this has yet to amount to quantifiable, neat, positivist descriptive analysis 
within the framework of the author’s long term research agenda. At this stage, we are 
armed with a recognition, a number of metaphors, and the notion that our sensibilities 
in Eastern Europe and within the Central-Eastern European sub-region, should 
                                                        
2
 Not to be mistaken with the contemporary Hungarian sociologist, Endre Sik. Shiik comes from the 
Russian transciption of his name since he worked until the mid 1940s in the Soviet Union. He is the 
author of the 4-volume History of Black Africa. He was the founder of the Soviet scholarship on Africa. 
See:  Matusevich, (2003). 
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realign with important work that has been done and is being done, in the global South, 
notably including Africa. Quantitative analyses of the convergence between Eastern 
Europe and Africa and the comparative uncovering of their respective political 
economies may come at a later stage in this process. By way of presenting parallels, 
this article hopes to increase appreciation of an understudied and almost forgotten 
branch of human inquiry (African radicalism) and points out how engagement with 
that branch may reinvigorate our own receptivity, sensitivity and difference. The 
material for this article has largely been based on the author’s research for his 
forthcoming monograph Naija Marxisms: Revolutionary Thought in Nigeria (Mayer, 
2016) where a reassessment of 20
th
 century Marxist theory in that country is supplied. 
The lessons of that research included how Marxism in Africa did not represent a 
rootless foreign ideology, but from the 1960s onwards, presented adequate analyses, 
and supplied answers and alternatives, to the ever more startling realities that African 
intellectuals had to confront. The claim of my present article is similar: While it is 
natural that radical analysis has to spring out of the analysis of local conditions in any 
given region, it is also necessary to engage with theory produced elsewhere, to make 
use of comparative opportunities and a plethora of analytical ideas that originate in 
another region of the world. Specifically, this article also identifies a problem of 
attitudes in Eastern Europe where self-negation in the intellectual sense has been 
internalised to such a degree that it makes sense for us to re-engage with the very 
notions of pride and dignity. Especially under conditions of suffering and dislocation, 
this is very difficult. In this sense especially, it has tremendous value for us to learn to 
engage with what Africa has to offer in the vein of African radical movements for 
emancipation. Today, the emancipation of the Eastern European social scientist and 
humanities scholar happens mostly by way of individual mimicry and adjustment 
when subtle shades of accommodation to Western demands are self-engineered by 
participants. This is exactly the way of the colonial subject, uncovered by Frantz Fanon 
at the onset of Algerian independence half a century ago. Today, the realisation that 
Eastern Europe is under neo-colonial exploitation triggers ultra-right reactions exactly 
because of the lack of awareness for global parallels and the marked lack of global 
solidarity that characterises our region to a unique degree. It is the recognition of this 
article that we may discover ourselves in the image of today’s and yesterday’s radical 
African, and that such a recognition will help us regain not only our own solidarity and 
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The research and policy impacts of subjective well-being (SWB) have 
gained more emphasis in the last decade as international agencies 
became aware of its importance. Governments have realised that 
besides the improvements of the economy, the overall life satisfaction 
of citizens are influenced by multiple other factors. An important part 
of SWB is work related well-being – often referred to simply as work 
satisfaction. The nature of work has changed a lot in the recent 
decades due to immense technological development, more people are 
behind desks than ever and in general the structure and policies of 
huge companies have evolved as well. Simply put: life has changed 
substantially, especially for white-collar workers. The way how people 
perceive work has also changed, hence the structure of work 
satisfaction is also different. This paper aims to give an overview on 
results in this domain and to highlight some possible directions in 
future research. First the paper gives an overview on SWB and the 
related research methodologies. Then some current international 
surveys are briefly described that may be used for SWB related 
research and finally recent results on work related well-being are 
shown and some research questions are presented. 
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Happiness is more than money – Easterlin’s paradox 
 
How well a country performs could be measured by many indicators in many ways. 
The simplest, thus most often used indicators are pure economic indicators like 
overall GDP, GDP per capita, annual GDP growth or budget balance measures. 
These are measures demonstrating the output of the economy, the wealth of a nation 
giving an overall indicator about the country. In their simplicity they only indicate how 
well the country does in the economic sense as a whole, yet it does not really say much 
about how well-off the country's residents are. This weakness of purely economic 
measures was already recognised recognized in the late 1960s
2
, yet even today, the 




The most important results emphasising this lack of correlation was that of 
Richard A. Easterlin analysing data in of the USA and other countries spanning 
several decades (Easterlin, 1974). While some results did support the intuitively 
positive relationship between wealth and happiness, some have shed light on 
interesting phenomena. Within the country the basic positive relationship was clearly 
presented by results, but cross-country comparisons didn’t allow such straight forward 
conclusions. The difference in happiness between richer and poorer countries was not 
by far as emphasised as in case of people within the country. A similar phenomenon 
was observed in longitudinal data: despite the massive GDP (and thus income) growth, 
happiness did not increase proportionally in the US between the 1940s and the 1970s. 
The main conclusion derived from this – namely that the happiness of residents does 
not increase systematically with economic growth – later became known as the 
Easterlin Paradox. In his work Easterlin raised numerous important arguments trying 
to point at other directions in explaining this phenomenon. Some of his concerns 
were related to the concept and methodology of happiness measurements, but he also 
raised numerous points related to the behaviour and perception model of humans 
used by economists. He underlines that considering the differences in social 
experiences, underlying social norms and other non-economic features for richer and 
poorer classes and for different countries in general it is vital to understand the 
differences in happiness.   
Later research however has led to interpret Easterlin’s results differently – 
basically further agreeing with the points Easterlin raised about the need for further 
considering social factors, but mainly falsifying Easterlin’s conclusion (Ruut 
                                                        
1
 I would like to thank the MTA TK “Lendület” RECENS research group at the Hungarian Academy of 
Science for the support of this work. 
2  
One may refer to Robert Kennedy’s historic speech of 18 March 1968 
3 
In 2007 this was the prime topic of a conference entitled ‘Beyond GDP’ focusing on ‘… clarify which 
indices are most appropriate to measure progress, and how these can be best integrated into the decision-
making process and taken up by public debate’ (see 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/beyond_gdp/background_en .html). The initiative has fulfilled its goals 
through its report in 2013 (European Commission, 2013) which served as a basis for improving various 
key indicators in the European statistical system. 
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Veenhoven & Vergunst, 2014). The argument of Veenhoven et.al. has been about the 
existence of positive correlation between happiness and GDP
4
, yet the most important 
conclusion that can be drawn from their work was that indeed, there is much more to 
well-being than simple GDP, or income per head. In their work Veenhoven et al. 
have basically tried to control for the other factors influencing happiness to be able to 
clean the effect of GDP. For example one of their findings was regarding Easterlin’s 
explanation of that happiness didn’t increase over time in the US despite the massive 
GDP growth. Easterlin used this data to question the correlation between happiness 
and nation wealth, yet in this attempt – as pointed out by Veenhoven et al. – he 
basically supressed all other variables possibly explaining this phenomenon. One 
contributing factor in this case was the effect of the deterioration of family life clearly 
observable in this period.    
Similar findings were reported by by other studies as well. In a more technical 
approach it was highlighted that absolute (log) household income is indeed correlated 
with well-being (Stevenson & Wolfers, 2008). It is interesting to note though that if the 
correlation gets weaker in higher GDP regions, taking the log of the income could 
partially mask this decrease of correlation. Supporting this, Diener and Suh also find 
that this correlation disappears at richer countries (Diener & Suh, 2000). To put it 
another way, there is a clear, but diminishing marginal effect of GDP on happiness – 
above a certain limit of household income. 
 
Figure 1: Life satisfaction (Cantril ladder 2010 – see later) and GDP/capita (source: Fig 12.3 (OECD, 
2011)) 
                                                        
4 
In his works Veenhoven presents numerous convincing results to support his claim. However it cannot 
be overemphasised that the measurement methodology and the data available to Easterlin was by far not 
as advanced as newly developed happiness measures. He used a 3 level scale to measure happiness and 
in other questions, plus the other items were measured by asking about best and worst life possibilities 
and not happiness explicitly. In his study he also reflected on these drawbacks of the happiness 
measurements used. 
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The concept of subjective well being 
 
So while main economic indicators were still the prime measures used, social 
scientists have designed various measures to monitor people’s well-being or 
satisfaction (Larsen, Diener, & Emmons, 1985). Well-being as a whole however is a 
far more complex phenomenon than simple satisfaction. The term used to capture its 
complexity is ‘subjective well-being’ (SWB) and it is widely used since its proposal by 
Diener (Diener, 1984). As Diener – following numerous earlier studies spanning 
decades of related work – suggests, subjective well-being is defined through multiple 
dimensions. It is not only about satisfaction with life in general, but also includes the 
everyday positive and negative effects people experience in various domains of their 
lives (this adds the ‘subjective’ element). A brief definition given in a later work 
summarises the notion perfectly: ‘a person’s cognitive and affective evaluations of his 
or her life’ (Diener, Oishi, & Lucas, 2003). While the formalisation and 
operationalisation can take various directions this brief definition describes the notion 
of SWB the most accurately
5
. 
Life evaluation consists of people’s perceptions on various domains of their 
lives and some general questions about life. Starting with general satisfaction about life, 
life choices and perspectives the questions may narrow down to several areas. This 
may include evaluations of income, housing, job satisfaction, environment and other 
factors. 
Positive and negative affect include the emotions people experience during 
everyday life. Usually such questions focus on recent events, as these have an 
immediate effect on emotional well-being It is important to note that positive and 
negative affect are not complimentary – the absence of positive affect does not 
necessarily mean negative affect and vice versa. Moreover people are more sensitive to 
negative affect in the short run than to positive affect. However, people can make an 
judgement to describe the overall ‘balance’ of these affects (Kahneman, Diener, & 
Schwarz, 1999), so it is indeed possible to use a single ‘affect balance’ measure. 
To distinguish life evaluation and affect, well-being can also be classified 
temporarily. ‘Hedonic’ well-being refers to short term well-being, mainly associated to 
affect and ‘eudaimonic’
6
 well-being is used in the sense of long term well-being, 
associated with life evaluation. Here the terms of life evaluation and affect are used. 
Besides these subjective measures the objectively measurable items – related to 
the domains of life evaluation – are also prime topics in SWB research. Often these 
are referred to as ‘quality of life’ (QoL) measures. These include – among others – 
income, housing properties, social status, employment status and conditions, 
environmental conditions and health. These factors are important when deriving 
policy implications from SWB data and when country level comparison is done – also 
these are the domains that can be improved with various policies. 
                                                        
5 
Of course it is important to note that the logic of well-being is based on the human needs. The easiest 
way to approach this is referring to Maslow’s pyramid of needs (Maslow, 1943). Although numerous 
works on the field of psychology discuss well-being (for a good review see Diener's various works referred 
here), the main focus of this paper is rather on measurement aspects and results. 
6 
This may also found as ‘eudamonic’ or ‘eudemonic’ well-being in the literature. 
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Often the literature refers to ‘happiness’ as ‘well-being’ which is a 
misconception in some sense. Happiness – being a much ‘older’ notion in both 
practical and psychological sense – may mean multiple things. It can be used to 
describe a temporal emotional state as a result of recent affections and also a general 
emotional state resulting from more stable factors. On the contrary well-being tends to 
be referred to being more ‘stable’ over time as it is influenced by the individual's 
affect, environment and future expectations as well. To avoid confusion in this paper 
the notion of happiness is avoided – unless used explicitly in a referred work. 
Similarly the literature also uses ‘quality of life’ in relation to subjective well-
being. As mentioned above quality of life is usually meant the exogenous factors – 
income, environment, housing, job etc. – of well-being rather than the perception of 
well-being. Quality of life data and its importance will be discussed later and for clarity 
reasons, it is always specified if QoL questions are discussed.   
 
Measurement methods and scales of subjective well-being 
 
Defining a proper measure for well-being has been a prime topic already in the 1960s, 
even though the proper theoretical foundations were not present at the time. Mostly 
the scientific community attributed people’s well-being directly to their happiness. 
One of the first widely known works on this field (in sociology) was done by Wilson, 
discussing the relationship between social factors – age, gender, family status, income 
etc. – and happiness (Wilson, 1967). At this point time happiness was considered not 
too different from the notion defined in Greek philosophy, hence the conclusions 
drawn from data were vague from the vantage point of today’s approach. Wilson has 
given a clear description on an ‘average happy person’ by his social traits: young, 
healthy, well-educated, extroverted, well-paid, religious, married, having high self-
esteem and work morale. His second main conclusion concerned the notion of 
happiness itself – namely that it didn’t develop too much.  
Along Wilson’s measurement there were numerous scales used in the 1960s 
and 1970s using both single item and multi-item measures. The single item scales 
mostly aimed at asking about happiness in general (‘how happy do you feel’ or similar) 
and multi item scales were measuring several aspects of satisfaction and emotional 
affect (for a brief review, see (Diener, 1984). The drawbacks of some of these was that 
they were developed not in a generic way, but to investigate the relationship of 
satisfaction and a specific area. 
A relevant measure from this era is Cantril’s Self-anchoring Striving Scale, or as 
simply known – due to the ‘ladder’ in the question – as Cantril’s ladder (Cantril, 
1965)
7
. This scale basically asks for a general life evaluation (abstracted to steps on a 
ladder, which allows personal interpretations of course) for the present and the close 
future on a 10 level scale. Although it is simple and tempting to be used, it does not 
uncover the underlying factors, yet when this is used the goal is in general not the 
discussion of these, just an overall indication of life satisfaction. Hence it has limited 
use, but due to its robustness it is still in practice today – used as a measure for life 
satisfaction. 
                                                        
7 
See the appendix on the questions in Cantril’s ladder. 
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The first really widely used measure – also used nowadays as remarked later – 
is the ‘Satisfaction With Life Scale’ (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985; Pavot, 
Diener, Colvin, & Sandvik, 1991). It is a very simple measure directly asking 
respondents about life satisfaction on different aspects per se
8
. This multi-item 
measure consists of 5 questions each of which can be evaluated on a 7 level scale, 
resulting in 35 points in total. The responses are equally weighted (points are summed 
up practically) to produce the SWLS index of a person that is classified to seven 
categories. Diener et al. claim that the factor loadings in the SWLS scale components 
are relatively even (0.61-0.84) and the overall SWLS correlations with other previous 
measures are also significant. 
These measures have been used to survey well-being in various countries with 
different economies and social structures. The results obviously being different, it may 
be important to investigate the impact of the inter-country differences on the validity 
of the measures. There are numerous points where asking about satisfaction and 
happiness in different countries may lead to significantly different opinions when 
controlling for other factors. Two important factors are the wording of the survey 
questions
9
 and the approach to happiness in the given culture. 
Diener has reported on studies exploring samples of Asian students reporting 
on happiness (Diener, Suh, Smith, & Shao, 1995). He has found that indeed in the 
Asian sample, different SWB was reported compared to USA samples. Ouwenheel 
and Veenhoven on the other hand have analysed several studies and concluded that 
the differences in SWB are indeed due to the well-being provided by the states to 
their citizens (Ouweneel & Veenhoven, 1991). Two decades later Veenhoven revisited 
this question with more recent data and he reached similar conclusions (Ruut 
Veenhoven, 2012). Hence here we may thus assume that the SWB results are not 
significantly distorted by the differences in the cultural background of Western 
countries and post-socialist countries. 
 
General findings on subjective well-being and social factors 
 
In one of their works Diener et al. have numerous findings about SWB (Diener, Suh, 
Lucas, & Smith, 1999). They concluded based on results from the preceding decades 
that a substantial part of an individual's SWB is attributable to the personality and it is 
also heritable. Naturally both social and cultural environment are contributing factors, 
but they also conclude that those pursuing materialistic goals attain lower SWB levels 
due to the interference of these goals with other prosocial and self-actualisation goals. 
The latter conclusion also supports Easterlin’s paradox on the micro scale. 
Further evidence on the questionable direct effect of income was presented as 
well (Diener & Suh, 1997). In general the time series of the US, Japan and France 
have shown very small deviations between 1946 and 1990 (slightly decreasing for the 
US in this period). The data obtained did not cover the entire period, so the post-
world war effects were not observable for France and Japan, but a few data points 
                                                        
8 
See the appendix on the questions in the SWLS scale 
9
 There are many connotations of ‘happiness’ in different languages. It may mean hedonistic happiness, 
or it may be closer to satisfaction. 
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show a recovery from a lower level of SWB (as the war waged on in the country as 
well as opposed to the US).  
Diener and Suh also investigate other findings of Wilson finding that religion 
explains only a very small ratio of SWB and is probably correlated to the cognitive 
affect and marriage is – as expected – positively correlated to SWB. An important 
conclusion corresponds to the age effect, which was again put into question. First of 
all, the differences in the emotional sensitivity of the elderly was not considered at all 
in the SWB measurements, hence the positive (and negative) affect scores were not 
properly calculated. As with age the affect’s influence on satisfaction decreases, the 
measured SWB will also decrease unless the data is controlled for this effect. 
Moreover, a generic satisfaction measure (overall satisfaction) did not support 
Wilson’s conclusion that a happy person is young. 
Gender didn’t have a remarkable effect on SWB either (although it is 
important to note that affects are more intense in the case of women than men), 
neither does intelligence. In terms of job satisfaction an opposite relation was 
suggested by Diener and Suh, namely that people more satisfied with their lives tend 
to have higher satisfaction in their work as well. Education was also correlated to 
SWB, but in this case probably the direct effects of being educated (higher income 
and social status) have to do more with the increased SWB. 
Another interesting phenomenon about income was noted by Kahneman and 
Deaton, who concluded based on their results, that there is a given limit of income for 
emotional affect and hence for SWB. Under a certain income negative emotional 
well-being is experienced, but above that limit positive affect is not observable either, 
only the negative affect diminishes. This subjective limit is individual and relates to the 
minimal needs of emotional well-being (Kahneman & Deaton, 2010). This is similar 
to the figure of GDP and overall satisfaction, in the lower regions of income a clear 
correlation can be observed, but as it reaches a certain level, it largely decreases, or 
disappears even. All this evidence shows that although the Easterlin’s paradox is not 
unfounded, the question of happiness or well-being is indeed much more complex 
than how much is in one’s wallet. 
The relationship between the components of SWB is also interesting. Ideal 
measures would be completely independent, but of course as was already noted this is 
not the case, as affect does have an effect on life satisfaction and vice versa. According 
to OECD data (collected between 2006 and 2010) life satisfaction, positive and 
negative affect are also correlated (OECD, 2013a)
10
. As it is expected, negative and 
positive affect are negatively correlated, which is in line with the results of Kahneman 
and Deaton. More importantly though, life satisfaction is also correlated to positive 
and negative affect, but the correlation is weak
11
. Hence although they are not ideal 
measures, they are not correlated to the extent to significantly distort results. 
Besides the life satisfaction, affect and social variables, the objective and 
perceived quality of life measures are also very important. Quality of life measures 
                                                        
10 
Data used in this analysis derived from using Gallup World Poll results. The positive and negative affect 
was obtained by creating indices from questions related to affect and life satisfaction was measured using 
the Cantril ladder. 
11 
The correlation is ~0.23 between life satisfaction and affect (both positive and negative) 
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include numerous items (some of which may also be classified as social factors): direct 
financial status, housing, living environment, health conditions, work conditions etc. 
Some of these items can be measured objectively providing a good basis for 
comparison, but their perception is also often recorded in the surveys. Using the 
perceived QoL data enables a more accurate mapping of factors influencing overall 
life satisfaction as well.  
In terms of international surveys the importance of quality of life measures is 
that it provides basis for the cross-country comparison and also it provides context for 
interpreting the SWB results in general. When considering a cross-country or cross-
regional comparison also generic QoL data can be used – for example information on 
the average income at a region, regional specifics about the environment and housing 
conditions. As shown later, numerous relationships were investigated using such data 
that allowed to establish some general trends and conclusions. 
When the QoL data is recorded in the surveys it is often used to create indices 
– both objective and perceived data. As SWB has a high dimensionality, such indices 
ease the analysis – of course the structure of the various indices strongly influences the 
results. It is particularly important in case of cross-country comparisons to make sure 
that indices with similar meaning are used. 
Also temporal and contextual effects are to be taken into account. The best 
example of this is the effect of major life events (both personal, and ones affecting a 
huge portion of the population). Such a recent event is the 2008 crisis, which had a 
clearly measurable effect on SWB (Deaton, 2012; Welsch & Kühling, 2011)
12
. It had a 
direct effect on income and other social factors (housing, job loss, etc.) that affected 
the perception of safety and then satisfaction in general. 
Contextual effects also include the cultural differences as well. Similarly to the 
influence of personality the cultural traits also determinants of the structure of SWB. 
It was found in numerous studies that SWB results differ significantly between 
different nations (or minorities). While these results can partially be explained by the 
different economic status of nations and minorities, a key determinant was their 
culture (Diener et al., 2003). 
 
  
                                                        
12 
Deaton has investigated the issue also analysing the stock market and has found that it moves very much 
together with the SWB results. A reason for this – besides the direct relationship to other economic 
factors – is that the stock market also ‘calculates’ future expectations in prices similarly to how such event 
influences one’s life satisfaction and expectations. 
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Measuring SWB – international surveys 
 
Along with the scientific progress on the issue of well-being, more and more questions 
about well-being were included in international surveys. Most importantly these 
surveys aimed at gathering information for comparative analysis of the participating 
countries. Some major international surveys to mention are the World Value Survey 
(WVS), the surveys run by OECD, EU sponsored surveys (Eurostat, Eurobarometer 
and Eurofound surveys), the Gallup World Poll aimed at well-being
13
 and the 
European Social Survey (ESS)
14
. 
The purpose of these surveys is different, hence the quality-of-life related 
questions targeted different domains as well. The WVS was indeed focusing on 
values, so well-being was only lightly emphasised. Surveys by the OECD and Eurostat 
on the other hand were strongly focusing on SWB, as their purpose was policy 
oriented. The Gallup World Poll also has a wide scope both in terms of well-being 
and background variables and the ESS has good coverage on many SWB domains as 
well. In the following these will be briefly analysed, while their results are briefly 
discussed. The results will focus on Hungarian data where available.  
 




The Eurobarometer is the earliest survey run including life satisfaction related 
questions having a long timespan (it has entered into its fifth decade) and was mainly 
run in EU countries along with the expansion of the EU. Its big advantage is that it is 
run twice a year, hence very dense longitudinal data are available. The drawback of 
the survey is that it focuses on opinions and attitudes towards EU related or in general 
politics related variables, but does not include the variables required for detailed 
analysis – questions on perceptions and QoL related questions, except for a few basic 
ones. The survey includes however an explicit question on life satisfaction measured 
on a 4 level scale (Not satisfied at all, to Very satisfied) that enables a brief longitudinal 
analysis. 
 
b. Eurostat surveys 
 
Among the other surveys run by the EC, Eurostat focuses on Quality of life indicators 
in their survey – similarly to OECD, they based their indicators on the 
recommendations of the Stiglitz/Sen/Fitoussi Comission. The first (and so far only) 
                                                        
13 
The Gallup poll is also worth mentioning. It is also referred to in OECD publications and the well-being 
related research is only a small part of Gallup’s activities. Although some results will be referred too, the 
Gallup World Poll will not be analysed in this paper in detail. 
14 
There are of course other initiatives as well about measuring well-being, for example the New Economic 
Foundation (http://www.nationalaccountsofwellbeing.org/), whose goal is proposing international 
measures for well-being. However as no longitudinal data is available and there are no details on the 
samples used (responses collected on-line) it is not considered here. 
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implementation of these indicators was done in the 2013 EU-SILC
15
 survey. The 
survey itself is being used since 2004 and the last available dataset is dated 2013, the 
results are gathered by the statistical agencies of the EU member countries.    
The SWB module of the survey includes numerous questions about the 
psychological side of SWB (emotional affect) alongside questions aimed at 
satisfaction. The psychological questions include questions ranging from anxiety and 
calmness to more abstract topics – like the meaning of life. Many questions focus on 
satisfaction with different domains (accommodation, job etc.), but there are only 
general questions about overall satisfaction on the domain. Hence this survey will not 
be used further. 
 
c. European Quality of Life Surveys 
 
The EQLS survey is run by Eurofound and is a European cross-national household 
survey having been run in 3 waves so far. Run every 4 years, it was started in 2003 and 
it is at its next run in 2016. It contains complex question blocks on all aspects of 
subjective well-being putting emphasis on perceived and actual quality of life. The 
blocks include questions about housing conditions, health conditions, family 
conditions (and family life), time usage and work-life balance. 
Obviously the main focus of the EQLS surveys is a European comparison 
rather than producing country specific analysis. The results concerning Hungary are in 
line with the Eurobarometer data for life satisfaction.  
The model of subjective well-being in the EQLS consists of 5 areas adding 
‘psychological functioning’ and ‘social well-being’ to the three commonly mentioned 
components life satisfaction, positive and negative affect. 
 
World Value Survey (1982-) 
 
One of the earliest international surveys including SWB questions is the World Value 
Survey (WVS). Already in its first wave of 1982, questions on happiness and 
satisfaction on various aspects (World Values Survey, 2014) were found. There were 
in total 6 waves so far with expanding scope as more and more countries joined in. 
Hungary was present in the first wave (1982), wave 3 (1995-1998) and wave 5 (2005-
2009), but did not take part in the other three waves. 
The questions concerning satisfaction in the WVS did not follow the structure 
of the SWB questions as mentioned explicitly. The questions resembled Cantril’s 
ladder – although the formulation of the question didn’t mention ‘ladder’ – asking for 
satisfaction on a 10 level scale. In the first wave numerous similar questions were 
raised. They related to past comparisons, future expectations, job satisfaction, 
household income satisfaction and ‘home life’ satisfaction (this notion allowed some 
free interpretations, but it resembled satisfaction with family life). In the following 
waves however, fewer and fewer questions concerned these matters, leaving only life 
satisfaction and household income satisfaction in the latest survey of 2014.  
                                                        
15
 SILC refers to ‘Statistics on Income and Living Conditions’ 
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On the other hand another important aspect, emotional affect is included in 
many questions. Happiness is surveyed explicitly, measured on a 4 level scale and on 
many domains (including job and family). There were always questions regarding the 
current emotional state of respondents and the affect experienced in the recent past.     
So while the questions in the WVS are not completely in line with the structure 
outlined in the literature, the multi-item scales proposed by Diener et al. can be 
derived from the survey. Moreover the surveys contain questions mapping the 
contributing factors – namely surveying the importance of the various fields – hence 
more complex relations can be directly investigated. 
The biggest drawback of the WVS is that it does not survey quality of life 
measures. So while happiness and satisfaction can indeed be investigated, there is no 
good way to really see connections to exogenous or some social variables (social 
status).  
Currently the WVS is preparing its seventh wave, which is scheduled to be 
surveyed in the period of 2017-2018. Although the questionnaire has not been 
finalised yet, it is already clear, that SWB and happiness will be among the topics of 
the survey.  
 
European Social Survey (2002-) 
 
The European Social Survey (ESS) is cross national survey run biennially since 2002 
in European (not necessary EU) countries (plus Israel). The surveys focus on many 
areas that are mainly related to attitudes (various domains including politics, media, 
human values etc.), behaviour (media consumption) and well-being. These topics 
were common in each round, but besides them there was always a specific topic 
recorded in a ‘rotating’ block of questions – these include attitudes towards 
immigration, welfare state, personal and social well-being etc.   
The SWB block is in the ‘core’ block of the survey, which means that it was 
included in each round of the survey – currently included in 7 waves already. Both life 
satisfaction and happiness is recorded explicitly in the survey using an 11 level scale (0 
to 10). Besides these perceptions there are also a number of QoL related questions 
and attitudes towards other domains relevant for SWB. The ‘human values’ block of 
this questionnaire provides better insight on the structure of well-being as well, as it is 
composed of queries on the importance of various life domains. 
Considering the questions present in the ESS, its frequency and the range of 
responders (covering a relatively stable set of European countries), the ESS provides a 
solid dataset for investigating SWB from various aspects. 
 
OECD Surveys (2011-) 
 
Well-being and life satisfaction has been measured specifically by the OECD only 
since the past decade
16
 – as scientific and mainstream interest started focusing more 
                                                        
16 
The research of well-being is conducted by the Better Life Initiative within OECD. The framework 
used in well-being research was established based on results produced in 2009 together with the 
Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (including Joseph E. 
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and more on these issues. The research conducted by the OECD focuses entirely on 
well-being, hence questions spanning all domains may be found in the OECD survey. 
A considerable part of the survey focuses on environmental and natural issues – this is 
due to the interest of OECD in sustainable development in general and is indeed 
gaining importance based on latest results. 
The OECD framework is show in Figure 2 (from an earlier OECD 
publication), this already outlines the complexity of the OECD surveys. Different 
domains of well-being are described along 11 indicators in total, each consisting of 
multiple items. These include both objective and subjective measures, included in 
both self-reported and exogenous (country specific) variables. 
There were three reports published by the OECD (OECD, 2011, 2013b, 2015) 
spanning the OECD countries with their data. In this aspect the OECD data is much 
broader than the VWS, yet since this initiative is relatively new, no long-term analysis 
may be done using that data
17
. Being an OECD country, Hungary has participated in 
each wave. 
 
Figure 2: the OECD framework for measuring well-being (OECD, 2011) 
                                                                                                                                               
Stiglitz – a strong critic of Easterlin’s paradox – and Amartya Sen), also known as the Stiglitz/Sen/Fitoussy 
Commission. 
17 
Note however that another study of the OECD gives a broad longitudinal analysis on well-being (van 
Zanden et al., 2014) – obviously summarising only the evolution of living conditions (material and 
environmental) 
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This framework (and the structure of the survey) resembles that of the EQLS surveys 
in the aspect of individual well-being. The different types of capital mentioned in this 
framework are an improvement compared to the EQLS model, as they are treated as 
exogenous variables. Hence comparisons can be made not only based on perceived 
QoL variables.  
The results of the SWB measurements are quantified in the ‘Better Life Index’, 
which basically implements this framework. The index consists of indices covering the 
areas identified by the framework: housing, income, jobs, community, education, 
environment, civic engagement, health, life satisfaction, safety and work-life balance. 
This covers the data that is required to investigate most SWB questions. The 
weakness of this framework lies in the complete absence of emotional affect (neither 
positive nor negative affect are surveyed) – this omits investigating hedonic SWB 
completely, but gives a wide range of QoL data to use. 
 
Results on subjective well-being – trends in the past few decades 
 
In the aforementioned surveys subjective well-being is measured in several ways in 
different surveys along multiple dimensions. Measurements have been using various 
scales (4, 7, 10 or 11 level) and the dimensions surveyed covered different areas with 
different weights depending on the purpose of the survey. Most notably, the quality of 
life variables have been treated differently. Here a short analysis is given on SWB 
trends in the past few decades with specific emphasis on results in Hungary in 
comparison to the other Visegrád countries – Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. All of them being post-socialist countries they serve as a solid base of 
comparison. 
First of all it is important to define important periods in Hungary. The first 
period before 1990 signifies the last decade of the communist regime; then the years 
1990-1995 correspond to the recession after the regime change. The years following 
1995 were characterised by a boost in the economy and this period ended in 2004 
upon joining the EU. The next period are the first 4 years in the EU until the crisis in 
2008. The crisis years were 2008-2010, which are followed by the cycles of the current 
government (2010-). 
So, to cover these periods it is interesting to look at the trends obtained from 
various databases (mainly ESS, WVS, and databases of SRI
18
) showing results in 
Hungary. These numbers show an almost constant decline in SWB data since the 
regime change (the data in 1999 probably being an outlier – this unlikely change can 
probably be explained by sampling issues).  
                                                        
18 
SRI refers to TÁRKI 
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Figure 3:  Mean life satisfaction in Hungary and the other Visegrád countries measured on a 11 level 
scale from various databases
19




These data show a steady, very slowly descending SWB value, which didn’t change 
significantly until the 2008 crisis and the 2010 elections (after which it reached its 
negative peak). More interesting results can be seen if happiness data are also taken 
into account. The data in the following figure are from the WVS (on-line accessible) 
and we can draw somewhat different conclusions from these results – a reason for the 
difference could be the sampling methodology. 
The other Visegrad countries did much better in the 2000s and are rapidly 
approaching the SWB level of the US. As the data shows, all these countries did 
benefit from joining the EU, in each country the SWB increased steeply after 2004. 
As expected the world crisis had its effect on them as well, with Poland being the only 
exception where the constant rise did not halt even temporarily.  
 
                                                        
19 





See http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/countries/hungary/ for this data 
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Figure 4: Happiness and life satisfaction in Hungary in the WVS data (1981-2009)21 
 
The data on happiness show clear differences between the different eras in Hungary 
before, spanning the second economy decade, the regime change, and the pre/post 
European Union membership. Unfortunately no data is available from the post-crisis 
period in the WVS. 
Starting from the last decade of the communist regime, Hungary was indeed the 
‘merriest barrack’ among the post-socialist countries, with around 70% of people 
reporting being very happy or quite happy, and the same ratio reporting a life 
satisfaction of at least 6. After the change of the regime the immediate recession is 
clearly observable in the data, people reporting decreased happiness and much lower 
life satisfaction. Then life satisfaction moved together with happiness with the only 
exception of the 1994-1998 period, when despite the continuous decrease in life 
satisfaction, the happiness levels rose. In general the medium-term effects of the 
transformation from a socialist (with higher social and job security) to a capitalist-
liberal (weakening of the welfare state) regime can be observed in life satisfaction data. 
                                                        
21 
The data presented here were obtained from the on-line data analysis of the WVS accessible at 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp  
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The post EU period brought an improvement in the economy increasing both 
financial and social security and increasing life satisfaction as well to the post-regime 
change level.  
To provide a short summary, we can conclude that in Hungary the collapse of 
the communist regime had the strongest effect on SWB among the recent major 
events in the country’s history. Comparing Hungary to the other Visegrád countries 
based on this data we may see that EU membership did not have the expected 
positive impact on Hungary in this group. It is also notable that the GDP per person 




International results on work related well-being 
 
Importance of work related well-being 
 
Usually when referring to work related well-being, the objective outcomes of high job 
satisfaction are considered: the work output. While it has been proven before, high 
job satisfaction does indeed have a positive effect on productivity (Bryson, Forth, & 
Stokes, 2014; Judge, Thoresen, Bono, & Patton, 2001), such management oriented 
issues are not in the focus of this paper. 
As was discussed in the previous sections, subjective well-being is composed of 
many factors, work satisfaction being one of them. Obviously since people spend at 
least a third of their day at work, the well-being during this period is a key contributing 
factor to overall well-being. In fact as Heliwell et. al found, the social aspects of work 
have a comparatively strong influence on overall life satisfaction (Heliwell & Huang, 
2005).  
Hence here not only ‘job satisfaction’ is addressed, but also its components as 
for example the social aspects of a job (responsibility perceived during work, creativity 
required for work) are also related to higher needs and influence life satisfaction 
directly. 
The last few decades brought various changes on the field of labour. Not only 
did the employment rate increase in most OECD countries even despite the 2008 
crisis (OECD, 2011), but there were huge changes in the contents and nature of work 
due to the boost in technology. The ratio of blue collar workers and jobs has 
decreased while the demand for skilled white collar workers has increased
23
. Besides 
this change another common phenomenon is related to globalisation – that is 
outsourcing and off-shoring white collar work. It has numerous impacts on the way of 
working, on people interacting each other and also on the role of work perceived by 
the worker. 
The most important technical change that made this available was of course the 
introduction of computers into various fields of work. This completely changed the 
work done by the white collar workers and indirectly impacted on blue collar workers 
                                                        
22
 Based on World Bank data. 
23 
In the case of the US the ratio of skilled white collar workers has doubled between 1920-1980 and then 
increased by another 50% until 2010 (Katz & Margo, 2013). 
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as well (Marteen Goos, 2013). It is probable that these changes will further speed up 
in the close future. There were numerous changes in the work and working conditions 
of white collar workers specifically; the work is less and less routine work, the office 
may or may not exist due to remote working and also with the sharing economy 
becoming an ever wider spreading trend (requiring highly developed technological 
infrastructure) and work contracts have also changed. All these affect how work is 
perceived by the workers and how it affects everyday life and general well-being, hence 
the work related well-being structure of white collar workers is an exciting topic. 
The importance of work satisfaction and well-being perceived during work can 
be also demonstrated through its weight in everyday life. As also the WVS data shows, 
work is the second important domain in life behind family – in the last two decades in 
Hungary always at least half of the respondents has valued it ‘very important’ in life 
(on a 4 level scale) in the WVS surveys.  
 
 
Figure 5: The importance of various life domains in Hungary using WVS data 
 
Over the past decades work has not lost its second place in this ranking, being 
significantly more important than friends, leisure time or even religion. Hence it is 
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Results on work related well-being 
 
Although the main topic of this section is work related satisfaction, the purpose is to 
raise questions and inspire research about investigating work related well-being of 
white collar workers. The international surveys described earlier provide a wide range 
of data regarding work related well-being. Besides a short analysis, a recent study is 
highlighted here giving a good example on how these issues may be investigated and 
providing some interesting results.  
A recent work by Hajdu and Hajdu presents a concise study on work 
satisfaction and its components on a European sample using the fifth wave (run in 
2010) of the ESS (Hajdu & Hajdu, 2014). The sample size in Hungary in this wave 
was 521 and the country is ranked in the mid-range for work related satisfaction with 
the average of 7.21 on a 10 level scale. The authors have used the complete ESS 
dataset, where all relevant information (active-working responders, who also provided 
their income) was available (with a total of 15,875 responses used). 
In their study Hajdu and Hajdu focused on eudaimonic well-being and 
consider the emotional affect also in the long term through properties indirectly (e.g. 
like help received from colleagues). They investigated the effect of objective and 
perceived (subjective) work properties on work related well-being. The ESS includes 
numerous questions on both objective and subjective work properties, and surveys the 
quality of life as well. In the paper the focus is on all these aspects besides numerous 




The main methodology of the study was OLS regression, but looking at the 
bivariate correlations between the different aspects of work and work satisfaction is 
already interesting. The ESS data shows that the variety of work done has the strongest 
correlation to work satisfaction followed by job security and learning new things during 
work
25
. These were followed by the help gotten from colleagues, possibility of 
advancement and influence on the work
26
. Although these correlations are not strong 
(0.33 being the strongest), it is interesting that health risks, leisure time and the ease of 
finding a new job were not correlated to work satisfaction (income was not included).  
There were three models tested by Hajdu and Hajdu: one containing purely 
subjective measures, another containing only objective measures and a third one 
containing all subjective and objective variables. Clearly the subjective work properties 
have more effect on work satisfaction, with the coefficients being stronger for the 
properties mentioned before (variety of work, job security and learning new things). 
Higher income in general brings higher work satisfaction and the negative effect of 
overtime is due to worse evaluation of subjective work properties. Interestingly the 
employees at private enterprises are at a disadvantage in work satisfaction compared 
with governmental employees (despite the higher average income). 
                                                        
24 
International Standard Classification of Occupations, it was encoded in 10 categories in the survey. 
25 
Variety had a coefficient of 0.33 while the others were both around 0.27. 
26 
Each three almost head to head with a correlation of 0.23. 
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Investigating the differential effects
27
 shows somewhat different results, here the 
work-life balance has a strong effect together with work variety and advancement. 
Work security also has a stronger effect, but surprisingly the effect of flexible working 
hours is not relevant. Note, that ‘flexible working hours’ was not analysed in details
28
. 
Hajdu and Hajdu also compare the Western and Eastern European countries 
underlining several key differences
29
. Earnings are a much stronger factor in work 
satisfaction for Eastern European employees followed by the lack of advancement and 
work-life balance problems.  
The data also highlight differences between graduate employees and employees 
not holding a degree. For degree holders the variety of work and learning new things 
has more impact on work satisfaction, while income had a higher impact for those 
without a degree. For our topic the former group is much more interesting as we can 
assume that degree holders are the group from which white collar workers are 
recruited. In the following conclusions the studies and surveys reviewed in this paper 




In this paper a brief review was given on subjective well-being and the international 
surveys that could be used to investigate SWB. A particular focus was work-related 
well-being, more specifically the role of subjective and objective measures of well-
being. The surveys reviewed here contained items focusing on hedonic and 
eudaimonic subjective well-being as well, hence the most important properties of 
SWB are well covered. Also they included various countries (mostly European) in the 
sample, hence cross-country comparisons are also feasible using the databases.  
The variety of these surveys can provide insight into various aspects of well-
being. The World Value Survey focuses mostly on attitudes towards certain properties 
of living, describing perception of attitudes, but it is short on quality of life related 
information.  
The EU funded surveys (Eurobarometer, Eurostat, EQLS and ESS) cover wide 
areas and present a large scale of relevant information: explicit questions on both 
hedonic and eudaimonic properties SWB, broad QoL overview and often good 
details on specific SWB fields. Among these surveys the ESS is the easiest to access 
and already provides a good range of information enabling various topics for analysis. 
The EQLS gives more detailed QoL information than the other surveys, yet due to 
                                                        
27 
Assuming that an independent variable jumps from the lowest to the highest category. 
28 
In case of when flexibility means that the daily 8 hours of work may be shifted with an hour (from 9-17h 
to 8-16h), this may not be perceived as something significant as opposed to a flexibility which allows e.g. 
that some working hours are spread on different workdays to allow other types of activities (family, 
medical or governmental administration related) to be conducted during working hours. 
29 
In Europe in general there is a significant difference in the work satisfaction between Western and 
Eastern European countries (basically post-socialist countries). It was previously found that although the 
‘iron curtain’ was physically been destroyed, it still exists in terms of work satisfaction (and other 
properties) (Lelkes, 2003). 
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the lack of wider SWB blocks (it has blocks on different aspects of SWB) only a 
general SWB-QoL relationship can be investigated. 
The OECD also provides a good framework for SWB research and the current 
waves already produced interesting results. It is already possible to do comparisons 
between the different waves, but with further waves it will be a good source for 
longitudinal studies. Since it includes non-European countries as well, even wider 
comparisons can be done. 
In each of the aforementioned surveys at least some questions related to work-
related satisfaction are included. Starting from the simplest explicit question various 
objective and subjective work properties are surveyed along which the different types 
of workers can be investigated.  
The last few decades brought a change in the work itself as higher and higher 
proportions of managerial and technical professional work is done in the offices as 
white collar work. The tools of this work have also changed with technology and the 
geographic and language barriers are nowadays also disappearing. In these 
circumstances it is obvious that the attitude to work, the expectations of work and how 
work influences people’s well-being is also changing, hence it is a relevant subject for 
research.  
The data available now in these databases through these surveys can give insight 
to numerous features of this change. How is work itself valued in life? When deriving 
satisfaction from work, how important do we consider work-life balance, the 
advancement we can make in work, the variety of the jobs we do? Do we ‘mix’ our 
social life with work more frequently nowadays? How does the relationship between a 
company and an employee influence the employee’s overall SWB? 
While these questions have always been relevant, nowadays it will become 
more and more important to answer them both from managerial viewpoints and from 
the policy-maker’s perspective. It serves so that both the employees’ interests in 
enjoyable work and the companies’ interests in a productive working environment can 
be considered when national governments or the management of companies are 
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The Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS) 
 
The following text is authored by Ed Diener and may be downloaded freely (Diener, 
2016). 
 
“Below are five statements that you may agree or disagree with. Using the 1 - 7 scale 
below, indicate your agreement with each item by placing the appropriate number on 
the line preceding that item. Please be open and honest in your responding. 
 
7 - Strongly agree  
6 - Agree  
5 - Slightly agree  
4 - Neither agree nor disagree  
3 - Slightly disagree  
2 - Disagree  
1 - Strongly disagree 
____ In most ways my life is close to my ideal.  
____ The conditions of my life are excellent. 
____ I am satisfied with my life. 
____ So far I have gotten the important things I want in life. 
____ If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing. 
 31 - 35 Extremely satisfied  
 26 - 30 Satisfied  
 21 - 25 Slightly satisfied  
 20        Neutral  
 15 - 19 Slightly dissatisfied  
 10 - 14 Dissatisfied  
 5 -  9   Extremely dissatisfied” 
 
Cantril’s ladder  
 
The following text describes how Cantril’s ladder is implemented in the Gallup 
World Survey. It may be accessed freely (Gallup Inc, 2016). 
 
“The Cantril Self-Anchoring Scale, developed by pioneering social researcher Dr. 
Hadley Cantril, consists of the following: 
 Please imagine a ladder with steps numbered from zero at the bottom to 10 at 
the top. 
 The top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom 
of the ladder represents the worst possible life for you. 
 On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at 
this time? (ladder-present) 
On which step do you think you will stand about five years from now? (ladder-future)” 
 
ZOLTÁN ÁDÁM AND ANDRÁS BOZÓKI  
State and Faith: Right-wing Populism and Nationalized 
Religion in Hungary 
                                                        

 [bozokia@ceu.edu] (Central European University, Budapest, 
Hungary) and [zoltan.adam@kopint-tarki.hu] (Department of 
Comparative and Institutional Economics, Corvinus University of 
Budapest, Hungary and Kopint-Tárki Institute for Economic Research) 
 
Intersections. EEJSP                     









Our paper explores how populist radical right-wing forces re-interpret 
religion, and re-frame Christianity in a non-universalistic, nationalist 
way to legitimize their rule in Hungary. Populism is considered as an 
anti-elitist, anti-institutional political behavior that identifies with ‘the 
people’, and enhances their ‘direct’ participation in the political 
process as opposed to representative government. Populism has an 
ideological character but in itself does not have a particular ideological 
content. As a form of government it is based on popular participation 
with limited public contest for power. Although neither Fidesz nor 
Jobbik appeared before the electorate as a deeply religious political 
party, both of them have portrayed themselves as socially 
conservative, ‘Christian’ nationalists. This implied a form of 
institutionalized cooperation between them and the large historical 
Christian churches. The Orbán regime demonstrates that radical 
right-wing populism employs a quasi-religious ideological construction 
through which it attempts to mobilize a wider social spectrum: ethno-
nationalism. This surrogate religion offers a nationalist and paganized 
understanding of Christianity and elevates the concept of ethnically 
defined nation to a sacred status. 
 
Keywords: populism, radical right, religion, Christianity, nationalism, Hungary.
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The relation between right-wing politics and religious world views in Central and 
Eastern Europe in general and in Hungary in particular has been subject of recent 
academic research (Enyedi, 2000 and 2003; Máthé-Tóth and Rughinis, 2011; Pirro, 
2015; Minkenberg, 2015). This inquiry fits into the long-standing research interest in 
religious interventions into politics and the role of the church in shaping policy 
decisions (Koesel, 2014; Grzymala-Busse, 2015). In this paper we argue that although 
in Hungary the relationship between right-wing populism and religion is of secondary 
importance only in setting the right-wing political agenda, historical Christian churches 
take part in providing legitimacy for right-wing populism.1 We agree with those who 
argue that Fidesz is not a moderate center-right conservative party any more due to its 
political radicalization driven by party president and prime minister Orbán (Mudde, 
2015). The governing Fidesz party2, and its far-right (semi-)opposition Jobbik3, that are 
both considered to be radical right-wing populist parties, in turn, make religious 
references to signal their traditional social values and identification with the societal 
mainstream. While Jobbik tends to mainstream extremism, Fidesz radicalizes the 
mainstream. 
As Hungary has been fairly secularized, right-wing populist parties cannot afford 
to appear in front of the electorate as political representatives of churches or religious 
values. Yet, both Fidesz and Jobbik tend to refer to religious values and to seek 
church support as we will show. As a result, a link between right-wing populism and 
religion has been created in Hungarian politics in the previous 25 years, following 
long-standing historical patterns originating from the inter-war period. Meanwhile, 
liberal and left-wing parties have rather promoted secular ideologies. The divide 
between leftist/liberal-centrist versus anti-communist parties thus has appeared 
following the classic secular vs. confessional cleavage (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). 
In the following, first we will present our understanding of political populism. 
Secondly, we will discuss the rise of right-wing populism in Hungary and its 
dominance since the end of the 2000s. Thirdly, we will look at the role of religion in 
right-wing politics and the relation between churches and right-wing parties. Fourthly, 





                                                        
1
 ‘Right-wing’ in East Central Europe is defined in cultural rather than economic terms. It usually 
contains (ethnic) nationalism, social conservatism, elements of religious traditions and historical 
references to patriotism (Kitschelt, 1992). 
2
 Since 2003, the full name of the party: Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség (Fidesz – Hungarian Civic 
Alliance). From 1989 to 1995 the party used the name Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége (Alliance of Young 
Democrats) which was changed to Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Párt (Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Party) in 1995. 
As of 1995 the name Fidesz is no longer an abbreviation but a noun. 
3
 The full name of the party: Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (Movement for a Better Hungary). 
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1. Populism as politics of under-institutionalization 
 
We consider populism as an anti-elitist political ideology, sentiment, and movement 
which contrasts the interests of the ‘pure people’, often presented as oppressed and 
innocent, with the oppressive, corrupt elite and its foreign allies. Populists favor ‘the 
people’ over any other options (Canovan, 1981; Mudde, 2007; Kriesi and Pappas, 
2015). As Edward Shils famously observed, ‘according to populism the will of the 
people enjoys top priority in the face of any other principle, right, and institutional 
standard. Populists identify the people with justice and morality’ (Shils, 1956: 97). As 
Shils’ definition implies, for populists, people’s justice, independently from its actual 
content, is regarded more important than the procedures of the rule of law. 
When electorally successful, populist parties come to power and form 
government. As they initially represent an anti-elitist and anti-institutional stance, their 
administrative performance may well run into difficulties, and they often under-deliver 
on promises. Yet, the Fidesz administration in Hungary since 2010 has demonstrated 
that populist parties can be successful in power, and their administrative performance 
might well be sufficient to get re-elected. Fidesz managed to combine anti-elitism, 
nationalism and an anti-EU stance with a pragmatist approach in most policy areas, 
presenting a charismatic leadership, allegedly defending the national interest and those 
of ordinary people. 
Populism does not have a particular and permanent ideological content but 
rather an anti-elitist approach to politics that has sought political mass-mobilization 
and mass-participation in the political process (Laclau, 2005). In this sense populism 
is truly ‘democratic’ even if it fails to live up to (or openly rejects) the constitutional 
norms of liberal democracy. While engaging in mass-mobilization, populist parties 
tend to manipulate the public discourse by using mass media outlets and advocating 
their own (often ideologically defined) world views. These ideological contents might 
be nationalistic, xenophobic, anti-gay, anti-liberal, anti-western or, anti-Semite, anti-
Arab, anti-Muslim or, for that matter, even neoliberal: the only criteria is that along 
the particular ideological content populist political entrepreneurs must be able to 
perform top-down mass-mobilization. Once this requirement is attained, populism 
can serve various ideological purposes: it can be nationalist, socialist, semi-fascist or 
even neoliberal (Bozóki, 2015a). Populism might extend any of these ideas as the 
unifying and homogenizing idea of the nation. Therefore, populism can be described 
‘as the militant use of political partisanship for the sake of overcoming pluralism in 
partisan views and creating a unified opinion, that is to say, by making one partisan 
view representative of the whole people’ (Urbinati, 2014: 109).  
Populism in power can be also understood as a way of governance in which 
power is personalized and its execution organized along personal relations. This has 
to do with permanent mass-mobilization as a means of popular legitimation: as formal 
political and administrative institutions need to be sufficiently fluid to allow for mass 
participation in politics, the organizing principle of power resorts to personal 
authority. Populism promises broad inclusion of the society but usually end up in 
producing a new vertical political setting. ‘Simplification and polarization produce 
verticalization of political consent, which inaugurates a deeper unification of the 
masses under an organic narrative and a charismatic or Caesarist leader personating it’ 
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(Urbinati, 2014: 131). Populism represents a certain regression towards pre-
democratic politics in an era of mass-democracy when political legitimation is 
conditioned on the open expression of mass political will. Yet, such a popular 
legitimation process typically takes place under illiberal or semi-authoritarian 
conditions that insure the continued power of the ruling populist party of government, 
while curtailing the opposition’s chances to raise an effective electoral challenge.  
This illiberal or semi-authoritarian rule is, however, not always easy to 
maintain.4 The open expression of political will requires a degree of formal 
institutionalization of the political process — a condition populist governments have 
difficulties to cope with once they start losing popularity. In fact, the loss of popularity 
in case of populist governments easily turns into loss of legitimacy: i.e., the loss of the 
popular belief that those in government justifiably exercise power even if their policies 
are harmful for some part of the electorate and hence do not enjoy unanimous 
approval. In consequence, populist governments typically try to maintain their 
popularity even at very high long term economic costs. Because of the type of 
legitimacy populist governments enjoy, such economic policies can still make sense 
politically on the short run (Sachs, 1989; Dornbusch and Edwards, 1989). This was 
mainly a characteristic of left wing populism in Latin America that sought popular 
legitimation through the inclusion of under-privileged social classes. Neoliberal 
populism, in turn, pursued market reforms and maintained economically sustainable 
but politically increasingly oppressive policies (Gibson, 1997). None of these regimes 
led toward liberal democracy. 
However, all types of populism tends to rely on charismatic, personalized rule, 
in contrast to the impersonalized, rational bureaucratic legitimacy characteristic of 
industrialized Western societies (Weber, 1978 [1922]). Traditional and charismatic 
legitimacy in a Weberian sense do not require any formal act of mass-approval of 
power. Populism, on the other hand, is based on formal approval of governance by 
people, and populist political regimes in this sense belong to the tradition of 
modernized, secular power. However, as a result of weak political institutions, 
bureaucratic legitimacy is typically not sufficient to preserve political stability in 
relatively less developed societies. Therefore, charismatic legitimacy continues to play 
a dominant role, along with formal mass-approval of power.5 Hence, populism in a 
Weberian context can be labeled as an attempt to rationalize, and thus justify, 
charismatic rule, in which political leaders themselves become institutions and power 
tends to be personalized. 
In other words, populism is a shortcut for establishing the missing element of 
impersonal institutions. In the absence of sufficiently strong civil societies and political 
institutions, populism makes up for the missing element of bureaucratic legitimacy.6 
                                                        
4
 For the consequences of under-institutionalization in authoritarian regimes see (Gandhi, 2008). 
5
 To be sure, charismatic and traditional legitimacy play a crucial role in mature liberal democracies as 
well. Identification with particular politicians, their personal characteristics and capability to represent a 
set of ‘sacred values’ in a particular society remain to be decisive elements of democratic political life 
(Williams, 2015; Berrett-Koehler and Hofstede, 1997). 
6
 In line with this observation, the critique of technocratic, impersonalized power in modern societies 
emphasizes the positive role of populism in making society once again the dominant political actor 
instead of professionalized technocratic elites (Laclau, 2005). 
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However, a political regime based on a personalized way of governance, lacking 
rationally organized bureaucratic institutions remains predictably unstable (Horowitz, 
1992). This fits our conceptual framework: as personal authority in populism tends to 
substitute for institutional authority, the loss of popularity of leaders tends to create 
systemic crises, while the transfer of power from one leader to another is typically a 
great challenge for a populist government.  
Populism uses a direct style of expression to address its followers. It is a politics 
that opposes intellectual sophistication, it displays a lack of any ambiguity, relies on 
passion, emotions, and religious worship. In short, populism is the ‘politics of faith’ 
(Canovan). Populist leaders are often tempted to rely on the infrastructure of the 
Church in order to substitute the missing links in the ‘infrastructural power’7 of the 
state, particularly at times of crises. By ‘outsourcing’ this infrastructural power to the 
Church populist leaders can maintain their power over the remnants of state 
institutions that perform the vital function of coercive power 
Modern democratic populism in the post-WWII era can be interpreted as the 
substitute of totalitarian politics in a period of mass democracies (Ionescu and 
Gellner, 1969).  Modern populism originally appeared in South America where 
illiberal politics was less discredited than in Western Europe. Modern populists, such 
as Argentina’s Juan D. Perón, managed to combine popular participation with the 
oppression of the political opposition (Laclau, 1987). As an observer put it, ‘populism 
emerged as a form of authoritarian democracy for the postwar world; one that could 
adapt the totalitarian version of politics to the post-war hegemony of democratic 
representation. While it curtailed political rights, populism expanded social rights; and 
at the same it put limits to the more radical emancipatory combinations of both’ 
(Finchelstein, 2014: 467).  
Hence, populist governments are typically ‘democratic’ in the sense of seeking 
mass-approval of power, but they build ‘illiberal democracies’ in which governments 
are not constrained by the rule of law, and impose a majoritarian approach of 
governance, systematically exploiting political minorities, and ensuring their 
reelection by using public resources. They approximate Robert Dahl’s ‘inclusive 
hegemony’ that allows for limited participation but curtails contest for political power 
(Dahl, 1971). Some populists tend to use plebiscitarian mass support in order to 
transform established institutions into more ’flexible’ ones. They concentrate power 
in the hands of the president, limit debates, strike at opponents, and tend to use state 
resources and state apparatus for campaigning. They seek to deconstruct democratic 
accountability by eliminating safeguards against arbitrary rule. Other populists favor 
market economy, they also push for undemocratic constitutional changes and 
embrace an increasingly personalist leadership style and the practice of rule by 
‘emergency’ decrees. Leaders in both camps tend to dismantle checks and balances, 
intimidate the opposition, attacking the privately owned media, co-opting civil society 
organizations and trying to build new ‘civic’ organizations from the top down (Cf. 
Mazzuca, 2013; Weyland, 2013). Contemporary populist phenomena include 
                                                        
7 
For distinction between infrastructural and coercive power and a detailed analysis of dimensions of state 
power see Mann (1984, 1986). 
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‘videocratic forms of popular identification, simplified polarization of public opinion 
into niches of self-referential creeds, dogmatic radicalization of political ideologies, 
and the search for a winning leader in the age of the public’ (Urbinati, 2014: 133). 
Populist leaders tend to selectively disregard the norms and procedures of liberal 




2. The populist takeover of Hungary 
 
Strengthening of right-wing populist and extreme nationalist movements across 
Europe has puzzled democratic theorists and worldwide observers alike as a trend that 
would seem to be incompatible in the purportedly liberal democracies in which they 
are taking root. In the nearly three decades since the collapse of communism in the 
former Soviet bloc, countries in East-Central Europe have struggled to create a 
democratic legacy and propel their societies towards democratic futures. In Hungary 
— although the Round-table Talks of 1989 led to a democratic arrangement and 
nonviolent transition from communism to a market economy and democracy 
(Bozóki, 2002) — many Hungarians have become disillusioned by their post-transition 
situation. A sense that democracy was ‘stolen’ from Hungarians has arisen and that a 
new transformation must be undertaken if Hungary is to be truly vindicated after 
centuries of indignity under various imperial powers and then under communism.  
A 2009 Pew Research report measured public opinion of democracy and the 
current state of affairs in post-communist states. Tellingly, 77 per cent of Hungarian 
respondents indicated their frustration with the way Hungarian democracy had 
worked within the time period of 1991-2009, and 91 per cent of Hungarians thought 
that Hungary was not on the right track.9 Approval of democracy in Hungary 
immediately following the fall of communism was at 74 per cent, whereas by 2009 this 
figure had fallen eighteen percentage points to 56 per cent.10  
In 2010, shortly after these survey results were published, Orbán’s nationalist 
Fidesz party won the elections with an absolute majority, which was translated, due to 
the disproportionate electoral rules, into a two-thirds parliamentary supermajority. 
Not insignificantly, Jobbik took 17 per cent of the vote in addition to Fidesz’s 53 per 
cent, representing a noteworthy increase in radical right wing representation in 
Hungarian elections. 
Using its two-thirds parliamentary majority, Fidesz altered the constitutional 
system. Not only did they introduce a new constitution, but they also changed 
electoral rules and fundamental laws, governing the relationships among government 
bodies and between the government and the citizenry (Bozóki, 2011; Korkut, 2014). 
                                                        
8
 For analyses of the Orbán regime see Bozóki (2011, 2015b, 2015c, 2016), Csillag and Szelényi (2015), 
Kornai (2011, 2015), Körösényi (2015), Magyar (2015, 2016), Pataki (2013), and Ungváry (2014). 
9
 For more details see ‘Two Decades after the Wall's Fall: End of Communism Cheered but Now with 
More Reservations.’ (2009), The Pew Global Attitudes Project. Pew Research Center, November 2, 
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The authoritarian turn was carried out using the two-thirds parliamentary majority 
only, lacking any meaningful concession to the opposition and without a referendum 
or other institutionalized way of popular approval of the new Fundamental Law that 
replaced the Constitution of 1989. The Fundamental Law suffers a critical lack of 
legitimacy, and hence will be relatively easy to modify by a future liberal democratic 
majority (Kis, 2012). However, perhaps the most shocking aspect of the Fidesz 
takeover from a liberal democratic viewpoint has been the fact that even this restricted 
legitimacy seems to represent a larger, more extensive popular political appeal than 
the pre-2010 liberal democratic regime did. In this sense, the right wing populism of 
Fidesz that is in many ways based on exclusionary policies appear to be more 
successful — and for some key electoral groups more inclusive — than the left-wing 
populism of previous center-left coalitions had been. Whereas Fidesz exercises 
authoritarian rule and exerts strict state control over society and economy, center-left 
governments maintained liberal democratic institutions and pursued inclusive policies 
through providing economically unsustainability social provisions.11 Whereas Fidesz 
built an economic clientèle, the center-left let multinational companies run the 
economy. By introducing a flat personal income tax, Fidesz increased the taxation of 
lower incomes and reduced that of higher ones. It also provided large tax allowances 
for high earning middle class families — and in real terms much smaller ones for low 
earners. Hence, it redistributed money from the relatively poor to the relatively rich, 
relying on the political support of the latter, but also gaining popularity among the 
former as a nationalist government providing law and order after the ’two chaotic 
decades of transition’. 
Increasing economic problems after 2006 were widely associated with the 
failure of liberalism and the political Left. The fact that left-wing governments 
privatized national assets both in the 1990s and the 2000s — according to right-wing 
parties, allegedly benefiting former communist oligarchs — pushed the right-wing 
electorate to adopt simultaneously anti-communists and anti-capitalist attitudes. The 
visible rise in foreign direct investment reinforced their perception of liberal elitism 
and crony-ism between a ‘comprador bourgeoisie’, made up by former communists 
and multi-national capital. In short, the economic crisis of the 2000s alongside the 
insustainability of populist economic policies played a major role in the de-
legitimization of liberal democracy (Korkut, 2012: 60).
  
At the June 2009 European parliamentary elections, center-right Fidesz gained 
56 per cent of popular votes whereas far-right Jobbik received 15 per cent. Next, in 
the spring 2010 national elections, Fidesz received 53 per cent and Jobbik got 17. Due 
to the disproportional electoral system, Fidesz’ victory was transformed into a two-
thirds parliamentary majority. Left-wing and centrist parties together gained less than 
20 per cent of parliamentary seats. The takeover by the populist Right was completed 
politically and ideologically12 and a new, anti-liberal regime was established. Liberal 
democracy has been replaced by an illiberal one, and later on, since the unfair 
                                                        
11
 For a discussion on economic policies prior to 2010 see Ádám (2015). 
12
 On Hungarian populism see Bozóki (2015a) and Enyedi (2015). 
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elections of 2014, by a hybrid regime, a mix of democratic and autocratic practices.13 
In a hybrid regime, formal democratic institutions exist and are viewed as the primary 
means of gaining power, but in which incumbents’ abuse of the state brings them a 
significant advantage against their opponents. Even if such a regime is competitive, it is 
not democratic due to the uneven playing field favoring them, created by the 
incumbents.14  
 
3. Radical right populism and politicized christianity 
 
Historical Christian churches had been traditionally strongly affiliated to right-wing 
politics in inter-war Hungary, providing popular legitimacy for the Horthy regime15 
that relied on the so called ‘Christian national middle class,’ and considered itself 
anti-liberal, anti-Semitic and strongly nationalist. ‘Christian’ in this context first of all 
meant non-Jewish: reducing the economic, social and cultural influence of the 
generally highly assimilated Hungarian Jewish community was a primary ambition of 
the regime. Hence, Hungary introduced a cap on the number of Jewish university 
students as early as 1920, which is considered the first anti-Jewish Act of 20th century 
Europe (Kovács, 2012). As a historian of the inter-war period explained: 
In the Horthy era, Hungary can be described as being under an authoritarian 
political system, operated under a multi-party parliament and government. At 
the same time, the rule concerning the right to vote were far from democratic, 
with state institutions serving the governing conservative party. (…) [It] had an 
overwhelming majority in the parliament, something that made it practically 
impossible to transform the existing political system. (…) The regime also had 
its own official ideology, known as ‘Christian nationalism’. The latter blamed 
liberal legislation during the period prior to 1918 for weakening the ‘spiritual 
unity’ of the Hungarian nation, something it claimed could only be guaranteed 
by Christianity. Therefore, after 1920, Church and State were indissolubly 
linked to the whole of the regime and took on a ‘Christian character’, implying 
a complete sharing of interests between the historical Christian Churches and 
the Hungarian State (Fazekas, 2015). 
Fidesz and Jobbik are in many ways successors of inter-war political parties. Fidesz is 
the current dominant right-wing social conservative party that, in line with Dahl and 
Finchelstein, allows for participation but severely limits contest for power. As a 
governing party, it has staged ‘National Consultations’ along with mass advertisement 
campaigns, a ritual of masquerading its (often repressive) policies as the result of 
direct participation. Through its government-sponsored ‘civil society organization’, 
called the ‘Forum of Civil Alliance’, it has staged mass rallies called ‘Peace Walks’ as 
                                                        
13
 For the empirical analyses of transformation of liberal democracy into a hybrid regime in Hungary, see 
Bozóki (2015b, 2016), Magyar (2016), Ungváry (2014). 
14
 For more detailed analyses of hybrid or mixed regimes see Levitsky and Way (2010) and Bunce and 
Wolchik (2011). 
15
 Miklós Horthy was Regent of Hungary in 1920-1944. For an historical assessment of the Horthy 
regime, see Ungváry (2012). 
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a means of mass mobilization to protect the national interest against ‘external 
enemies’ such as the IMF and the EU, and to express solidarity with the government. 
In a classic authoritarian fashion, Fidesz has hijacked the entire state and made it its 
own political and economic asset, refusing the principles of limited government and 
the system of constitutional checks and balances, curtailing the prerogatives of the 
(otherwise already diluted) Constitutional Court and undermining the institutional 
autonomy of the judiciary system. Finally, the new voting system has given Fidesz an 
even larger electoral advantage than a dominant party had enjoyed in the 1990-2010 
electoral system, resembling the structural political conditions of the inter-war period 
at an increased level of participation. 
Jobbik, in turn, represents the far-right opposition of the ruling party, following 
the tradition of the Arrow Cross movement that ruled Hungary in 1944-1945 during 
the Nazi occupation. It rejects the social and political principles of the European 
Union, campaigns for a strategic alliance with Russia and other eastern powers, and 
mobilizes against the Jewish and Roma minorities. Fidesz and Jobbik have both 
attempted building a mass movement around themselves: whereas Fidesz created the 
network of ‘civic circles’, Jobbik built a paramilitary group in uniform, the Hungarian 
Guard. Since the transformation of Jobbik from movement to party is widely 
documented (Mikecz, 2015; Tóth and Grajczjár, 2015), in the following we focus on 
their position within the camp of populist radical right and their political relationship 
to religion.   
Fidesz and Jobbik both operate outside the realm of liberal democracy. They 
both campaign for the extreme right vote, resulting in a strongly nationalist populism 
in both of their cases (Cueva, 2015; Dobszay, 2015; Krekó and Mayer, 2015; Mudde, 
2015). This required Fidesz to adopt increasingly illiberal policies so that maintaining 
its political dominance and a parliamentary supermajority since 2010. (Fidesz kept its 
two-third parliamentary majority at the 2014 general elections, labeled as free and 
unfair, but lost it a year later as a result of a local by-election.) Consequently, the 
political center shifted further to the right, polarizing left and right and making it more 
difficult for political moderates to appeal to a mass electorate.16
 
One of the most intriguing questions from our point of view is whether the 
politicization of religion has played a significant role in this further right shift. Our 
answer is no: Hungarian right-wing populism, performed by Fidesz and Jobbik in an 
increasingly similar ideological fashion, has used limited religious references in the 
post-1989 era. The most important reason for this, we argue, is the limited role of 
churches and religion in the Hungarian society.  
 
  
                                                        
16
 This is by no means a new phenomenon in Hungarian politics, though. Polarization had been a 
characteristic of Hungarian politics since about the mid-1990s (Karácsony, 2006; Körösényi, 2013). 
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Table 1. Ratio of believers/non-believers in international comparison. Source: Smith (2008) 
Percent of respondents who claim that ’I don't believe in 
God’ 
Percent of respondents who claim that ’I know 
God really exists and I have no doubts about it’ 
Germany (East) 52.1 Japan  4,3 
Czech Republic 39.9 Germany (East) 7.8 
France  23.3 Sweden  10.2 
The Netherlands 19.7 Czech Republic 11.1 
Sweden  19.3 Denmark  13.0 
Latvia  18.3 Norway  14.8 
Great Britain 18.0 France  15.5 
Denmark  17.9 Great Britain 16.8 
Norway  17.4 The Netherlands 21.2 
Australia  15.9 Austria  21.4 
HUNGARY  15.2 Latvia  21.7 
Slovenia  13.2 HUNGARY  23.5 
New Zealand 12.6 Slovenia  23.6 
Slovakia  11.7 Australia  24.9 
Germany (West) 10.3 Switzerland 25.0 
Spain  9.7 New Zealand 26.4 
Switzerland 9.3 Germany (West) 26.7 
Austria  9.2 Russia  30.5 
Japan  8.7 Spain  38.4 
Russia  6.8 Slovakia  39.2 
Northern Ireland 6.6 Italy  41.0 
Israel  6.0 Ireland  43.2 
Italy  5.9 Northern Ireland 45.6 
Portugal  5.1 Portugal  50.9 
Ireland  5.0 Cyprus  59.0 
Poland  3.3 United States 60.6 
United States 3.0 Poland  62.0 
Chile  1.9 Israel  65.5 
Cyprus  1.9 Chile  79.4 
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Although Hungary is certainly not particularly an atheist society, a clear majority 
refuses to follow churches and to participate in institutionalized religious activities. 
Whereas a revival of churchgoing had taken place after 1989, a large part of society 
still distance themselves from churches and religious references. Hence, appearing to 
be overly devoted towards religion and churches may alienate a substantial part of the 
electorate from any particular party. 
Although József Torgyán’s Independent Smallholder’s Party (FKgP)17 in the 
1990s renewed the historic party slogan of ‘God, Fatherland, Family’, Christianity 
itself played a limited role even in their relatively old fashioned right-wing populism.18 
As representatives of current right-wing populism, neither Fidesz nor Jobbik defines 
itself through a religious identity, although in party manifestos both of them claim to 
be ‘Christian’. Yet, Christianity in this context rather signifies a degree of social 
conservatism and traditional nationalism than expressing any substantive religious 
reference.  
As for Fidesz, party leader Orbán regularly participates in the festive Catholic 
processions, known as Szent Jobb Körmenet (Sacred Right March) held on the 
anniversary of the foundation of the Hungarian state, August 20, every year. In the 
meantime, he openly identifies his own political camp with ‘the Nation’ and takes his 
opponents as the ones who serve ‘foreign interests’. The turn from their original anti-
clericalism in the late 1980s and the early 1990s to their openly positive stance 
towards religion never played a highly important role in the history of Fidesz. A recent 
book on the history of the party — published by a semi-official publishing house of 
Fidesz — does not even discuss the role of religion in the formation of party ideology 
(Oltay, 2012).   
The new Fundamental Law adopted in 2011 was the result of a unilateral 
governmental process, which did not reflect at all a national consensus. This Law, 
voted by Fidesz MPs only, refers to Hungary as a country based on Christian values 
(Bánkuti, Halmai and Scheppele, 2015). The text increases the role of religion, 
traditions and ‘national values’. In contrast to the Constitution of 1989, the 
Fundamental Law of 2011 serves as expression of a secularized national religious 
belief system: a sort of paganized, particularistic understanding of the universalistic 
spirit of Christianity. The signing of the Fundamental Law by the President of the 
Republic took place on the first anniversary of the electoral victory of Fidesz that 
happened on Easter Monday, April 25, 2011, blasphemously claiming a bizarre 
parallel between the resurrection of Jesus and the adoption of the new Fidesz 
constitution (Bozóki, 2015b).  
Fidesz uses religious symbols in an eclectic way in which references to 
Christianity are often mentioned together with the pre-Christian pagan traditions. By 
politicizing Christianity in this contradictory manner Orbán aims to reconcile 
conflicting cultural frames in the minds of Hungarians. This approach refers to the 
idea of ‘two Hungaries’: the Western Christian, and the Eastern pagan, tribal one. 
                                                        
17
 The full name of the party: Független Kisgazdapárt (Independent Smallholder’s Party) 
18
 József Torgyán, an old-school populist politician, served as Minister for Agriculture and Rural 
Development and the Development of Countryside at the first Orbán-cabinet between 1998-2001. Five 
years after his resignation he published a book on Christianity (Torgyán, 2006). 
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When Orbán talks about the reunification of the Hungarian nation, he intends to re-
balance power relations between the two camps. He aims to ‘Christianize’ the pagan 
traditions — or rather, to paganize Christianity to accommodate it to the needs of the 
Hungarian nationalist right — when he brings together seemingly incompatible 
religious symbols. In his vocabulary, the Holy Crown of Saint Stephen, the first 
Hungarian king, who introduced Christianity in Hungary, can easily go together with 
the Turul bird, a symbol of pre-Christian, ancient Hungarians. The concept of 
political nation gave way to the ethnic idea of national consciousness. On inaugurating 
the monument of ‘National Togetherness’, Viktor Orbán voiced his conviction that 
the Turul bird is the ancient image into which the Hungarians are born:  
 
From the moment of our births, our seven tribes enter into an alliance, our 
Saint King Stephen establishes a state, our armies suffer a defeat at the Battle 
of Mohács, and the Turul bird is the symbol of national identity of the living, 
the deceased, and the yet-to-be-born Hungarians (Orbán, 2012). 
 
He conjectures that, like a family, the nation also has a natural home — in this case, 
the Carpathian Basin — where the state-organized world of work produces order and 
security, and one’s status in the hierarchy defines authority. The legitimacy of the 
government and the Fundamental Law is not only based on democratic approval, but 
it is approved by God, and features the spirit of Hungarians represented by the Turul. 
All these concepts have replaced an earlier public discourse whose central categories 
were liberal democracy, market economy, pluralism, inalienable human rights, 
republic, elected political community, and cultural diversity.  
 As for Jobbik, research proves that its pro-Christian stance simply indicates that 
the party should be interpreted as ‘non-Jewish’.19 By using this discourse, Jobbik 
creates an easily identifiable reference to its antiSemitism. Founded in 2002 from a 
conservative university movement, Jobbik’s official ideological standpoint in their own 
terms is that of a 
 
principled, conservative and radically patriotic Christian party. Its 
fundamental purpose is protecting Hungarian values and interests. It stands 
up against the ever more blatant efforts to eradicate the nation as the 
foundation of human community. Its strategic program takes into 
consideration the possibility of the crumbling of globalization as we know it 
in a chain reaction due to its internal weaknesses and its disconnect from 
the real processes of the economy. The party considers the protection, 
replenishment and expansion of the national resources crucial. These 
include the physical and mental condition of the nation, patriotic 
togetherness and solidarity (Jobbik, 2006). 
 
This ideology is that of a radical right-wing party ‘whose core element is a myth of a 
homogeneous nation, a romantic and populist ultra-nationalism directed against the 
concept of liberal and pluralistic democracy and its underlying principles of 
                                                        
19
 Political Capital Institute: Research on religion and right-wing politics. Budapest, 2011. 
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individualism and universalism’ (Jobbik, 2006).
 
In addition to this nationalist rhetoric 
there is an underlying economic appeal that blames globalization for Hungary’s 
troubles.  
Pirro identifies Jobbik by its clericalism, irredentism, social-nationalist 
economic program, and by its anti-Roma, anti-corruption, and anti-EU stance. The 
party believes that ‘national morality can only be based on the strengthening of the 
teachings of Christ’, and Jobbik promotes the spiritual recovery of Hungarians which 
has to be achieved by returning to the traditional communities, i.e., the family, the 
churches, and the nation (Pirro, 2015: 71). True, Jobbik was particularly militant 
against the Roma and against the EU (burning an EU flag and throwing out another 
one from the window of the Hungarian parliament). It was also vehemently pro-
Christian in installing large wooden crosses at several squares of Budapest. 
Nonetheless, as others explain: 
 
Scapegoating against the Jews and Roma is not what makes Jobbik exceptional 
in Europe today. (…) The solutions that Jobbik proposes to solve Hungary’s 
problems not only signal an anti-liberal, anti-Semitic, anti-Roma, anti-capitalist, 
anti-European, and anti-globalist stance (positions that may be shared by other 
European right-wing parties), but also appear to be historically and culturally 
hostile to the West (Akcali and Korkut, 2012: 602). 
 
Although Jobbik enjoys the support of certain members of both the Catholic and the 
Calvinist Churches neither church in general approves of Jobbik and most church 
leaders tend to distance themselves from it. Despite its manifestly Christian self-
identification, Jobbik is seen by many of them as representing an essentially pagan, 
anti-Christian cultural tradition. This might not be accidental. In fact, despite 




Percentage of atheists in party voter camps 


















FIDESZ Total LMP MSZP Jobbik
 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 2 (1): 98-122.   
ÁDÁM, Z. AND A. BOZÓKI: STATE AND FAITH: RIGHT-WING POPULISM AND NATIONALIZED 
RELIGION IN HUNGARY 
111 
Graph 1. Source: Political Capital Institute (2011) 
 
Whereas the followers of churches seem to represent the highest share among Fidesz 
voters, their ratio is a mere 22 per cent, followed by 15 per cent among Socialist 
voters. Again, followers of churches represent a conspicuously low 6 per cent among 
Jobbik voters. At the same time, explicitly non-religious people have the highest share 
among Jobbik voters (41 per cent), and their share, interestingly enough, is lower 
among Socialist voters (21per cent) than among the Fidesz electorate (22 per cent). 
 
Table 2. Answers to the question ‘How much religious are you?’ among voters of parliamentary parties 
(in per cent of the particular party’s total electorate). Source: Political Capital Institute (2011) 
 I am 
religious, 







my own way 
I am not 
religious 









22 51 22 5 1 100 
Jobbik 6 43 41 9 1 100 
MSZP 15 57 21 7 1 100 
LMP 4 51 35 9 1 100 
 
While Fidesz has probably been the most preferred political party by Christian 
churches since at least the beginning of the 2000s, and Prime Minister Orbán has on 
numerous occasions identified himself as a Christian believer, Fidesz has established a 
strategic alliance with the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP), a dominantly 
Catholic historic party, since 2002. As part of their agreement, KDNP has been 
provided a sufficient number of parliamentary seats to form its own parliamentary 
faction and is also allocated a generous number of government positions when they 
are in power. In exchange, KDNP has effectively given up its separate political identity 
and become a Fidesz-satellite, endorsing its ‘Christianity’ by its sheer name. 
Although certainly not disliked by the Catholic Church, Fidesz probably has 
closer ties to the Calvinist Church, Hungary’s second largest congregation. Orbán 
himself is Calvinist and one of its closest political confidants, Minister of Human 
Resources, Zoltán Balog was a Calvinist pastor before joining professional politics. 
Orbán likes to attend religious ceremonies and to deliver semi-public speeches in 
churches. Correspondingly, Fidesz’s relation to Churches is friendly but not strongly 
institutionalized. Yet, Christianity in general serves as a broad ideological reference, 
and at some politically prominent instances this reference becomes more concrete. 
For instance, in the new ‘Memorial of the German Occupation of 1944-45’ on 
Szabadság tér, a central square in Budapest, Hungary is represented by Archangel 
Gabriel, being attacked by the German imperial eagle. This is a highly controversial 
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new memorial that seeks to modify the public discourse on Hungary’s role in WWII, 
depicting the country as a victim rather than a perpetrator. In this context, Hungary is 
represented by the Archangel, providing an obviously religious reference for national 
identity politics. Nevertheless, Fidesz typically refrains from directly advocating 
hardcore religious ideas that may alienate people. We explain this by the fact that 
Fidesz is a large umbrella organization, ‘the party of power’, and its voters typically do 
not nurture strong religious identities. Therefore, while using religion to justify its 
populist policies, Fidesz have to keep a delicate balance. 
 
Graph 2. Share of religious congregations in Hungary (in per cent of the total population). Source: 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office, census data 
 
Somewhat similarly, Jobbik does not appear to be a representative of religious 
interests either. In contrast to other right-wing populist parties of the region, for 
instance Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland, it does not appear to be the protagonist of 
religious values. In contrast, it sometimes seems to nurture pagan affiliations, 
cultivating a longstanding relation of far-right or Nazi political culture to pre-Christian 
paganism. However, just like Fidesz, Jobbik also has its own direct links to the 
Calvinist Church with one of the most prominent Budapest pastors being an explicit 
supporter while his wife, another Calvinist pastor by profession, being an elected 
Jobbik MP. 
The particular congregation run by this couple happens to be located on 
Szabadság tér in Budapest, in about 50 meters from the German Occupation 
Memorial. On the staircase of the church, already on private property but facing the 
entire square, is a bust of Admiral Horthy, a present day extreme right political icon, 
who in fact fought the extreme right parties of the 1930s and 40s, and incarcerated the 
leader of the Arrow Cross movement, Ferenc Szálasi, who subsequently replaced him 
as head of state in October 1944 with the assistance of the Nazis. This is the way 
religious ideas and (semi-) public religious spaces meet radical right politics in present 
day Hungary: typically they do not themselves create political identities, but both 
Fidesz and Jobbik use them as references to secure their positions and enhance their 
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4. Sacralization of the nation 
 
Whereas neither Fidesz nor Jobbik can be considered to be the political 
representatives of specific churches or particular religious values, radical right-wing 
populism itself can be understood as a kind of surrogate religion, as for many socially 
conservatives and/or nationalists it provides a sacred subject to worship. Hungarian 
right-wing populism uses Christianity as a reference, but its political content often 
appears to be in contrast to Christian values. Instead, it advocates an ethno-
nationalistic surrogate religion in which the nation itself becomes a sacred entity and 
national identification carries religious attributes. Although from a Christian 
perspective this represents a kind of worldly paganism, and as such should be 
dismissed on actual religious grounds, this kind of surrogate religion is able to draw a 
sizable crowd as followers in Hungary as well as in other countries. Such a surrogate, 
paganized Christianity has little to do with actual religious beliefs, though, even if it 
uses religion in general and Christianity in particular as a source of political 
endorsement. As Tamás Szilágyi argued:  
 
Though radical right-wing ideology places itself in the political field, it uses a 
syncretistic religious narrative to legitimate its program, the central elements of 
which are the sacralization of the Hungarian nation, the idea of chosen people, 
the designation of the national territory as a sacral space, and the inclusion of 
religious moral elements into political rhetoric. The Hungarian radical right-
wing does not only designate religious doctrines as the source of ideals and 
values that underpin its political actions, but the orientation towards the 
transcendental also appears specifically in its ideological direction. The 
elements of Christianity and the ancient Hungarian pagan faith are mixed in the 
religious narratives of the radical right-wing ideology. (…) In the Hungarian 
radical right-wing, the groups using Christian rhetoric seem to enjoy the most 
popularity, but the currently marginal paganism-oriented group plays a more 
and more increasing role (Szilágyi, 2011: 252). 
 
The nation as a sacred collective entity is a crucial element of both Jobbik’s and 
Fidesz’s political ideology, and large historic Christian churches typically subscribe to 
this. The dominant attitude of the Roman Catholic and the Calvinist Churches — the 
two largest Christian congregations — approves it, and only smaller Christian churches, 
notably the traditionally more liberal Lutherans and some evangelical communities, 
tend to distance themselves from it. Christianity and the two largest Christian 
Churches, thus play a legitimizing role of populist right-wing politics, in line with the 
long-standing historical pattern in inter-war Hungary. 
The role of churches is important precisely because of the lack of rationally 
operating social and political institutions that integrate the nation as a political 
community. Instead, churches provide ideological resources to support right-wing 
populism, essentially playing a propaganda role for the regime. In exchange for this, a 
growing share of publicly financed services in education and health care are being 
administered by the historical Christian churches. This makes institutional relations 
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between churches and secular authorities increasingly vital for both the churches and 
the state: church-run schools, hospitals and even universities are quite generously 
financed by the government but in exchange they need to fulfill certain administrative 
criteria in operation. Another way of the institutionalized participation of churches in 
everyday life is the incorporation of religious studies into the national curriculum of 
elementary schools that the Fidesz government introduced from 2013.20  
Religious conflicts, such as the opposition to Islam or other religions have not 
played a major role in political identity creation so far. Unlike their radical West 
European counterparts, the Hungarian populist Right has not displayed any strong 
anti-Islam stance, which was probably due to its traditional antiSemitism. This attitude 
changed recently due to the increasing number of migrants to Hungary from the 
Middle East. In the summer of 2015, the Hungarian government built a wire netting 
fence on the border between Serbia and Hungary to prevent any form of migration 
regardless to the political or economic motifs. It also took the opportunity to raise its 
popularity by conducting a populist hate campaign against immigrants, which was, 
however, rather based on ethnicity than religion.  
To demonstrate the state of mind of the Hungarian radical Right on the 
migration issue, it is worth referring to Péter Boross, a former prime minister of 
Hungary and former advisor to Viktor Orbán, who has equally been close to Fidesz 
and Jobbik. In an interview, Boross blames the United States for the rise of the 
number of refugees in Europe and the crisis in the Middle East. In his comment he 
criticizes the Americans for maintaining universalistic principles, like democracy and 
God, instead of accepting local democracies and local Gods.21 As influential father 
figure in shaping the ideas of the Hungarian right, Boross claims that each nation has a 
right to create its own state, its own political regime (whether it is democracy or 
autocracy is less relevant), and also to choose its own God.  While aiming to defend 
Europe, he displays strong anti-EU sentiments. For him any supranational entity 
which bases itself on general principles beyond the nation-state (a universalistic 
approach to democracy, human rights, and Christianity) is wrong, because God 
belongs to nations not to individuals.  
Recent mass migration from the Middle East to Europe is interpreted by 
Boross as not a cultural but a biological and a genetic problem, which cannot be 
solved by the classic nationalist ways of assimilation. These views, received positively 
by the populist radical right, embrace ethnic nationalism in its crude form: for Boross, 
cultural integration has not yielded anything good, neither ‘in the case of the gypsies’ 
nor with the ‘hordes of Muslims crossing the green border’. Therefore, ‘the European 
Union should not be thinking in terms of its own refugee quota system, but in forming 
its own armed forces’ (Boross, 2015).  
                                                        
20
 Non-religious students can choose ethics instead. 
21
 As Péter Boross said: ‘The thing is that the Americans enforce a ruthless approach by favoring 
the strong over the weak in everything. With them the strong are free to trample the week. They named 
this system “absolute democracy”. After putting their hands on the world, they think that from an “Arab 
Spring” a functioning democracy will form. (…) Rome was wise back then. They left the conquered 
provinces in peace and officially adopted some of their gods in Rome. Washington does the opposite. It 
wants to impose its own God, Democracy, on the conquered countries’ (Boross, 2015). 
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In this militaristic approach, a provincialized ‘national Christianity’ is contrasted 
to the mainstream, universal form of Christianity as a religion of love. In the 
meantime, it is also contrasted to the Gods of the refugees which are deemed 
unacceptable in Europe. Hence, ethno-nationalism, embraced by the populist Right, 
provides a sufficient basis of political identification as a type of surrogate-religion. 
While Fidesz interprets Christianity within the framework of nationalism, Jobbik 
frames it as part of its nationalism and anti-Semitism. God is not presented as a 
symbol of universal religious identity, as it is understood in the New Testament or 
explained in several speeches of Pope Francis, but as ‘the God of Hungarians’ (‘a 
magyarok istene’), in its particularistic, tribal, paganized, political understanding. In 
this sense, Hungarian right-wing populism does not have to rely on religious 
affiliations and neither places a particular emphasis on mobilizing them: they are 
simply parts of their fundamentally nationalist world views without any substantive 
religious references. Although religious identities are mobilized by the Right, they are 
merged with nationalistic worldviews and ideologies. 
 Finally, one should note that Fidesz in government has insisted to approve 
church statuses on political grounds. In a high-profile case, the Fidesz government in 
2012 introduced a restrictive regime of registering churches, making it the prerogative 
of parliament to recognize a religious community as a church. Yet, both the 
Constitutional Court (in 2013) and the European Court of Human Rights (in 2014) 
judged the new provisions unacceptable, forcing the parliament to repeatedly revise 
it.22 The new provisions obviously sought to extend government control and to 
differentiate between ‘accepted’ and ‘non-accepted’ churches. This way, the Fidesz 
government attempted to alter the relations between the state and churches and to 





Hungarian right-wing populism, represented by governing Fidesz and its (semi-) 
opposition Jobbik, has been dominating the Hungarian political scene since the end 
of the 2000s. The Hungarian populist Right has in many ways followed the historical 
patterns laid down in the inter-war period by the then governing conservatives and 
their extreme right opposition.  
We considered populism as an anti-elitist, anti-institutional political behavior 
that identifies with ‘the people’, and enhances their ‘direct’ participation in the 
political process as opposed to representative government. Populism has an 
ideological character but in itself does not have a particular ideological content. 
Rather, it is a pattern of discourse and behavior that can be filled by both left- and 
right-wing ideologies. We also argued that in a post-totalitarian historical era, populism 
                                                        
22
 The Constitutional Court in 2013 and the European Court of Human Rights in 2014 considered the 
deprivation from the status as a church and recognition by the Parliament as a violation of rights, while 
the existence of two kinds of statuses for religious groups was considered discriminatory. (Eötvös Károly 
Policy Institute, Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, and Mérték 
Médiaelemző Műhely, 2014).   
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should be seen as the political manifestation of illiberalism, especially in (semi-) 
peripheries such as Latin America and Eastern Europe. Such an understanding of 
populism can be easily reconciled with the Dahlian concept of inclusive hegemony: a 
form of government based on popular participation without public contest for power.  
Both Fidesz and Jobbik have strong tendencies towards such a restrictive notion 
of democracy and they both manifestly dismiss the principles of liberal democracy. 
Although neither of them appeared before the electorate as a deeply religious political 
party, both of them portrayed themselves as socially conservative, ‘Christian’ 
nationalists. This implied a form of institutionalized cooperation between them and 
large historical Christian churches. Whereas the political Right gain political support 
and legitimacy from churches, the latter are commissioned to run educational, health 
and social care institutions on government-provided budgets. In addition, politically 
well-received churches have been given official church status with all its benefits, 
whereas their politically less obedient counterparts have been stripped off it. 
However, in a substantially secularized country, such as Hungary, actual 
religious values play a limited role in policy-making. No rational political party would 
risk to represent a primarily religious agenda if it was to win elections. Christianity is 
an important political asset, but it is not enough to carry elections and gain majority 
political support. To maximize electoral votes and to avoid the breakdown of the 
state, Viktor Orbán used the infrastructural power of the Church to outsource certain 
functions and responsibilities of the state to the Church while maintaining his own 
exclusive control over the coercive power of the state. Within the realm of politics, the 
‘vision of “the people”’ as united body implies impatience with party strife, and can 
encourage support for strong leadership where a charismatic individual is available to 
personify the interests of the nation (Canovan, 1999: 5). As a charismatic leader 
Orbán claimed full sovereignty over the political process and used populism as a 
shortcut to reach his political aims. 
The Orbán regime also demonstrates that radical right-wing populism employs 
a quasi-religious ideological construction through which it attempts at mobilizing a 
wider social spectrum: ethno-nationalism. This surrogate religion offers a politicized 
(nationalist and paganized) understanding of Christianity and elevates the concept of 
ethnically defined nation to a sacred status. Thus, religion is ‘nationalized’, and the 
universalism of Christianity is transformed to a particularistic, pagan vision in which 
faith appears to be not an individual but a tribal issue. ‘Nationalized Christianity’ also 
provides legitimacy for the ‘rationalized charismatic rule’ of authoritarian leaders, who 
represent exceptional characteristics but are nevertheless popularly elected. This rule 
is illiberal and anti-democratic even though it relies on (often manipulated) elections 
and other forms of politically conditioned popular participation. Within the European 
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Despite the substantive findings of existing research, the electoral mandate is still an 
elusive category in representation theory and empirical political science.1 It was not so 
long ago that Andreas Schedler (1998: 191-192) contended that the ‘mandate theory 
of elections (…) has not commanded too much attention from political science’. 
Eventually, the concept received the serious treatment it deserved in the form of an 
edited volume by Manin, Przeworski and Stokes (1999). A serious but less than 
uncontroversial treatment.  
In describing the ‘mandate conception of representation’ the authors claimed 
that ‘mandate-representation’ occurs if ‘parties truthfully inform voters about their 
intentions and the implementation of these intentions is best for voters under the 
given circumstances’ (Manin et al., 1999: 30). While the first part of the definition is in 
line with most accounts of elections as a means to ‘confer the median mandate’ 
(McDonald and Budge, 2005), the second part introduces a somewhat alien element, 
and a fair amount of tension, into the equation.  
On the one hand, informing the citizens of proposed policies and incentives 
conducive to the implementation of these policies is well mapped in the principal-
agent literature of delegation and representation (see e.g., Besley, 2006). On the other 
hand, the injection of a benchmark of citizens’ interests in the theoretical framework 
other than their revealed preferences at the polling station creates conflicting directives 
for normative evaluation as well as a model that is less suitable for operationalization.  
Indeed, two decidedly empirical research agendas make only use of the first part of 
the ‘mandate-representation’ definition: pledge and saliency research. One way to 
operationalize the complexities of electoral mandates for empirical research is to look 
at explicit promises made during the campaigns. Studies following this approach 
create their databases by extracting relevant information from party manifestos and 
other electoral communications.  
They mainly come in two flavors, which are distinguished based on their 
respective understanding of mandates. On the one hand, ‘saliency’-based approaches 
(such as the classic study by Budge and Hofferbert, 1990) map general trends in 
policy-making (often relying on budgetary data) in order to gauge the relevance of 
party manifestos in setting the direction of government. ‘Pledge’ research, by contrast, 
singles out individual commitments and the fulfillment thereof, regardless of 
overarching tendencies in governance (see e.g., Royed, 1996; Thomson, 2001; 
Thomson et al., 2014). As the latter approach has generated a more extensive 
literature, in the following pledge research serves as our main focus. 
While these studies make use of an increasingly standardized set of variables, 
they rarely venture into uncharted theoretical territory. They mostly rely on an implicit 
mandate theory derived from the concept of responsible party government. This 
‘strictly empirics’ line of research, however, is not without its own shortcomings. 
Perhaps the most important of these, from the perspective of representation theory, is 
their dependence on the unpacked concept of pledge fulfillment. In this line of 
research pledge fulfillment is treated as an inherently positive result for the functioning 
                                                          
1 
I am thankful for the comments by two anonymous reviewers. All remaining errors are mine.  
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of representative democracy. The problem here is that, as it was highlighted by the 
dual definition of Manin and his co-authors, the redemption of electoral promises 
may in fact lead to catastrophic consequences for citizens under changing 
circumstances.  
The present article offers a conceptual framework that promises to properly 
evaluate mandate fulfillment in general, and pledge fulfillment in particular from the 
standpoint of the normative theory of representation. In this framework the non-
fulfillment of pledges is not necessarily bad for representation since mandate slippage, 
or the gradual process of abandoning the mandate in the post-election phase, may 
come in both bad and good forms. The proposed framework also develops an 
empirical research agenda for measuring the causes of bad mandates and mandate 
slippage by relying and expanding on the toolkit of empirical pledge research.  
The argument unfolds in three steps. First, the baseline principal-agent theory 
of representation is presented along with a new metaphor of the process of 
representation: the delegation tree. Second, the concepts of bad mandate and 
mandate slippage are introduced. Third, the conceptual framework presented in the 
previous chapters is translated for the purposes of empirical research in order to be 
able to measure the factors leading to mandate slippage. The final section concludes. 
 
II. The Baseline Principal-Agent Model and its Discontents 
 
II.1. A delegation tree with branches in the air 
 
It is a common feature of contemporary works on democracy to assume that modern 
government must derive its ‘authority directly or indirectly from the people’ 
(Ferejohn, 1999: 131). It is also clear that variations persist in terms of the exact forms 
and channels of what we refer to as the program-to-policy linkage (Thomson, 2001). 
As the fictional government by the people was suppressed by an indirect government 
of the people, the concept of representation became inherently linked to the role of 
elections in a democracy.  
Elections are pivotal elements of representative democracy as they establish the 
core political relationship of the system by linking principals and agents via 
accountability (Shepsle, 2008: 30). They produce a bundle of winners—by way of 
sanctioning poor performance or forward-looking selection—and at the same time they 
also produce mandates. Though it manifests itself in various guises, the latter 
component is always present in campaigns—even as some authors downplay its 
relevance in effective electoral control (Fearon, 1999). In fact, classic public choice 
texts on political accountability share the view that ‘if voters vote on the basis of 
platforms or “issues,” politicians have little incentive to do what they promise. Thus, 
voters might be well-advised to pay attention to the incumbent's performance in office 
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rather than to the hypothetical promises of competing candidates’ (Ferejohn, 1986: 
7).2
 
This negative general attitude toward a concept of political accountability linked 
to and based on ex ante authorization3 spawned a sprawling literature linking popular 
preferences directly to societal outcomes, without any institutional or policy-related 
intermediary (see studies on ‘opinion/policy consistency/dynamics’, such as Monroe, 
1998). This results in cutting out the ‘middle man’, the institutions mediating the 
content of mandates; in the process the institutional environment that filters this 
content is removed. Thus, it sheds little light on the mechanism of preference 
transmission. And in this it presents both empirical and theoretical conundrums: it 
underestimates the importance—in fact: persistence—of electoral pledges and 
manifestos in actual campaigns. Perhaps more importantly, it also reduces voters into 
rational principals similar to corporate shareholders for whom the only relevant 
metrics is located under the red line of earnings reports. Yet politics resists such 
simplifications: elections may be won and lost over pledges that turned out to be 
untrue, or policy switches that contradicted existing party ideology.  
There are also persuasive reasons for giving elections (as opposed to, say, 
public opinion polls) a central role in revealing voter preferences. Election day 
establishes a political contract between principals and agents that is anything but a 
fiction or metaphor: it institutes obligations buttressed by constitutional law as 
opposed to the more informal mechanism of responsiveness. As it happens, this is the 
root that gives rise to the tree of representative government, and its crown consists of a 
complex structure of branches and leaves (see Figure 1). Party mandates, then, are 
best understood as the trunk of this tree of delegation: all future decisions emanate 
from this original authorization for the party/parties of government.4
 
 
                                                          
2
 Even researchers adhering to the mandate tradition acknowledged that mainstream studies had 
considered parties too weak to ‘function effectively as programmatic, policy effecting agents’, at least in a 
system based on the separation of powers (Budge and Hofferbert, 1990: 11). 
3
 The terms authorization and accountability are used in the sense of the principal-agent model of politics 
(see e.g. Ferejohn, 1999: 133). Authorization is the ‘means by which a representative obtains his or her 
standing, status, position or office’ (Dovi, 2011). Ex ante authorization demands that the authorization 
takes place before the execution of the task or mission at hand. Accountability is ‘the ability of 
constituents to punish their representative for failing to act in accordance with their wishes (e.g., voting an 
elected official out of office) or the responsiveness of the representative to the constituents’ (ibid.). 
4
 For applying the tree metaphor to public policy decision-making, see Lindblom (1959) and the 
literature centered around this classic book. 
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Figure1. The flow of legitimacy through a branch of the mandate process 
 
True, some decisions are not rooted in policy mandates in the substantive sense. The 
government’s relations with social partners and exogenous shocks all shape the 
general direction of government decisions. Nevertheless, the answers to virtually all of 
the challenges of governance are embedded in party ideology and the values espoused 
by a political community of like-minded people (consider, for instance, the motives 
behind the presidential nominations of Supreme Court judges in the U.S.). These are 
all part of a broader concept of mandate that is far from devoid of policy content.  
The totality of government decisions that involve a modicum of policy content 
are, therefore, relevant for mandate theory. This is true despite the fact that in many 
cases no clear path can be discerned connecting the actual policy decision to the 
original authorization. In other words, government resembles a tree with some 
branches suspended in the air. These branches may or may not have capillaries 
emanating from the trunk. Furthermore, some decisions may be in direct 
contradiction with pledges made in the same policy domain. In this respect, they may 
disrupt the chain of responsiveness (Powell, 2004) even as they perform some basic 
government function. The tree of delegation is hence supplemented by branches 
unrelated to ex ante authorization, and together they form government policy.  
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All in all, mandate models are integral parts of the more general field of 
political accountability. And in light of these considerations, when it comes to theories 
of political authorization, they appear simply unavoidable. Following this line of 
reasoning, in the remainder of this paper it is assumed that party mandates are vital 
elements of well-functioning representative democracies.5 Nevertheless, we are still 
faced with the problem of defining what exactly constitutes a mandate. 6 
 
II.2. The trunk of the tree: The direct flow of the mandate 
 
The concept of the electoral mandate has been the subject of interpretations and 
redefinitions by politicians and political scientists alike. Based on an analysis of the 
1984 presidential campaign in the United States, Hershey (1994) discerns three 
recurring thematic elements in mandate claims by politicians: the party mandate, the 
personal mandate and the policy mandate. This provides a useful starting point as it 
highlights the diverse conceptual sources of electoral mandates. The common 
denominator is the presence of a partially binding content which is associated with ex 
ante authorization. This partially binding mandate is the essence of representation; 
and is understood as a counterpoint to the appointment of delegates (with a fully 
binding mandate) and trustees (with a fully non-binding mandate).  
With mandate-based representation thus described, the next challenge is to 
make sense of the content of the partially binding mandate. Figure 2 breaks down this 
loaded concept.  
                                                          
5
 The question of personal vs. party mandates (as in studies on the personification/presidentialisation of 
party government) is less important for our current purposes as long as personal mandates involve a 
modicum of policy content (which is present even in ‘good type’-style approaches in which the candidate's 
policy preferences are similar to that of his voters (Fearon, 1999: 68).  
6
 One sitting prime minister in Central Eastern Europe famously stated during his campaign: ‘our 
program consists of just one word: [we’ll] continue.’ 
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Figure 2 The content of the mandate: from parties to pledges. Source: Sebők – Soós, 2013: 48. 
 
In its most general form, the mandate is associated with a beneficiary: a party or 
person. Insofar as most leaders are members and representatives of their own parties, 
it is not necessary to distinguish between these two levels. Furthermore, there is an 
implicit linkage between leader and party: their shared history, decisions and ideology. 
In this sense there is arguably no such thing as a mandate without policy content, even 
if some leaders make no effort to present a manifesto to the public.7
 
Having said that, parties and politicians in developed countries do have a 
propensity to publish electoral programs (as witnessed by the main database of the 
Comparative Manifesto Project). This helps to make the case for the relevance of ex 
ante authorization in democratic theory and practice. Yet in trying to find the meaning 
of electoral mandates, manifestos are a part of the problem at least to the same degree 
as they are part of the solution. What authorization entails still depends on the 
researchers’ point of view, and the prime exhibit which illustrates this phenomenon is 
the division of the research community along pledge and saliency lines.  
Once again, both strands of research rely on a policy-based definition of 
mandate, only this time they consider explicit pledges and issue emphases as opposed 
to more implicit party ideology. Explicitness, on the other hand, is not a privilege of 
manifesto pledges: campaigns are ripe with reactive policy statements, which are 
                                                          
7
 One sitting prime minister in Central Eastern Europe famously stated during his campaign: ‘our 
program consists of just one word: [we’ll] continue.’ 
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sometimes expressed only verbally, as opposed to the more proactive, written form of 
communication that is the hallmark of manifestos. Perhaps the best way to understand 
the overall policy content of campaigns—and, thus, that of the mandate—is to think of 
it as a word cloud. In this mandate cloud some pledges will appear more often, and in 
more varied forms and terms, while others retain a small, standalone place in the 
cloud. 
This diffuse policy mandate is difficult to interpret and evaluate for social 
scientists, let alone for the average citizen. That is one of the reasons why research 
strategies have gravitated towards the piecemeal approach of analyzing manifesto 
pledges or issue saliency. Studies regarding ‘cloud fulfillment’ estimates seem like 
science fiction in light of entrenched research agendas, but they are the next logical 
step all the same. From the electorate’s perspective, such a cloud may come closest to 
laying out the contents of a contract between themselves (the principals) and the 
parties (the agents). Insofar as campaigns are informative, and the cloud is filled with 
pledges and issues that send voters signals about future government policies, it is not 
an exaggeration to speak of a direct, undisturbed and uncompromised flow of the 
mandate.  
This direct flow represents the trunk of the delegation tree. Although its 
relation to the root of the tree—voter preferences—is ambiguous8, the moment of 
authorization creates a firm link between the two. In formulating the provisions of the 
mandate contract, it is also unnecessary to take a stand regarding bottom-up or top-
down dominance (where the bottom-up approach refers to the dominance of focus 
groups and opinion polls in constructing party platforms and top-down is a metaphor 
for elite leadership and, possibly, herethetics). As long as parties offer a selection of 
campaign contents, a mutually endorsed content for the principal-agent contract is 
within reach.  
 
III. Concepts for Disrupted Principal-Agent Relations  
 
III.1. Bad mandates: The missing or ill-defined source 
 
While the conceptual development of the delegation tree offers a better metaphor for 
real-life representative processes, the basic terminology of principal-agent model is still 
deficient when it comes to explaining disruptions of text-book principal-agent 
relations. A new dictionary explaining these phenomena could make use of the 
notions of bad mandates and mandate slippage. 
Elections play a pivotal role in setting the content of the mandate, yet the 
contours of this content are shaped before and after polling day. The pre-election 
period defines the comprehensiveness of the contract, while the post-election phase 
determines the rate of contract fulfillment. Taken together, these steps constitute what 
might be called—by taking a page from Thomson’s work—the preferences-program-
                                                          
8 
The preferences-program part of the general preferences-program-policy linkage is not without its 
problems. Indeed, Pennings (2005) contends that ‘the low degree of responsiveness of parties indicates 
that the linkage between voters and parties is the weakest one in the chain of delegation.’ 
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policy linkage. As in this model elections are the mechanisms whereby the contents of 
contracts are endorsed and formally authorized, the preceding and subsequent phases 
decide if the provisions of approved contracts are actually delivered on.  
It follows directly from this framework that the linkage may break down either 
prior to or following the election. In the former case, bad mandates are the result of 
bad campaigns or weak authorizations. In the latter instance, disrupted principal-agent 
relations are the outcome of interactions between self-interested strategic players. The 
former render proper contract-fulfillment impossible as the preconditions for a 
principal-agent relationship are not met. The latter entail breakdowns in the execution 
of ex ante authorizations. Table 1 presents these sources of the breakdown of the 
preferences-program-policy linkage in a stylized chronological order.  
 





Empirical examples Normative status 
Pre-election Bad mandate Low information 
campaign 
Manifestos are not 
published 
Bad 
Pre-election Bad mandate Low participation Significantly below 
average 
Bad 
Pre-election Bad mandate Weak authorization Heavily contested 














Multiple flows Coalition formation Minority preferences 




pledge fulfillment  
Post-
election 
Multiple flows Government 
structure 
Mismatch between 
pledges and the 











Bad mandates become incomplete or void contracts on account of either deficiencies 
in the pre-election period (the campaign) or weak authorizations provided by the 
electorate. Among the necessary preconditions for a meaningful contract between 
principals and agents, the content of the campaign is paramount. The quality of the 
imparted knowledge (scope, depth, concreteness) determines whether a partly binding 
mandate is created. Citizens’ perceptions of the contents of the contract (or the 
mandate cloud) are also shaped by party decisions regarding the issues that are 
emphasized or the relative ratio of rhetorical, ideological and policy statements in the 
campaign. Bad mandates result from low-information electioneering or from massive 
overlaps in the platforms of major parties concerning all key issues even as other 
parties are crowded out.  
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The second source of bad mandates are low-participation elections, for these 
sever the link between the preferences of the majority of voters (who decided to 
abstain) and the parties responsible for governing. The third source of bad mandates 
is the weakness of ex ante authorization. Here the term weakness refers to both the 
scope of victory (whether it is a plurality, a majority, a supermajority etc.) and the 
relationship between the share of the popular vote received by the winner vis-à-vis the 
actual seat allocation in the legislature (even as the form of this relationship may differ 
between polities).  
Bad mandates invariably put a dent in the normative basis of representative 
democracy. Such deficiencies imply that the potential for meaningful mandate-
fulfillment is limited. This is also why bad mandates are relevant for normative theory, 
for they constitute a key area of representative deficit. Coupled with the bad sort of 
mandate slippage (see below), bad mandates dismantle the preferences-program-
policy linkage which is one of the key elements in the process of providing legitimacy 
in representative democracies. In sum, input legitimacy may be ‘contaminated’ right at 
the source. Nevertheless, anomalies in mandate-based representation are just as 
common in the later stages of the process. 
 
III.2. Mandate slippage: When the direct flow stops 
 
Modern representative government is built on institutional complexity. This 
complexity disrupts basic principal-agent relations: multiple principals and various 
agents crop up throughout the delegation chain and—in some cases—the chain itself is 
broken. Non-majoritarian institutions draw their legitimacy precisely from the fact that 
they are disjointed from elected office holders. In light of this complexity, the very 
usefulness of the ‘chain model’ is called into question: delegation flows through 
diverse channels as opposed to just one; and these may further dissociate, to the point 
of resembling a river delta or the crown of a tree.  
The branches can be connected by differing logics of representation. A 
relationship may be based on delegation in the strictest sense: a transfer of authority 
with no room for maneuver (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2005). An intermediate form 
of delegation is based on a partly binding mandate, which allows for some wiggle 
room in terms of interpreting the contents of the contract. The third form is 
trusteeship, which is a non-binding transfer of authority when it comes to policy 
content.  
The delegation tree consists of the aforementioned forms of relationships 
which are created between principals and agents, such as parties, political leaders, 
ministers and government agencies. They jointly populate the space between the 
original authorization provided by the people and the policy outcomes that partly 
serve as the basis for future decisions on authorization. The theoretical consequence 
of this space between the people who provide ex ante authorization and the people 
who provide ex post authorization of government performance is that policymakers 
may become released from direct electoral accountability. This is especially true in the 
case of long-term trusteeship contracts (as is the case with supreme court or 
constitutional court appointees in some countries—once again, see Table 1).  
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This phenomenon may also occur in parts of the tree where initially there is a 
clear and uncontested direct flow of delegation from the root/trunk. Three such 
phases merit a more detailed discussion: coalition formation; decisions related to the 
government structure; and their implementation.  
Election results are often ambiguous. In fact, in parliamentary democracies a 
single-party majority in (both houses of) the legislature is the exception rather than the 
norm. This sets the stage for a duplication (triplication etc.) of principal-agent relations 
at the top of the trunk. Various parties run on a wide assortment of pledges and issue 
emphases, and the coalition formation process blends these policy contents into an 
unpredictable shape: coalition agreements. In some cases there may be more than 
one majority constellation (including grand coalitions and the like), and even on its 
own this fact blurs electoral mandates. Overall, the problem of incomplete contracts 
manifests itself already at this first stage. 
This coalition effect is further compounded by an unbalanced relationship in 
party coalitions. The hierarchical ordering of parties assigns different weights to party-
specific mandates (as each party proposed a different manifesto with varying issue 
emphases): the formateur party may have more clout over the coalition agreement, 
just as a minority party with a great potential for hostage taking (especially when the 
formateur party only won a plurality) can end up being overrepresented. Either way, 
the chain of legitimacy (Nullmeier and Pritzlaff, 2010) remains intact while delegation 
relationships are muddled. 
The second step concerns government structure. It is shaped by the (formal or 
informal) coalition agreement in the form of allocations of control over 
ministries/departments or by appointments to non-majoritarian bodies and issue 
emphases in the government program. It is also a manifestation of the underlying 
constitutional structure, i.e., the specifics of the system of separation of powers. 
Multiple principals may have jurisdiction over the same policy domain, which may 
result in obscuring responsibility for the fulfillment of specific pledges. Finally, some 
pieces of legislation may require a supermajority, which brings in the opposition as a 
new set of stakeholders.  
The third major layer of complex delegation relationships is located at the level 
of implementation. Bureaucratic/agency behavior may be one of the important 
reasons behind the failure to fulfill a mandate. Classic causes underlying this include 
agency shirking and problems related to agency (or more general policy) design. The 
former refers to cases in which the ideal policy position of the agency is different from 
that of its principal (the legislature or the executive—Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999). 
Although the principals have various measures of ex ante or ex post control at their 
disposal, some level of shirking or laxity may nevertheless persist.  
Agency design may make matters worse: multiple missions or fuzzy missions 
confuse agents as to who their real targets are. Multiple and heterogeneous agents 
functioning in the same policy domain can replicate this jurisdictional overlap from 
the policy-maker level (where two departments are responsible for the same or largely 
overlapping policy area) to the ‘street level’ of bureaucrats (where e.g., two separate 
police units are responsible for the same or overlapping geographical area or crime 
type). And coordination between majoritarian and non-majoritarian institutions (such 
as those between a finance ministry and an independent central bank) can further 
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complicate mandate-fulfillment. Again, there is a limit to the extent to which careful 
policy design can be used to solve the ‘problem of many hands’ (Thompson, 1980) or 
the ‘difficulty of assigning responsibility in organizations in which many different 
individuals contribute to decisions and policies’.  
The three phases of coalition formation, government structure design and 
implementation depicted in Table 1—along with many other potential layers along the 
same lines—represent interruptions in the direct flow of delegation. They break or 
dissolve parts of the chain of delegation. Thus, they contribute to mandate non-
fulfillment, which—in the existing research—is considered a negative outcome from a 
normative theory perspective. The next subsection makes the case that this perception 
is somewhat misguided, as mandate slippage may come in two flavors: good and bad. 
  
III.3. Problems of controlling agents through mandates  
 
Breakdowns in the direct flow of legitimacy through the tree of delegation cast a 
shadow on theories of ex ante authorization. From the perspective of normative 
democratic theory, this is not all bad news, however. Mandate non-fulfillment or 
mandate slippage may manifest itself in many different forms during the long process 
spanning the time when campaign pledges are made to when policy outcomes are first 
realized. Each phase has its own normative character, which also means that no 
generalization can be made with respect to unfulfilled promises without the analysis of 
the normative character of each segment. Together they are a testament to the 
problems and virtues of controlling agents through mandates.  
This ‘neglected side’ of mandate theory was seldom subjected to a more 
detailed discussion. In one of these attempts Schedler (1998) contends that electoral 
accountability is a complex and contested exercise. According to him, the public 
controversies associated with the very idea of mandate-fulfillment can be settled only 
by the voter, whom he considers the ‘supreme judge.’ While this is probably true, 
there is a possibility to dig deeper and analyze the causes that shape this normative 
judgment. And these causes may be connected to the position of the individual 
‘transgression’ in the mandate slippage process.  
The concept of mandate slippage is best understood as a progressive 
divergence—realized in the course of governance—from the policy content of ex ante 
political authorization. It may be the product of strategic agency or an inadvertent 
consequence of decisions unrelated to mandate-fulfillment. The result is a delegation 
tree with some branches firmly connected to the root and trunk; and others seemingly 
up in the air without such attachments.  
Not all such breaks in the delegation chain are normatively unattractive. 
Modern representative government draws its legitimacy from a number of sources, 
and policy content-related input legitimacy is just one such element. Trustee-type 
institutions of ‘government for the people’ take no formal orders from elected leaders 
(who serve relatively short terms) as they fulfill their long-term mission. And voters 
have a tendency to acknowledge decisions made in a complex political and 
institutional environment that includes coalition governments, multi-level government 
and elaborate structures of government agencies. In this complex environment, the 
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merits of mandate-fulfillment are relative. It is advisable, therefore, to undertake a 
piece by piece, phase by phase analysis of the process of ‘slippage.’  
Mandate slippages may be assigned to either of three categories based on their 
normative status. On the one hand, ‘good slippages’ allow for the contradiction-laden 
process of converting heterogeneous voter preferences into actual policy outputs. ‘Bad 
slippages’ on the other hand are unrelated to plurality and mostly consist of 
institutional frictions (principal-agent anomalies) stemming from the process of 
governing. A third category refers to slippages that highlight a trade-off between 
following voter preferences and other normatively worthy requirements (such as 
governability or stability). Table 2 provides a summary of these phases of the mandate 
slippage process.  
 
Table 2. Examples of mandate slippage (post-election phase) 











of cabinet government 
Incomplete 
contracts 
Electoral manifestos vs. 
government programs 
Depends on the degree 
to which issue emphases 
and major pledges are 
observed 







of executive power and 
bureaucracy 
Agency shirking  The implementation of 
an initiative is 
obstructed by 
administrative units 





Pledges of economic 
growth before a global 
financial crisis 
A consequence of bad 
mandates. Trade-off 
between serving the 
‘public interest’ and 
pledge fulfillment 
 
In parliamentary systems the first breakdown in the delegation process usually occurs 
no later than election night. On the one hand, the policy content of the mandate may 
be straightforward when single-party majorities emerge (but even in these cases 
‘skeletons in the closet’ may divert the content or emphasis of policy-making). At the 
same time, multi-party majorities may upset clear expectations with coalition 
agreements which create a government that pursues only a subset of the pledges 
featured in each participant’s manifesto. Moreover, these pledges may be 
contradictory, which creates the need to reach a compromise, along with the necessity 
to insert new or modified policy initiatives into the government program.  
The literature on the relative merits of single-party and coalition governments 
underscores the importance of a trade-off between governability and compromise. 
Ideological distance between coalition parties may be a force for good, but at the same 
time it may also act as a source of constant tension. Issues related to polarization—
which are widespread in contemporary two-party systems—may be mitigated by the art 
of compromise as practiced in multi-party governments and grand coalitions. In light 
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of the conclusions found in this line of research, the least that can be said is that 
coalition governments may be both natural and appealing outcomes of the electoral 
systems typically used in parliamentary democracies. 
The next phase of mandate slippage concerns policy-related problems 
stemming from the structure of government. Non-fulfillment in this stage may be due 
to either incomplete contracts or lack of jurisdiction. First, government programs are 
not identical with coalition agreements. They address issues that were not emphasized 
in manifestos simply because campaigns and governments prioritize different issues. 
In most policy areas there is no mandate content to begin governance with: these 
contracts are incomplete and may contain no information even for some salient issues.  
A solution may lie in the combination of pledge and saliency approaches. The 
more transparently a party's stance is on a policy domain, the better. But in a situation 
when campaign strategists made no specific attempts to highlight an issue, the saliency 
approach may fill in the blanks. Then, non-compliance with this more general policy 
mandate at this stage is detrimental to mandate-based accountability.  
With respect to the structure of government, the second problem of non-
fulfillment stems from lack of jurisdiction. Let us assume that parties make pledges in 
good faith and they are willing to execute them if the opportunity arises. Nevertheless, 
there is a considerable difference between being willing and being able to execute 
policies. Portfolio allocation is key in this respect: controlling the relevant chunk of 
government bureaucracy is almost a prerequisite for solving complex policy problems. 
While issue-oriented parties (such as Green parties) have a tendency to ask for cabinet 
positions related to their main area of concern, they may fail to secure them. The 
fulfillment of pledges concerning policy areas that fall outside the direct policy control 
of a coalition party should therefore be evaluated against norms that are less strict than 
the ones one would apply in the case of full portfolio control.  
After these party-related issues, the third phase of mandate slippage pertains to 
government and execution. Formal veto points are less of an issue at this stage, the 
focus is on more informal factors in the way of mandate redemption. In some cases 
policy outputs require a mere act of parliament. In other cases fulfillment depends on 
a complex web of agencies and their cooperation.  
Part of the art of governance is policy design and bureaucratic control. In single 
party settings non-fulfillment resulting from these two factors should be frowned upon 
from a normative perspective. This also applies to ‘agency slippage,’ regardless of its 
source (shirking, opportunism or sheer incapacity). In coalition governments it is 
more difficult to assign the blame to a specific actor. Having said that, ministerial 
control should serve as a useful rule of thumb for determining where responsibility 
lies.  
Pledges related to policy outcomes are trickier still. Exogenous shocks may 
force cabinets to change course and go back on pledges. Such policy switches may 
nevertheless be tolerated by the electorate in the case of actual disasters that justify the 
change. In other situations ‘partnership non-compliance’ might occur: as in the case of 
a pledge to end a war with a neighboring country. It follows directly from this 
discussion that pledges targeting outcomes are less enforceable and parties should 
therefore mostly refrain from them. And for those outcome pledges that are 
 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 2 (1) 123-152. 




‘unavoidable,’ the evaluation of non-fulfillment will have to factor in outside 
circumstances.  
The conclusion that can derived from this cursory analysis leads us back to 
Schedler’s contention regarding the final judges of government performance. 
Experience also shows that voters make complex decisions regarding incumbents: 
their evaluation involves the ex post analysis of performance (including ‘economic 
voting’, pledge fulfillment, etc.) and also ex ante assessments of future performance. 
In this larger shape of things, mandate-fulfillment is but one metric that informs the 
electoral control of agents. Mandate slippages need not involve democratic deficits, let 
alone representation deficits. From the average citizen's perspective, therefore, 
mandate slippage may either be a normatively good thing or a normatively negative 
thing.  
This section provided an introduction into the theoretical problems of mandate 
slippage. The final task is to relate the concept of good and bad mandate slippages to 
the existing literature on pledge fulfillment so that we can make empirical sense of 
these theoretical propositions.  
 
IV. Explaining Mandate Slippage with Empirical Variables 
 
Studies in the pledge fulfillment have used various sources of data and produced 
impressive results regarding the empirical strength of ex ante authorization theories. 
However, there is no overarching theme in the literature concerning mandate-
fulfillment besides implicit mandate theory. As the delegation chain is dissected into 
pieces based on the focus of individual researchers, the literature remains devoid of 
hypotheses regarding the preferences-program-policy linkage as a whole (with the 
usual caveat of government/opposition). 
Despite its purely empiricist inclination, the literature on pledge fulfillment still 
serves as the best choice available for making empirical sense of, or indeed measure, 
mandate slippage. Two aspects of empirical pledge research deserve special attention 
from the perspective of mandate slippage theory. First, its theoretical sources and 
normative statements regarding representation. The task here is to relate its explicit 
conceptual underpinnings or implicit tendencies to the framework presented in the 
previous chapter. Second, the groups of its empirical variables as related to the phases 
of linkage breakdown in general, and to bad mandate slippage in particular (see Table 
2). By highlighting pivotal variables influencing mandate slippage the measurement of 
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IV.1. The theoretical sources of pledge research  
 
The theoretical sources of empirical research on the program-to-policy linkage are 
drawn of a distinctly canonic set of literature. Recent pledge research (Kostadinova, 
2013; Toros, 2015; Praprotnik, 2015; Thomson et al., 2014; Naurin, 2013; Dobos 
and Gyulai, 2015) mostly takes inspiration from a small selection of classic pieces in 
pledge research (Royed, 1996; Artés, 2013; Artés and Bustos, 2008; Naurin, 2011; 
Moury, 2011; Mansergh and Thomson, 2007; Costello and Thomson, 2008; and the 
APSA papers by a group of first generational pledge scholars: Thomson et al., 2010; 
2012; 2014) and the theoretical literature these classic pieces make reference to.  
The two main theoretical sources of these classic studies are the literature on 
responsible party government (following, inter alia, APSA, 1950 and Klingemann, 
Hofferbert and Budge, 1994; for an overview see: Körösényi and Sebők, 2013) and 
the theory of parties and coalitions as adapted to European context (such as Laver and 
Shepsle, 1996; Strøm et al., 2008). Nevertheless, formal models of principal-agent 
relations are not prominently featured in any of the landmark studies of pledge 
research. 
The discussion of the normative value of the results is even less pronounced. 
The staple quotation here is by Mansbridge (2003: 515) regarding ‘promissory 
representation’. The works of Manin (1997) and his co-authors (Manin et al., 1999) is 
also often summoned. In neither cases, however, are empirical hypotheses directly 
related to these theoretical underpinnings. This is true even as the tension regarding 
the normative aspects of the results is palpable in some work in the saliency or pledge 
traditions.  
Pennings (2005: 14) acknowledges that ‘the Dutch case shows that there are 
several structural barriers for the mandatory role of parties in consensus democracies 
where mandates are always shared with other parties.’ But the next step in the 
normative analysis of these ‘structural barriers’ is missing. Similarly, Royed and 
Borrelli (1999: 115) conclude that ‘institutional control is fairly predictive of the 
relative success of the parties, although other factors are also influential.’ Once again, 
the analysis does not go further into an examination of the relative importance of 
‘party success’ and ‘institutional control’ for the proper functioning of the delegation 
chain. 
It is important to emphasize that these features of the literature are not to be 
considered to be shortcomings per se. Pledge researchers follow their specific 
research agenda, which is empirical in its nature. Furthermore, they do indeed make 
some progress toward generalizing the content of their preferred variables. With some 
refinements these can indeed be related to various stages of the linkage process and, 
therefore, can be factored into normative evaluations of the process of representation 
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IV.2. Variable groups in empirical pledge research 
 
The preeminent characteristic of empirical pledge research is the heterogeneity of its 
hypotheses and explanatory variables (see Table 3 in the Appendix)9. Perhaps the 
single quasi-permanent hypothesis in over 25 years of research refers to 
government/opposition party position, with government parties expected to achieve a 
higher rate of pledge fulfillment. Other recurring variables include status quo (in 
pledge content), consensus over a pledge in multiple party manifestos as well as 
ministerial control related to the pledge in question.  
While a degree of standardization has been attained regarding a core set of 
variables, actual hypotheses are still tailored to the research question of individual 
papers. Factors related to the institutional setting of government (majority/minority; 
single party/coalition; affiliation of the chief executive; portfolio control etc.) are well-
explored, the initial and latter stages of the preferences-program-policy linkage make 
no appearance in most pledge research. From voter preferences regarding various 
issues10 to agency and partner slippage the list of important components of mandate 
slippage are mostly absent from empirical studies of pledge fulfillment.  
Only a few studies venture beyond stand-alone variables in order to make sense 
of variable groups and their role in the linkage process. Royed (1996: 48) 
conceptualizes the ‘factors influencing pledge fulfilment’ in terms of ‘leadership’, 
‘constraints’ and ‘decision-making environment’. The first of these is usually not 
captured by variables in pledge research (such as a presence of a ‘programmatic 
leader’). The second is most often represented in the control variables section of 
models. The third, however, foreshadows the proliferation of institutional variables in 
comparative studies, introduced from the early 2000s.  
Thomson, Royed and Naurin (2010) group some of their variables into the 
‘government-type’ and ‘prime ministerial and ministerial control’ categories. Thomson 
et al. (2014: 11) list ‘institutional context’, ‘resources’ and ‘pledge characteristics’ as 
major groupings. Naurin (2013: 1057) registers ‘type of change’ and ‘issue area’ as 
composite categories.  
Table 3 in the Appendix presents these overlapping ideas in a unified structure 
along with the pertinent variables in empirical research. Besides exogenous factors 
(which partly incorporates the ‘resources’ category) and dummies (mostly used for 
election years/periods), three major variable clusters emerge: pledge-related, party-
related and government-related factors. Pledge-related variables are associated with the 
                                                          
9
 For saliency studies, the most widely used pairing of variables consisted of the issue emphases in federal 
expenditure categories (dependent variable) and those of election platforms (which was used as the 
explanatory variable; in this the authors followed the lead of Budge and Hofferbert, 1990). This research 
direction is strongly tied to the work of the Manifesto Research Group (MRG)/Comparative Manifestos 
Project (CMP) and the policy topic coding system used by the latter (see 
https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/coding_schemes/1). Recent developments added breadth to the 
approach, which now focuses on voter preferences as they are manifest in survey data (Pennings, 2005), 
inter alia. On the dependent variable side, a three-fold description of pledge fulfillment (fully, partially or 
not fulfilled) has emerged as the standard, even as the causal models in these pieces of research are 
almost exclusively binary: fulfilled/not fulfilled. (I thank the anonymous reviewer for making this point—
for exceptions see e.g., Toros, 2015: 246.) 
10
 For an exception see the survey method used by Naurin, 2011. 
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pre-election phase of the linkage process. Most often they refer to the content of 
manifestos and pledges (issue area; left/right understood in terms of e.g., tax cuts; 
status quo or change). Some others touch on the entire corpus of pledges (saliency 
measures) or the action or outcome oriented nature.  
Two further groups are relevant for the post-election phase of the linkage 
process. Party-related variables describe the political clout of parties (legislative 
control), its history (incumbency) or its future oriented pledges vis-á-vis other parties’ 
pledges (consensus). The third group, government-related factors, resembles previous 
categorizations most (‘government type’; ‘decision-making environment’). This three-
fold classification scheme provides a means to relate the underlying empirical variable 
groups to mandate slippage theory. 
 
V.  Measuring Mandate Slippage with Pledge Research Variables 
 
Situating variables in the linkage process is a crucial step toward measuring mandate 
slippage. First of all, some variables are unrelated to the concept of mandate slippage 
as they refer to the pre-electoral phase of the process. These variables describe 
pledges as components of manifestos: the content or saliency of specific promises. 
Anomalies, such as an overwhelming reliance on outcome pledges (as opposed to 
output/action pledges), in these cases are only relevant for a discussion on bad 
mandates, as opposed to the mandate slippage. 
As for the post-election phase of the linkage process pledge research offers 
insights into mandate slippage, at least in some cases. A simple re-ordering of the 
elements along the tree structure of Figure 1 will immediately shed light on the 
potential of adapting these empirical variables for the purposes of normative 
evaluation (see Table 4 in the Appendix).  
The linkage process unfolds through five major phases: the formulation of 
policy preferences; the formulation of pledges; the assignment of party seats in the 
legislature; government formation; and execution. A brief evaluation of the variables, 
as situated in this process, from a normative standpoint is as follows. 
Forward-looking voter preferences lie at the root of all ex ante theories of 
representation. However, these may or may not be reflected in party manifestos since 
bottom-up preference representation is limited by incomplete, transient and 
manipulated preferences. The actual mandate formation process is less reminiscent of 
a nationwide poll of opinions on all policy issue than an amalgamation of party 
stances, ideologies and polls of preferences regarding specific issues. The resulting 
electoral programs provide a transparent interface for voters’ interaction with parties, 
and for both interested parties the content of the contract is unveiled during the 
campaign. Information is readily available, at no or negligible cost, and voters make 
their choice by either using it or opting for rational ignorance about it.  
The key normative concept of these first two phases (preferences formulation; 
pledge formulation) is the bad mandate. A bad mandate is by and large unrelated to 
mandate content: electoral authorization is always ripe with content as a mandate may 
include policy, personal and party elements with only blurred lines separating these 
segments (Hershey, 1994). Manifestos also provide a wide selection of information for 
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voters, including the party’s position in the policy space (such as the left-right 
spectrum), what issues it emphasizes, and the general weight of policy issues as 
opposed to political statements with no policy relevance. The wide variety of variables 
in empirical pledge research describing content (context area; status quo; favored 
groups; expand/cut taxes; policy instruments) reflects the diversity of types of content.  
Nevertheless, the most widely used variables in this category only derive their 
normative importance from describing the information level of campaigns not actual 
policy positions. In this context better information (in terms of its scope, depth, 
concreteness: see the output/outcome variable) equals better mandates. Similarly, the 
lack of manifestos may be indicative of bad mandates (even as a counterweight to the 
lack of explicit manifestos the policy history of parties and candidates should also be 
factored in). More salient pledges, on the contrary, have a higher visibility in the 
mandate ‘cloud’ and, therefore, they are expected to be fulfilled at a higher rate. 
Finally, economic indicators are factored in both to electoral decisions and policy 
outcome, yet—as they lag behind political decisions; and an element of luck is ever 
present—they have no clear normative relevance.
11 
Election day provides a linkage between the electorate and parties, which forms 
the basis of a legitimate government (see ex ante authorization, as the first step in the 
delegation chain). Elections (via turnout, voting and the electoral system) convert 
policy preferences to party size in the legislature.  
The crucial element here is the proportionality of pledge fulfillment to party 
size. This sets the normative evaluation of a number of overlapping variables 
(including coalition/grand coalition; chief executive). Of these, government/opposition 
clearly enjoys a unique position, both in theory and empirical research: it selects the 
subjects of pledge fulfillment (governing parties) as well as the actual set of pledges to 
be fulfilled. Consensus pledges, which a number of parties explicitly support, are to be 
fulfilled at a higher ratio than, say, ‘purely’ opposition pledges because of their wider 
support. This reasoning also applies to pledges featured in the coalition agreement. 
Perhaps the most developed set of explanatory variables in current mandate 
research concern government formation. Yet most of these variables are related to the 
trade-off between governability (having a stable government as opposed to a constant 
flow of early elections) and pledge fulfillment. This phase gives rise to the idea of 
unified and divided mandates, with the latter prevalent in the cases of coalition 
governments. The number of participants (coalition/single party government) and 
their ideological background (coalition/grand coalition) in itself signifies no normative 
value. They may be the result of a dominantly proportional electoral system or 
heterogeneous voter preferences. Furthermore, ministerial control may be misaligned 
with pledges made, but may be the price to be paid for a stable government. 
While variables related to government formation may serve as the key focus of 
some pledge research, the ultimate phase of implementation is more important from 
the perspective of normative analysis. In this stage the mandate is already set for each 
policy area: either by virtue of the initial authorization or the reshuffle of saliency and 
                                                          
11
 In fact, the study of ’mandate cloud fulfillment’ instead of ’pledge fulfillment’ or ’saliency research’ 
could lead to a new, more realistic research direction. Needless to say, this would involve a more detailed 
analysis of campaigns contrary to the current focus on government fulfillment. 
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control due to government formation. Nevertheless, divided government still plays a 
role with regards to the problem of input vs. output legitimacy.  
The wider bureaucratic structure, including the institutions of the system of 
separation of powers is a ‘melting pot’, where sources of legitimacy are intermixed. 
From an institutional perspective, constitutional courts and independent central banks 
are designed in a way that is expressly meant to give them the ability to withstand 
public pressure. Thus, input legitimacy (the theoretical basis on which ex ante 
authorization processes are built) competes with output legitimacy: in the eyes of the 
electorate, the value of pledge fulfillment competes with ‘good’ policy outcomes. The 
trunk of the delegation tree is disconnected from certain policy decisions in the given 
policy domain: some branches grow out of this trunk, others are hanging in the air. 
This presents a complicated scenario for normative analysis. On the one hand, 
non-fulfillment or the lack of co-operation by non-majoritarian institutions (such as the 
role a central bank plays in pledges concerning economic growth) represents a trade-
off between input and output legitimacy. On the other hand, agency slippage, in the 
form of shirking by street level bureaucrats or others, is considered detrimental for the 
proper functioning of the mandate model. The status of what could be referred to as 
partner noncompliance is less straightforward: this is typical of outcome-related 
pledges, as they require the cooperation of extra-governmental actors. In these cases 
coercing non-obliging actors into joint action may have adverse consequences for 
representative government as a whole. 
Taken together, the above-mentioned factors have a bearing on the rate of 
pledge fulfillment. In general, pledge fulfillment may be favorable from a normative 
perspective, but non-fulfillment is not necessarily bad. As a result pledge fulfillment 
can only be normatively evaluated in the wider context of the process of 
representation, and by a detailed analysis of each step and variable related to this 
process. 
Mandate slippage can only be measured when provided a good mandate: 
missing and ill-defined sources are difficult to track through the process of delegation. 
Variables widely used in pledge research may prove key components in any empirical 
analysis of mandate slippage. They may fall into good, neutral or bad categories 
depending on the presence of logics competing with the inherent value of pledge 
fulfillment (such as governability or output legitimacy).  
As for our normative analysis, only a few variables stand out for their normative 
relevance both when it comes to bad mandates and bad mandate slippage. The 
composition of the mandate cloud lead to relatively good or bad mandates, as in the 
case of output and outcome pledges. Bad mandate slippage may result from agency 
shirking in the implementation phase. In contrast, the positive evaluation of 
government party fulfillment could lead to a wider category encompassing various 
forms of popular support and party size (pledges enjoying a wider consensus; put forth 
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This article introduced the concept of mandate slippage, and the related terminology 
of bad mandates, as well as good and bad mandate slippage. It relates these concepts 
to empirical pledge research as the research agenda of the latter presents a unique 
opportunity to apply these concepts to the reality of contemporary representative 
government.  
The argument unfolded in three steps. First, the baseline principal-agent theory 
of representation was presented. Its various discontents include its reliance on the 
delegation chain metaphor and its inability to incorporate parallel processes of 
governance. For these reasons the alternative metaphor of the delegation tree was 
introduced. This captures more accurately the multiplicity of policy subsystems and 
the individual paths of various pledges from formulation to implementation.  
Second, the concepts of bad mandates, and those of good and bad mandate 
slippages were introduced in order to account for disrupted principal-agent relations. 
Third, the conceptual framework presented in the previous chapters is translated for 
the purposes of empirical research in order to be able to measure mandate slippage. It 
was argued that the theory of mandate slippage offers a hitherto missing general 
framework for situating and understanding empirical variables in the preferences-
program-policy linkage.  
Throughout our analysis the point was made that empirical pledge research will 
only make sense from a normative perspective if it can answer two simple questions:  
 
1. Is non-fulfillment bad for representation? 
2. If and when it is bad, which factors are responsible for this negative outcome? 
 
In contrast to extant research based on implicit mandate theory, the answer put forth 
to the first questions is: ‘not necessarily’. Indeed, one of the aims of this paper was to 
show that non-fulfillment may be related to neutral or even beneficial factors in the 
linkage process leading to ‘good’ representation. In the most simple rendering, ‘good’ 
representation consists of ‘good’ substance and ‘good’ process. On the one hand, a 
properly functioning delegation chain (or tree) provides the latter. On the other hand, 
it is quite impossible to forecast in a pre-defined manifesto all decisions of a 
parliamentary cycle of, say, four years. This is why both pledges and issue saliency 
matter—and also the missing element of underlying party ideology as well as the 
general trends in the (policy) contents of past decisions.  
‘Good substance,’ therefore, partly results from this more general link between 
campaign content (best understood as a ‘pledge cloud’) and government deeds. The 
other source of good substance is leadership or finding adequate answers in response 




The second research question concerns factors underlying pledge non-
fulfillment in a negative normative status. In the analysis two main culprits are picked 
                                                          
12
 This source is unrelated to ex ante authorization and, therefore, is of less importance for our current 
purposes. 
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out: bad mandates and bad mandate slippage. Bad mandates make pledge fulfillment 
irrelevant as in these cases there are no pledges to start with, or because they are 
vague, disorienting even. Bad mandate slippage causes the non-fulfillment of pledges 
in a way that is unrelated to normatively valuable trade-offs between fulfillment and 
governability or outcome legitimacy. 
In conclusion, a normatively relevant pledge (and saliency) research agenda 
should focus more on variables that have some bearing on bad mandates or bad 
mandate slippage. This entails more emphasis on the initial and ultimate phases of the 
delegation process: pledge formulation and implementation. A reoriented research 
agenda will make great strides toward fulfilling the promise of pledge research as the 
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 Abbreviations: exog. for exogenous; govern’t for government. Variable groups are presented by 
headline variable followed by related variables in the literature in brackets. GDP growth (Economic 
index); Election year (Election period); Context area (Issue area; Subject category; Policy area; Pledge 
field; Domestic; Socio-economic; Planned economy; Economic field); Status quo (Change); Expand/cut 
taxes (Expand/cut spending; More/less public sector); Policy instruments (Legislation; Review); Party 
platform topic saliency (‘prominenter’; Media coverage); Output (Action); Legislative majority (U.S. 
congressional control); Coalition agreement (Inter-party agreement; Government agreement); Ministerial 












































EXOG. GDP growth H3 V V 3
DUMMY Election year V V V V 4
PLEDGE Context area V V V V V V V 7
PLEDGE Status quo V H5 V V H2 V V V V H4 V 11
PLEDGE Favoured grops V 1
PLEDGE Expand/cut taxes V V V H4 V V V 7
PLEDGE Policy instruments V V V 3
PLEDGE EU H1-2 V V 3
PLEDGE Pledge saliency H8 V V H5 4
PLEDGE Output/outcome V V V V 4
PARTY Gov party vs. Opp. H1 H1 H1 H1 H1 H1 V V H1 9
PARTY Incumbency V 1
PARTY Legislative majority V V 2
PARTY Party size / seat share H2 V 2
PARTY Consensus / Agree V H6-7 H3 V V H6 V 7
GOVERN'T Coalition/single party gov H2 V V V H2 5
GOVERN'T Coalition/grand coalition H2 1
GOVERN'T Minority government V H2-3 V V 4
GOVERN'T Short governments V V 2
GOVERN'T Coalition agreement H4 V V V V H7 6
GOVERN'T Ministerial control H3 H3 V V V V V H3 8
GOVERN'T Chief executive H2 V V 3
TOTAL 6 4 4 1 7 10 7 5 5 6 3 10 7 8 8 6 97
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Table 4. The normative status of pledge research variables 













representation is limited by 
incomplete, transient and 
manipulated preferences 
Pledges 




No clear hierarchy between 
policy areas is discernible when 




As long as they convey a clear 
message, status quo and change-





Preferences for favoured groups 




As long as they convey a clear 
message, government 
expansion/cuts-type pledges can 




Alternative policy instruments 
may lead to similar results 
Pledge saliency 
The fulfillment of more 
salient pledges is 
preferred 
More salient pledges have a 
higher visibility in the mandate 
‘cloud’ 
Output/outcome 
Output pledges are 
preferred 
Outcome pledges exploit the 
bounded rationality of the 
electorate; May only be fulfilled 
with luck. Outcome pledges can 
be considered to be an 







Economic indicators lag behind 
political decisions; an element 





A higher ratio of 
government party pledge 
fulfillment is preferred 
Government party pledge 
fulfillment is in line with 
responsible party government 
theory: Opposition pledge 
fulfillment may also be 
beneficial if it is related to 
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Legislative majority / 
party size 
Bigger parties should 
have more clout over 
pledge fulfillment (even 
in opposition) 
Electoral institutions may place 
the party with the largest vote 
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Coalition or single party 
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the vote of a heterogenous 
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formateur party pledge 
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size 




There is a trade-off between 
governability and mandate 
fulfillment. Furthermore, a 
minority government may still 
be supported by a majority of 
the electorate (due to the effects 
of the electoral system) 
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The redemption of 
consensus pledges is 
preferred 
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There is a trade-off between 
governability and mandate 
fulfillment: a stable government 
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to relinquish portfolios 
pertinent to its most salient 
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Chief executive 
Insofar as the party 
affiliation of the chief 
executive is indicative of 
party size a higher 
fulfillment ratio is 
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As a general empirical tendency 
the party with the highest vote 
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Varieties on Discursive Governance 
Umut Korkut, Kesi Mahendran, Gregg Bucken-Knapp, and Robert Henry 
Cox (eds) (2015): Discursive Governance in Politics, Policy and the Public 
Sphere. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
The view that ideas play an important role in the policy process can be labelled as 
commonplace today. More than two decades ago, Peter Hall argued (Hall 1993) that 
beyond expertise and technical knowledge, we also have to consider policy paradigms 
to understand public policy-making. His article has ‘provide[d] a foothold for a new 
wave of ideational scholarship in policy science’ (Béland – Cox 2013, 195). However, 
recent pieces of that ideational scholarship seem to problematize the structuralism of 
the Hallian approach, and lay a greater emphasis on agency (see e.g. Bevir – Rhodes 
2006; Béland – Cox 2011; Hay 2011). This focus on agency is often coupled by a 
focus on the broader categories of discourse and ideas (see e.g. Schmidt 2002; 2010; 
2014). These factors enable ideational approaches to acknowledge the normative role 
of intersubjective ideas in regulating political conduct, and at the same time pay 
attention to the active role of political agency in shaping those ideas. 
The volume edited by Umut Korkut, Kesi Mahendran, Gregg Buckan-Knapp, 
and Robert Henry Cox fits into this research tradition. Cox, a prominent figure in 
today’s ideational scholarship, highlights in his Preface that ‘[t]he main intellectual 
message in this volume is that most of the social world is socially constructed’ (xiii.). 
The meaning of ‘discursive governance’ is to be understood in the light of that social 
constructivist assumption. As the editors in the Introduction put it: ‘discursive 
governance refers to implicit mechanisms of governance resting on narratives, 
leitmotifs, and strategic metaphors in political language, and the subsequent framing of 
policies using such language to interpose ideas in order to affect political and social 
representations within the public sphere in accordance with the wishes of political 
authorities.’ (p. 2) In this volume, as in several constructivist/ideational works, 
discourse is seen as strategic (in the sense of being a tool of legitimizing policy 
measures or achieving political goals), as well as constitutive (in the sense of shaping 
the perceptions of those who participate in the discourse). 
The editors argue that identities, communities, as well as institutions are shaped 
by our ideas that we communicate through discourse. To use Schmidt’s distinction 
(Schmidt 2002), the discourse has both an ideational and an interactive dimension. 
The editors see the most important contribution of the volume in reconstructing the 
latter, interactive dimension, or, as they put it in ‘tracing the discursive relationship 
among actors, namely governments and political parties, policy participants and 
societal actors, and the public’ (p. 2). 
Each chapter of the volume analyses an empirical case (or compares more 
cases), and tries to draw some theoretical conclusions, ask potentially important 
questions for further research. Although the cases show a great variety, there are some 
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topics on which several chapters touch, such as European integration, migration, or 
gender equality. The methods used by the authors are also manifold, ranging from 
qualitative content analysis through critical discourse and critical frame analysis to 
quota-sampled interviews. In the following, I will try to touch briefly upon the main 
findings of every article, while dwelling longer on some of them to illustrate a couple 
of the main problems addressed by the volume. 
The volume is organized into three parts. As the variety of topics and methods 
suggest, chapters are often connected rather loosely. In the first part, the focus is 
mainly on political parties, more precisely on how they use and generate discourses. 
In the second, other political and social actors come to the fore; and the third is 
mainly about the role of the public sphere in discursive governance. The first and 
second parts contain four chapters each, while the third consists of three.  
In the opening chapter, Lena Karamanidou uses a Critical Discourse Analysis 
approach to identify and analyse different frames and narratives that Greek 
government parties used about violence against migrants. The frame of illegalization 
denied migrants their true asylum-seekers status by emphasizing the illegality of the 
way they entered the country; while the frame of securitization identified migration as 
a threat to employment, national and cultural identity and to public order. The 
narratives construing anti-migrant violence as isolated events (in an expressive 
metaphor of a government spokesperson: ‘[i]n every basket of apples there is a rotten 
one that needs to be removed’ – p. 23) and recurrently emphasizing a lack of evidence 
served similar goals. In Karamanidou’s view, these goals were, on the one hand, to 
cover certain institutional (structural) shortcomings of the Greek polity (the 
unaccountability of security agencies, and connected to it the flawed nature of 
investigations about cases of violence committed by them). On the other hand, they 
helped the state to maintain one of its highly symbolic functions (the exercise of 
sovereignty understood as protecting citizens), and at the same time to cover the 
failure of the Greek state to exercise this function within the normative requirements 
of liberal democracy. The paradox of the case lies in the fact that while the 
government condemned violence against migrants as a violation of democratic norms, 
the discursive practices mentioned above contributed to the legitimization of that 
violence. 
The chapter written by Umut Korkut and Aron Buzogány problematizes the 
interaction between institutional (structural) and ideational factors. They compare the 
health care policy reforms in Slovakia and Hungary. What makes this comparison 
particularly interesting is that despite the similarity of certain conditions and of the 
ideational background of the reforms (neo-liberal economic ideas) one of the attempts 
ended with success, the other with complete failure. They argue that the different 
outcomes were due to the different relationship between institutional and discursive 
factors. In Slovakia, the institutional arrangements (the position of reform teams 
within government; the role of prime minister Dzurinda as a publicly acknowledged, 
authentic leader, head of a Europeanizing right-wing elite and as middleman in the 
coalition; the opportunity of coalition partners to carry out their own portfolio) played 
a vital role in the success by boosting ideational factors. By contrast, in Hungary the 
synergy between ideational and institutional factors was missing. Coalition tensions 
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between the liberals and the socialists, the weakening authority of Hungarian PM 
Ferenc Gyurcsány after his leaked Őszöd-speech (in which he admitted lying to the 
voters before the elections), and the dissipation of the government’s reform capacity 
with the dismissal of the liberal minister for healthcare Lajos Molnár led to the failure 
of the reform plans. Besides these factors, the successful negative framing of the 
planned reform by then-opposition party Fidesz also contributed to the failure. 
According to the authors, ‘the Hungarian case illustrates [that] discursive factors 
cannot bring forward policy reforms unless they enjoy institutional factors that enforce 
their resonance in the public sphere and impact of policy making’ (p. 59). The 
conclusion of the chapter in fact seems to point toward the limits of discursive 
governance: ideational factors and discourse on their own are not enough for a 
successful reform. 
The remaining two chapters of this part show how parties use certain ideas 
strategically. In the article of Mikael Nygård et al., the idea of social investment, 
human capital and equality of opportunity (concepts usually having a positive 
connotation) are used to legitimate policy shifts undertaken by parties. Mari K. Niemi 
shows how the selection of women as party leaders serves strategic purposes, although 
in different ways. In the Swedish case, through the selection of Mona Sahlin, her party 
tried to appeal to the Swedish public that is very sensitive about equality issues; while 
in the Finnish case the cause of selecting Jutta Urpilainen was rather her immaculate 
image. This difference draws our attention to the importance of the public/discursive 
context: as Niemi emphasizes, contrary to the common sense notion, the several kinds 
of Nordic public are not homogeneous when it comes to progressiveness. 
While parties are the primary initiators of policy discourses, other agents can 
play active roles as well. The rest of the book is about such actors – the second part 
about societal actors and policy participants, the third about the role of the public. 
The chapter by Marcin Dąbrowski illustrates how a new public policy 
instrument (the Joint European Support for Sustainable Investment in City Areas – 
JESSICA) ‘can result in the discursive frames becoming reality through incentives to 
change behavior and the perceived interest of the actors’ (p. 93). The new frame 
mentioned is the ‘results-oriented’ recalibration of the EU cohesion policy by the 
European Commission, following the economic crises and the emergence of the idea 
of austerity. 
A common point between the chapter by Dąbrowski and that by Alexandra 
Bousiou and Antonios Kontis is the importance of how policy actors interpret certain 
discursive packages presented to them. While in the former case, the new 
Commission Discourse and the policy instrument fostered new (although not at all 
unproblematic) cooperation and synergies between policy actors, in the latter case a 
narrative competition has begun. That competition takes place between the asylum 
policy of the EU and the bilateral agreements of southern member states with the 
countries of North-Africa concerning migration control. While the measures of the 
EU asylum policy are both control- and prevention oriented (both short- and long-
term), the inability of this union-level policy to handle cases of emergency led 
southern member states to focus only on the short-term, control-oriented measures. 
This resulted in disregarding the long-term dimension and several normative aspects 
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of the EU-level policy (e.g. that of refugee protection, and democratic reforms in 
North-African countries). Therefore, while the presence of a potentially 
transformative policy-instrument (that of JESSICA) can help in turning discursive 
commitments into reality, the lack of such instruments (in the case of EU asylum-
policy) can lead to rivalling interpretations and narrative competition. 
The other two chapters in this part show the potential power of discourse and 
the role of other, non-party actors in the discursive process. In the chapter written by 
Angela O’Hagan, these actors are femocrats and policy entrepreneurs who are able to 
present a particular policy goal (the introduction of gender budgeting) as essential to 
achieving the policy priorities of governments. Gregg Bucken-Knapp et al. 
emphasized the role of the media in framing labour migration in Sweden.  
A key question of any discursive theory is how we look upon the ‘recipients’ of 
the discourse, that is, upon the wider public. The third part of the volume tries to 
cope with this problem. The last chapter written by Hande Eslen-Ziya et al. is about 
the potential tension between constitutional norms and public attitudes. The case that 
it analyses is the paradox of the South African equality legislation: while equality as a 
norm resonates with the views of South-African society, LGBTI rights form an 
exception. This fact renders the constitutional protection of these rights ineffective. In 
this case, ideas challenge formal institutions – more precisely: the ‘conservative’ ideas 
of the public are at odds with the ‘progressive’ ideas institutionalized in the 
constitution. Ideas in this case are understood as ‘beliefs held by people in general’ (p. 
179). It is remarkable that the authors of the chapter seem to attribute a rather passive 
role of the citizenry, relying on former researches that conclude that ‘citizens lack 
factual information on political matters [and] [s]uch deficiency in political knowledge 
[...] affects their political behavior’ (p. 186). This view leads them to emphasize the 
role of the political and social elite (state representatives, churches, media) in forming 
public beliefs. 
Contrary to the analysis of Eslen-Ziya et al., the chapter by Kesi Mahendran et 
al. offers a micro-level perspective and attributes a more active role to citizens in the 
discursive processes. Relying on quota-sampled interviews of non-migrants, intra-
European migrants and non-European migrants, they investigate citizens’ ideas about 
European citizenship. They draw on Bakhtin’s concept of ‘authoring’, a process where 
people create a dialogical self, bringing in the voices of others when speaking about a 
topic – in this case, about their relationship to European citizenship. This points 
towards an understanding of social representations as dynamically created during 
interactions, and ‘exist[ing] between people, rather than in the heads of people’ (p. 
148); and towards the European public sphere understood as ‘a relational site [...] a 
more symbolic space, where stories circulate and shared stories create borders’ (pp. 
153–154). These theoretical considerations lead them to introduce the concept of the 
‘dialogical citizen’, that ‘enables a public citizen to emerge engaged with stories, 
metaphors and narrative ideas as a way of both enacting and making sense of Europe’ 
(p. 152), thereby actively engaging with ‘social knowledge circulating in a globalized 
and relational public space’ (p. 161). The image of the ‘dialogical citizen’ is founded 
on the interviews conducted by the authors. They identify various identification and 
disidentification patterns among the interviewed. The results lead to a conclusion 
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contrary to Raymond Aron’s statement that ‘[t]he European idea is empty’, and to the 
claim that ‘it seems to have gained some narrative plausibility [because] ordinary 
people are able to project their ideals into the European project’ (p. 161). More 
concretely, they identify the ‘freedom through mobility’ narrative as a potential basis 
of identification with the EU-project. 
The last chapter of the volume by Arno van der Zwet tries to reconstruct the 
dynamics of how party discourses resonate with the public; it focuses on the parties’ 
innovative use of a certain idea. The problem he analyses is how endorsing the idea of 
European integration can contribute to the mainstreaming of stateless nationalist and 
regionalist parties. He identifies three main areas: legitimizing core goals, moderating 
core message, and offering a platform for learning (through participating in the 
European Free Alliance). The main finding is that the protean nature of the European 
integration narrative and the malleability of the European idea is a crucial factor that 
enables these parties to frame it to their strategic goals – showing it as either a process 
towards post-sovereignty (as in the case of the Flemish FNP), or as an 
intergovernmental cooperation of sovereign nation-states (as in the case of the Scottish 
SNP). 
In summary, the volume offers a wide range of contributions to several highly 
actual problems (such as the migration problem or the future perspectives of the 
welfare state), and sophisticated analyses about their impacts on concrete policy fields. 
Researchers interested in the topics of European integration or gender equality, and in 
critical or feminist perspectives could also read it with interest. The structure of the 
volume is mainly logical – a considerable merit at this thematic and methodological 
variety – although one might have questions at some points (for example it seems to 
me that the chapter by van der Zwet might fit better into the first part than the one by 
Korkut and Buzogány).  
Finally, a short remark about the notion of ‘discursive governance’. Discursive 
approaches often face the fact that there is substantial distance between their 
theoretical background and their empirical analyses. The reader might feel something 
similar in the case of this volume, too. While the theoretical parts (the Preface and the 
Introduction) articulate a clear-cut social constructivist view, some chapters deal with 
problems that would not necessarily (or only partly) need this theoretical background 
to be addressed (e.g. the ‘classical’ institutional problems in the case of Korkut and 
Buzogány; an EU-level policy failure and national responses to it in the case of 
Bousiou and Kontis; or the impacts and shortcomings of a new policy instrument in 
Dąbrowski’s chapter). At the same time, some chapters (most notably that by 
Mahendran et al.) build on social constructivist views more substantively. So, if I had 
to name the lowest common denominator of all chapters, it would be – to borrow a 
phrase from Thomas A. Schwandt – some kind of ‘garden-variety constructivism’ 
(Schwandt 2010, 46.), meaning here that all authors attribute some importance to 
discursive factors, although in some cases this role is rather supplementary, in others 
more substantial. However, this is certainly not a grave problem, and it is perhaps 
even unavoidable in the case of a volume that tries to connect many authors with 
different topics and approaches. 
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The past decades have been characterised by a puzzling dilemma of 
the politics of the ‘Roma issue’ in European societies and also on the 
international level. On the one hand, due to the intense work of a 
range of influential international organisations of Roma representation 
and the enduring efforts of a group of dedicated politicians acting on 
the European level, the case of Roma has become thematised in 
political terms and as such, it has been drawn into the arena of 
governmental and inter-governmental politics and policy-making. As a 
peak of such efforts, the formulation of a national strategy on Roma 
inclusion has been made a task for all member states of the European 
Union and this way it has been successfully elevated to the existing 
mechanisms of monitoring and reviewing as parts of the Europe-wide 
applied open method of coordination in outlining developmental 
plans and policies. On the other hand, domestic statistics and research 
signal the lack of any improvement in the situation of Roma: 
occurrences of discrimination and segregation have not diminished, 
poverty and the extreme inequalities hitting Roma in education, work 
and the daily conditions of living have not been decreased, and the 
tendencies of exclusion have become stronger in a wide range of local 
communities all across. In an indirect way, these latter developments 
indicate the weakness and marginal state of Roma politics in attaining 
any breakthrough in the structures of power. A closer look at the 
conditions in a broader scope of political participation reveals how 
informality in articulating needs and claims weakens the potency of 
the minority in influencing decision-making about their cause, while 
the very same relations properly fit into their experiences of daily 
living. An overview of the conditions and prevailing relations in 
education and work in marginalised Roma communities will serve to 
demonstrate the congruence of informalisation between the daily 
realities and their political representation.  
 
Keywords: political participation; informality; minority rights.
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The past decades have been characterised by a puzzling dilemma of the politics of the 
‘Roma issue’ in European societies and also on the international level. On the one 
hand, due to the intense work of a range of influential international organisations of 
Roma representation and the enduring efforts of a group of dedicated politicians 
acting on the European level, the case of Roma has become thematised in political 
terms and as such, it has been drawn into the arena of governmental and inter-
governmental politics and policy-making (Vermeersch, 2007; van Baar, 2011). On the 
other hand, national statistics and research signal the lack of any improvement in the 
situation of Roma: occurrences of discrimination and segregation have not 
diminished, poverty and the extreme inequalities hitting Roma in education, work and 
the daily conditions of living have not been decreased, and the tendencies of exclusion 
have become stronger in a wide range of local communities all across Europe (FRA, 
2014; Kullmann et al., 2014). In an indirect way, these latter developments indicate 
the weakness and marginal state of Roma politics in attaining any breakthrough in the 
prevailing distribution of power and thus signal the perpetuation of the social and 
political contexts that bring about an undisturbed reproduction of deprivation and 
exclusion.    
Such a duality suggests that the politics of the ‘Roma issue’ is caught by 
unbridgeable departures. On the one hand, new institutions and new mechanisms of 
negotiations are in place in international and macro-level domestic currents, but these 
function largely without Roma participation; on the other hand, politically meaningful 
representation is seriously lacking in the settings where Roma live and where their 
lives are framed by the largely unchanged conditions of the communities that they are 
part of (Kóczé, 2013; Pajic, 2013).  
However, this duality and the sharp discrepancies between the macro- and 
micro-level politics around the ‘Roma issue’ call for explanation. Most frequently it is 
pointed out that, as part of the Europeanisation process driven by shared interests of 
unity of Europe’s nation-states, powerful alliances could be created around the ‘Roma 
issue’ as framed in terms of discrimination (human rights violation) and the rights of 
national minorities (Vermeersch, 2007; Sigona and Trehan, 2009; van Baar, 2011). At 
the same time, issues of segregation, poverty and deprivation as daily experiences in 
local communities rarely invoke political responses. Such failures of local-level politics 
and policy-making are, however, generally attributed to the widespread ‘indifference’ 
of Roma. ‘Indifference’ is usually reasoned to be due to their low education and their 
preoccupation with struggles for securing daily subsistence; it follows that the great 
majority of Roma neither have the potentials in time and energy nor have the 
knowledge to play politics (Ringold, Orenstein and Wilkens, 2005). Therefore, 
exclusion from participating in politics has to be seen as a ‘natural’ consequence and 
as a deeply ingrained cultural feature that is daily reproduced by the very conditions at 
the heart of the problem. This way the duality is represented as an unchangeable given 
and the responsibility for such a state of affairs is left with the Roma minority and its 
‘uninterested’ orientation.  
This article aims to show that ‘indifference’ as an attitudinal trait of Roma does 
not provide a proper conceptualisation of the reality of Roma participation in local 
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affairs. Instead, I propose to approach the phenomenon by extending the notion of 
political participation through embracing both its formal and informal manifestations1. 
As I will attempt to show, a closer look at the conditions that shape Roma 
participation in local public life reveals the dominance of personified informal 
relations between the local majority and the minority. It will be pointed out that these 
relations largely hinder the evolution of organised political representation and actions 
while they maintain informality and the adjacent invisibility of Roma political 
involvement.  
The theoretical foundations of such an extended approach to the phenomenon 
are provided by the classic work of Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward on Poor 
People’s Movement (1979) who propose to conceptualise the often non-traditional 
movements and actions of the poor American working class by framing their cases in 
the structural positions of those involved, on the one hand, and the potentials – and 
the limitations – of accessing various organisational settings in attaining their specific 
goals, on the other hand. Such a framing of the political processes allows for seeing 
the emerging claims in the context of changing needs that are generated, in turn, by 
the dynamics of structural forces and it also helps to see how the often informal 
associations behind these claims find their way to political expressions by reinventing 
and reinterpreting the existing organisational arrangements of collective action.   
A similar approach seems fruitful in the case of local Roma communities. 
Instead of ‘throwing out of the boat’ all the non-traditional incidences of participation 
and activity, the extension of our analysis to the embedding of such occurrences into 
the local social structures and their reflective analysis against the locally given 
organisational frameworks promises to bring in new aspects of involvement and 
expression. As I will argue below, such an extension of the scope implies the 
recognition of the formal and informal aspects of Roma daily living whereby a largely 
unrecognised duality of formality/informality can be brought into the understanding of 
everyday Roma political participation. 
The empirical foundation of the discussion that follows is provided by a recent 
cross-country comparative study on ‘Faces and causes of Roma marginalization and 
                                                 
1 
The distinction between the formal and informal forms of political participation considers the 
difference in the ways how participation is organised. Formal participation takes place either in registered 
organisations that follow legally defined rules of functioning and accountability, and/or it involves 
engagement in political activities that are organised according to set general regulations (e.g. elections). In 
addition to political organisations, participation in formal politics also embraces involvement in politically 
meaningful actions of non-political organisations (e.g. political demonstrations of trade unions). At the 
same time, the informal forms of political participation rely on spontaneously evolving loose associations 
of people and/or on one-time actions that do not claim lasting membership. Such loose associations and 
actions often emerge in response to certain non-political claims (e.g. educational needs, access to public 
work, etc.) and it is the public character of them that makes them ‘political’. It is often the case that 
spontaneous informal collectives make steps towards formalisation through setting up a new registered 
entity (mainly a new NGO). However, such a development requires a modicum of human and material 
resources that are often not available to those involved in informal actions. It has to be noted that the 
border between the formal and the informal forms of politics is sometimes quite obscure: due to internal 
conflicts or the lack of resources, attempts at providing organisational framing to local politics might fail 
or the experiment might prove transient, while a group of the most dedicated members of the community 
go ‘underground’ and try to maintain the political content of their work and network in the form of 
initiated informal actions.     
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exclusion in local communities’ that was run between 2012-14 in selected urban and 
rural communities in Hungary, Romania, and Serbia. This study looked at the 
structures and processes of marginalisation and exclusion in multi-ethnic communities 
with substantial Roma population and important groups of the non-Roma living in 
close proximity to the concentrated Roma communities. By combining quantitative 
data-collections and qualitative techniques of personal interviews and focus group 
discussions, the study looked in details at the locally existing provisions and 
developmental attempts in education, work and employment, and housing and 
infrastructure and contrasted these conditions with the daily experiences of their users, 
the young and adult generations of Roma and the poor. Experiences and opinions of 
the inhabitants of the marginalised Roma/poor segments were seen also in a relational 
way by facing them with the views of the representatives of the local non-Roma 
community whose explanations for the prevailing ethnic and ethnicised inequalities 
gave important points of reference in understanding the local power relations. This 
mirroring exercise helped us in detecting the major points of controversies and 
constraints between how Roma in dependency and non-Roma in power receive, 
explain and handle the same set of phenomena and the same set of relations in their 
background. Furthermore, the study put substantial weight on exploring the forms and 
the contents of participation in various domains of education, work and daily living in 
the broad sense of the term. It was our explicit aim to test how existing organisational 
settings are used and mobilised in meeting the needs of marginalised communities 
and how certain inadequacies of these settings are challenged by varied forms of 
informal participation. Given such extensions of the classical notion of engagement in 
politics, the collected material provides fertile soil for scrutinising the conditions and 
the logic of various forms of political participation ranging from informal involvement 
to the take-up of roles of representation and leadership. The discussion that follows 
builds on the extensive analyses of these conditions and manifestations as presented 
by the three in-depth country-studies of the research (Váradi and Virág, 2014a; 
Vincze, E. et al., 2014a; Cevjić, 2014a). 
 
The institutional frameworks  
 
The claim for creating appropriate frameworks for minority representation as parts of 
the legal, regulatory and administrative structures was one of the fundamental 
requirements that the three countries faced in joining the European Union. The case 
of Roma enjoyed particular importance in these preparatory negotiations. The 
responses to the claims of the EU required a thorough exploration of what ‘minority 
status’ and ‘minority rights’ mean in their respective social contexts. For sure, the 
concept of minority rights was new in their socio-political contexts. Given the ‘one 
nation – one state’ approach of the ruling Communist ideology and politics during the 
decades of state-socialism, even sizeable national minorities were denied special rights 
and institutions. With the profound turn now towards a liberal understanding of 
nationhood and towards the celebration of multinational/multicultural social relations, 
the concepts of nationhood and minority status gained new interpretations and these 
became the cornerstones of conceptualising identities and membership in the polity. 
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At the same time, these new interpretations had to be positioned against the prevailing 
traditions of representation and administration. The former problem meant to 
interpret the minority status of an ethnic group and meaningfully relate it to those of 
national minorities. The latter task bore on the institutional design: the frameworks of 
representation and rights protection had to be adjusted into the existing structures of 
national, regional and local governance. The three countries responded in three 
different ways to these challenges. However, their responses had an important 
common element: the case of Roma was kept apart from that of the traditional 
national minorities, and frameworks were created to guarantee the long-term 
maintenance of structural separation.  
Hungary2 experimented with the inauguration of a brand-new institution: in 
1993 it established the system of local minority self-governments that were perceived 
as elected representative bodies to safeguard the cultural rights of the country’s 13 
national and ethnic minorities. This decentralised system of minority representation 
fits well into the highly decentralised structures of public administration. However, the 
restriction of representation to culture and the cultural contents (but not the framings) 
of education has implied that, from their inception, the local Roma self-governments 
were emptied of providing true representation.3 After all, the preservation and 
revitalisation of Roma culture meant that the most pressing issues of discrimination, 
poverty and exclusion remained outside of the assigned competence of the new 
bodies. What is more, expectations in this regard implied the outright maintenance of 
those structures of deprivation that largely conditioned Roma culture in the past. 
Despite all these controversies and despite also the often constrained functioning of 
the new institutions due to tense local majority-minority relations, the system of 
minority self-governments provided for the first time electoral opportunities. Mainly 
this is the qualifying aspect of the new system that made it rather popular in Roma 
communities which is tellingly shown by the steadily growing number of local Roma 
self-governments by each election. Such a growing popularity reflects strong 
expectations of the Roma communities. Given the only available framework of 
representation and interest protection, they hope for some effective mediation and 
‘lobbying’, although they are aware that such functions are not formally assigned to the 
institution. The discrepancy between the formal entitlements and the informal 
expectations surrounds the local Roma self-governments with a good deal of 
informality: the local leaders of the institution are faced with a permanent duality and 
use their formal power to strengthen their informal position in the community while 
they simultaneously maintain similarly informal relations with the municipalities and 
the non-Roma leaders of the community-at-large. 
Romania4 gave a different response to the EU requirements concerning Roma 
minority rights. On the one hand, a set of new legal regulations on anti-discrimination, 
acknowledged minority status as part of citizenship, the banning of segregation and the 
                                                 
2
 The presentation of the Hungarian case of local Roma representation relies on Váradi and Virág 
(2014b). 
3
 Due to the relatively high educational level and above-average material conditions, further, due also to 
their small size and the support arriving from their mother-countries, the new system with new 
entitlements offers appropriate institutional framing for the other 12 minorities. 
4
 The presentation of the Romanian case of minority representation relies on Vincze (2014b). 
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extension of multicultural education were seen to circumscribe minority rights. On the 
other hand, due representation of Roma was understood as a matter of 
communication between the majority and the minority. Such an approach implied the 
administration of the Roma cause without changes in the prevailing administrative 
structure. Institutional innovations were driven by this latter consideration: within a 
short while the system of educational and health mediators was set up with the clear 
goal of providing better bridging. However, the new mediators were not armed with 
proper power. Their positioning between the Roma communities and the authorities 
in charge of public administration introduced a good deal of insecurity in their status 
and left them without clear means as much for proper minority representation as for 
enacting regulations and municipal interventions. Such a floating position gave birth to 
all-round suspicions. Roma saw the extended arm of authoritarian control in the work 
of the mediators, while the authorities found disturbing their ‘inappropriate’ claims 
and interventions as hindering their functioning instead of helping it. This way the 
system of mediators quickly became de-legitimised from both ends and it suffered 
personal losses by the mass-scale departure of the personnel. However, the dramatic 
weakening of a system that was weak from its inception left the Roma communities 
without channels for formal representation. Apart from the handful of Roma 
participating in national politics, Roma remained enclosed in the informality of their 
communities where interest representation and protection remained the direct 
derivatives of personal relations – on rare occasions for the fortune, but mainly for the 
misfortune of the affected communities. 
The Serbian case5 is different yet again. It is important to note that Serbia is still 
not a member state of the European Union. Although the ongoing negotiations 
accompanying the preparation of accession put important weight on the 
acknowledgement of Roma minority rights, a fully-fledged functioning of the 
respective institutional arrangements has not been expected yet. In this sense, the 
current administration of the Roma cause can be seen as transient and incomplete. 
Nevertheless, the outlines seem to be clear and nothing points towards any intentions 
for their alteration. As it appears, Serbia does not conceive of the ‘Roma issue’ in the 
framework of minority rights. Instead, the case is conceptualised in the refinement 
and better targeting of administrative arrangements. This is reflected in the fact that 
the EU challenges were responded to by creating a wide range of administrative 
positions: ‘Roma referees’ and ‘Roma departments’ with clearly defined tasks and 
responsibilities have been inserted into the ministerial hierarchies and also into the 
functioning of the regional offices of public administration. This rigidly top-down 
construction does not reach the municipalities and the local offices which suggests that 
it is mainly coordination and control that they are assumed to provide. More to the 
point of rights and representation are the recent legislative acts that, in concordance 
with the EU requirements, tackle discrimination in the first place but that do not 
entrust any Roma minority bodies or institutions with representation and political 
negotiations. The latter are left to the rather weak structures of Roma parties and a 
rather immature build-up of a system of Roma health and educational mediators. 
However, neither the competing Roma parties, nor the loose network of mediators 
                                                 
5
 The presentation of the Serbian case of minority representation relies on Cvejić (2014b).  
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have been strong enough so far to provide needs articulation and interest protection 
for Roma on the field. Given the overweight of administrative arrangements and 
regulations, the traditional relationships between Roma and the majority in local 
communities have remained unaffected. The frames and contents of the prevailing 
patron/client relations largely continue to rule the scene with their ingrained 
informality. Any challenging of these relations falls outside of the competences of the 
Roma-specific administration. It is perhaps better and more accurate to say that a new 
administrative professionalism is actually built on the unchanged functioning of 
majority-minority relations that set the boundaries of rights and representation 
according to the well-established patterns of domination and subordination. New 
initiatives founded by a new understanding of the Roma cause find themselves outside 
of the political arena and the civil organisations called into being are confined to act 
on the margins of society. 
The above brief overview of the responses that the three countries gave to the 
challenges of the ‘Roma issue’ as an important constituent of their EU accession 
carries a few lessons. First, it shows that despite the remarkable differences in 
conceptualisation and practice, none of the applied solutions provides proper framing 
for Roma representation and none of them can be considered satisfactory in 
expressing and exercising minority rights. Instead, secondly, a common line can be 
identified in tackling the issue as a matter of expertise in administration and 
management. Given the common pursuit of administrative responses that maintain 
the prevailing power of the majority in governing the relationships with the Roma 
minority, it is not surprising that the new arrangements quickly lost the interest and 
support of the Roma community. In a way we can say that, by driving Roma interests 
away from the institutions and stages of meaningful politics, these attempts and 
arrangements help to reinforce the distancing of Roma from the scenes of true 
politicisation while they extend the control of the majority above all needs, issues and 
claims with potential implications for distinguished Roma articulation.  
The third implication follows from these trends. Since the new arrangements 
either never aspired to providing representation to the Roma minority or quickly lost 
any such potential, they actually contribute to new waves of informalisation. As we 
saw, the deliberate reduction of competencies in the case of the Roma minority self-
governments in Hungary, the discrediting of representation through mediation in the 
case of Romania and the drawing of the Roma cause under administrative settings in 
Serbia all failed to create the scope for articulating and protecting Roma interests in 
changing or at least improving the structural conditions of daily living. However, the 
squeezing of issues of segregation, poverty, discrimination and exclusion into the 
sideline does not erase the needs of and the claims for betterment. Instead, these 
needs and claims find new ways to informality where the lack of proper institutions 
and organisations has induced permanent insecurity, instability and an unceasing 
working of the haphazard patterns of personification. Amid these conditions, all what 
appears to the outsider as ‘indifference in politics’ is part of a fundamental feature: the 
all-round ruling of informality in driving the lives of the Roma community.  
The causes of such a state of affairs are manifold. Beside the above discussed 
discrepancies between the official framing and the everyday realities of Roma political 
representation and participation, a closer look at the conditions in a broader scope of 
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participation may help us to see how informality in articulating needs and claims fits 
into the experiences of living up to the ruling of informal relations in the various 
domains of everyday life. An overview of the conditions and prevailing relations in 
education and work in marginalised Roma communities will serve to demonstrate the 
congruence of informalisation between the daily realities and their political 
representation.  
The selection of these two domains is reasoned by a number of specificities. 
First, both provide experience concluding in common concerns and claims of the 
majority of the Roma communities. Second, both areas have been affected by 
important formal changes as parts of the broad reforms of post-socialist 
transformation and thus clearly show how marginalisation is reproduced in profoundly 
changed conditions. Third, and perhaps most importantly, Roma gave clear responses 
to the experienced institutional changes, still these responses and the claims that 
followed did not cross the boundaries of informality: the prevailing majority-minority 
relations and the implied inequalities of power have kept them caught in the 
established patron/client contacts of personal dependency. 
 
Informalities in education 
 
When considering recent trends in Roma education, two contrasting developments 
deserve particular attention. The first is an important change in the parental attitudes 
towards education. By experiencing the strengthened association between educational 
attainment and one’s employment opportunities, Roma parents have started to 
emphatically pay attention to their children’s schooling. Throughout the fieldwork – 
much in accordance with earlier findings6 – parents gave voice to their conviction that 
the completion of schooling was the most important guarantee of employability, hence 
they are ready to make all efforts for extending schooling to a level affordable by the 
resources and conditions of the family. This way accomplishment of the primary 
school became a norm and most parents make serious efforts to facilitate their 
children’s continuation also at the secondary level.  
At the same time, the ongoing reforms in education have deepened the 
segmentation of the school systems in all our three countries by tightening the 
association of the various school-types with the expectable labour market and social 
positions. The adaptation of the designated social groups has been assisted by the 
various new forms of private education (including the extended interest of the 
churches in schooling) and the concurrent enactment of new rules of admission in 
public institutions. While these new trends affect mainly the schools and training 
forms at the secondary level, primary schools adapt to the new challenges by 
intensified streaming according to different clusters of knowledge and skills.  
These manifold changes importantly affect Roma children’s opportunities. As a 
rule they find themselves in the least valued streams in primary schools and face 
                                                 
6
 See the results of the qualitative inquiries with parents of school-age children in the four post-socialist 
countries (Hungary, the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia) that participated in the cross-country 
comparative study on ‘Ethnic Differences in Education and Diverging Prospects for Urban Youth in an 
Enlarged Europe’ (EDUMIGROM) (Szalai, 2011). 
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severe segregation into the units of poor vocational training at the secondary level 
(Messing, 2014). All these processes have been accompanied by pronounced 
informality that drew the claims of Roma parents and children under the 
uncontrollable and uncontrolled relationships between the schools and educational 
authorities on one side and Roma families on the other. A few examples may highlight 
the point. 
The first is the case of the one-time special schools that used to host substantial 
proportions of Roma children away from the ‘ordinary’ arrangements of schooling. At 
the strong claims of human rights groups and the pressure of the European Union 
that considered such schools the embodiment of unlawful harsh segregation, the 
number of special schools has been significantly reduced in Romania and Serbia, and 
enrolment to these institutions was banned in Hungary. The new ‘invention’ in 
substitution was the introduction of a new educational category of students with 
‘special educational needs’ whose education is expected to be organised in integrated 
arrangements in ordinary primary schools. However, being classified as a ‘SEN child’ 
carries a strong stigma resembling the old institutional labelling. As a rule, these 
children are considered inapt by intellectual and behavioural qualities to progress 
according to the ordinary pace and structuring of schooling. Hence, they usually find 
themselves at the bottom of the educational segments of the primary schools that 
usually implies outright deprivation of certain forms and contents of instruction.  
Parents do not fail to see this form of segregation and try to give voice to claims 
for putting up their children into the ‘normal’ conditions. However, they are without 
means for making their claims complied with. These claims are seen by the school as 
‘unauthorised’ intervention: after all, the new system of identifying who is and who is 
not a SEN student is built on the exclusive competence of the teachers and it implies 
their expertise in finding out ‘the best’ way for the child. Parents’ claims are thus seen 
as unjustified and as inducing a disturbing ‘noise’ into the regular functioning of the 
system. And the schools’ liberty to deny them is further underscored by the vastly 
shared views about the low competence of Roma parents in child-rearing and their 
unreliability relating to the requirements of education. It follows that Roma parents 
are left to acknowledge their multi-sided ‘incompetence’ and they remain without even 
the loose control that the old system provided by binding special school enrolment to 
parental consent. In brief, the acceptance of the low positioning of their children with 
gloomy prospects on continuation remains a rule that is seldom challenged by the rare 
occasions of fortunate personal relationships with one or another member of the 
school staff who acts on behalf of the child and the family by strongly emphasising the 
special favour implied in the exceptional case. Exceptionalness of such interventions 
underscores two important aspects at once: it demonstrates the significance of 
informality in transgressing the prevailing limitations while it also points to the severe 
restrictions on any such attempts. 
 The second powerful example of informality in education comes from 
vocational training. 
 Vocational training has been the target of important reforms in all the three 
countries. These reforms served two, partially conflicting, goals. On the one hand, 
vocational training schools as parts of the system of secondary education gained 
increased power in shaping their admittance policies by founding those on the 
 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 2 (1): 159-182.   
SZALAI, J.: INFORMALITY AND THE INVISIBILITY OF ROMA POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
168 
acknowledgement of students’ earlier performance and by launching streams with 
clear hierarchical arrangements according to the measured indices of knowledge and 
skills. On the other hand, vocational schools have been considered in their relation to 
local labour market needs. More than before, these schools exercise a good deal of 
freedom in tightening their relationships with selected entrepreneurs and firms while 
declining interest in other fields and actors. The dual bondage of the reformed system 
is reflected in its administration: while the educational authorities maintain control 
over the educational tasks of the schools, their actual management and financing is 
bound to the local industrial boards having direct influence on their professional 
shaping.  
The needs of Roma youth have to be seen against these frameworks. Given the 
state of sharp selection among the various forms of secondary education, apart from 
the tiny minority of some 15 per cent of the Roma students attending one or another 
form of secondary schools providing graduation in all the three countries, it is the 
vocational domain that has to accommodate the majority. However, the dominant part 
of the schools seems reluctant to open its doors to Roma. Their elevated prestige as 
educational units inspires them instead to apply the methods of ‘good old’ streaming. 
By building on their new freedoms of defining the profiles and the rules of 
admittance, the vocational schools devote themselves to the principles of competition 
and declare unbiased justice by applying these principles in admittance.  
Roma students populate with very high over-representation the lowest-ranking 
streams and classes. They and their parents see the risks of how such separation 
implies segregation that does not lead anywhere on the formal labour market. 
However, there are only limited means at their disposal to respond, and all the 
available means fall outside of the frames of any formal protection. The first response 
– seemingly the one applied with the highest frequency – is to leave behind the school 
as soon as the age of compulsory education (16 years) is reached. Although this way 
the fleeing students risk later employment, and they also create hardship for the 
school in maintaining the ‘emptied’ tracks, the ceasing of outright humiliation together 
with the work on offer in the informal economy provide strong enough pulling factors. 
The second response also leads to informality: in cases when the parents succeed in 
keeping alive the old working contacts with their one-time non-Roma colleagues, these 
old friends are asked for mediation in order to attain a better and more meaningful 
placement for the child.  
 However, admittance is not the only point under informal rule in the system. 
Obscurity is perhaps even greater concerning the heart of acquiring a vocation: 
apprenticeship. The reforms in secondary education introduced decentralisation in 
this regard by shifting the responsibility for practical training from the regional or 
municipal educational boards to the schools. In the new arrangement, vocational 
schools are compelled to find placements for their students, and this implies 
tightening their relations with the local economic actors. However, this way the quality 
and later usability of the training has become directly dependent on the interests and 
willingness of these actors who, in turn, consider apprenticeship solely in terms of 
their recruitment policy. This way openness or refusal of their role in providing 
apprenticeship is conditioned by their position and success in the local competition. It 
is no surprise that such a direct competition creates its own hierarchy by offering 
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differentially attractive placements with highly differing contents and prospects for 
later employability. As a rule, Roma students are at the bottom of this hierarchy. 
Given their attendance in classes and streams with highly restricted opportunities for 
later employment, they are either refused any placement or are accepted by firms 
which themselves struggle for survival and which thus prove unable to offer usable 
practical training.  
In addition, the family interviews revealed a great number of cases of harsh 
stigmatisation and direct discrimination. As parents disclosed their frustrating and 
annoying experiences, it turned out that, by referring to the prevailing prejudices of 
the non-Roma majority as a ‘given’ to set the stage, local entrepreneurs tend to refuse 
acceptance of Roma as a potential risk for the success of their business. Due to such 
refusals, Roma find themselves excluded from working in a non-Roma dominated 
shop floor or they are denied training in vocations that involve bodily contacts like 
butchers, waiters, hairdressers, etc. This way exclusion and sharp humiliation become 
parts of the experience of Roma in vocational training, and thus escaping this arena of 
education seems the only rational response.  
Again, students and parents at best have informal ways of seeking personal 
favours and support. The availability of such contacts is conditioned by the old 
socialist acquaintances and/or by the offering of extra services within the prevailing 
system of patronage. It is easy to see that the younger generations of families can 
hardly mobilise such contacts and favours and this way remain without help and 
protection. The outcome is clear. Despite strong efforts for modernising the system, 
vocational training is still a domain of traditional relations of pre-modern patriarchy 
and it ‘uses’ its Roma clients to assure the unbroken maintenance of such relations. 
Part of the characteristic features of the domain is the low level of institutionalisation 
that provides a free flow to the ruling of informality. Given the weak positions of 
Roma in the system, informality implies deepened dependency that, in turn, 
concludes in segregation and ultimate exclusion.  
The case of vocational training demonstrates perhaps even better than the 
segregating trends in primary education that these disturbing outcomes do not follow 
from the alleged ‘indifference’ of Roma in education but reflect the strength of the 
prevailing structures and the weaknesses of informal intervention for attaining any 
change of them.  
However, informality hides the political momentum. Given the lack of 
collective political representation of needs and claims and the consequent lack of 
organisational frames, the actions and steps of Roma parents and students appear as 
purely personal intentions that do not add up to any collective claims. Their 
personified perception allows for reducing their handling to matters of individual 
behaviour that justifies the lack of any systematic responses and that also allows for 
maintaining personified patron/client relations as their base. At the same time, 
personification and a case-by-case management of the claims help to preserve the 
structurally conditioned distance between the individual attempts and the existing 
organisational settings. The differential conceptualisation in itself safeguards the 
departing workings by emphasising personal ‘deservingness’ on the one hand and the 
fulfilment of macro-level political and policy aims on the other. Given their departing 
conceptualisations and the implied divergences in daily working, the two levels do not 
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get into interaction and this fact alone helps in maintaining the unchanged relations of 
the prevailing structures.  
Informality helps this process in additional ways. The personified perception of 
Roma claims for reducing discrimination and segregation reinforces the personified 
views of the majority on the entirety of the Roma community. The widespread views 
about Roma parents’ ‘indifference in education’ and their inaptness in nurturing child 
development remain in place in justifying ‘white flight’ as a proper response of non-
Roma parents for protecting their children’s undisturbed progressing in education. By 
elevating personification and the implied behavioural characterisation at the level of 
the community, Roma families’ actions and claims for change are not simply denied 
but become declared as unjustified attempts. Furthermore, personification at the level 
of the community pulls out discrimination and segregation from their institutional 
framing whereby it helps to hide the structural features of these processes and renders 
ill-placed (if not illegitimate) any claims for change. In brief, informality and the 
involved currents of personification are important constituents of preserving the 
prevailing relations of dominance and power by serving the needs of the non-Roma 
majority. At the same time, these processes keep breaking down Roma attempts at 
politicisation and suggest that any such strivings are in vain. 
 
The ruling of informality in work 
 
As the above examples suggest, despite the growing importance and depoliticising 
impact of informality in education, a modicum of public visibility and responses is 
maintained by the sheer fact that certain formal ties and involvements in the 
educational and training institutions have been maintained in the meantime. Even if 
deprived of providing proper representation and protection, these ties and 
engagements preserve some potential for the success of efforts of the Roma families 
and communities to remain involved in the mainstream relations and thus frame their 
claims in ways that allow for publicly controllable negotiations and actions for 
changing the structures and contents of schooling. This is an important difference 
when comparing the potentials of Roma representation to the currents of the past 
twenty years in employment and work. For given the processes of vast privatisation 
and marketisation, employment has been driven out of public control and it has 
become a private matter framed by the exclusive relationship of the employer and the 
employee. It follows that the recent developments have led to a severe weakening 
(sometimes utter disappearance) of all formal ties and involvements and have 
produced a concurrent overall ruling of informality in regulating access and omission.  
As I will attempt to show below, such a development has devastating 
consequences on Roma employment and work. For informality helps to purposefully 
frame an important segment of competition in marketisation: the race for 
employment in the least qualified segments of work where informal re-framing of the 
relationships by ethnicity serves for maintaining non-Roma primacy while keeping it 
under hierarchical control. At the same time, all-round informality assists in drawing 
Roma attempts at employment under the personified relations of behavioural 
adaptation and acceptance whereby – similarly to what we have seen in education – 
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employability becomes a matter of individualised arrangements and it remains 
confined in the traditional patron-client relations of the prevailing local social 
structures. 
 As I will show in details, the drawing of Roma work under informality directly 
follows from the single most important development in their socio-economic position: 
the massive erasing of their ties to formal employment and the enforced 
accommodation of the community to permanent unemployment and inactivity. The 
high prevalence of unemployment is not simply a matter of economic change. Despite 
marked differences in the economic development of our three countries and also 
despite the variations in their economic structures, the high rates of Roma 
unemployment show little variation. A high degree of invariability also is reproduced 
at the level of settlements: whether in industrial or agrarian settings, whether in urban 
or rural areas, Roma face unemployment as their typical state, and their lead remains 
in place also in comparison to similarly educated and qualified non-Roma groups 
(Hyde, 2006; O’Higgins, 2012). All these indicate that deep ethnicisation of access to 
work is an outstanding feature of post-socialist employment, and as we will see below, 
it proves an important constituent of the informalisation of the involved economic and 
social relations. 
 It is easy to see that in the conditions of massive economic exclusion Roma 
would be highly interested in forms and ways of collective interest representation for 
claiming the extension of employment and for providing meaningful training that 
renders access to new opportunities. However, such bodies of attaining collective 
political goals have not come into being in the course of post-socialist transformation. 
Out of the complexity of the causes in the background, let me point here to the falling 
apart of the old trade unions and the limited strength and outreach of the new ones 
that have proven ineffective to represent labour interests and to inform the prevailing 
neo-liberal economic policies by elevating these interests to partnership in 
privatisation and marketisation (Dimitrova and Vilrokx, 2005). Further, the evolving 
tripartite bodies of macro-level negotiations do not even strive for universal 
representation and steadily remain under the pressures of the best organised parts of 
the labour force. Moreover, the development of the collective forms of representation 
has been severely hindered by the sharpening competition among the different groups 
of employees and by their often contrasting claims considering training and the rules 
of admission (Kubicek, 2004). At the same time, the emerging few civil initiatives 
dedicate their activity to developing new forms of employment for their membership 
which is enough to show alternatives but which is inadequate in attaining deeper-going 
structural change.  
Given this landscape, it follows nearly by definition that, for the most part, 
employment remains a highly individualised domain in the post-socialist economies 
that is put under the ruling of informality. It is this broader context that frames Roma 
attempts at employment. However, while informality remains a rather subordinated 
aspect of the employment of the well-established groups of society, it gains exclusivity 
in the case of Roma. Due to its domination, it is worth seeing its varied functioning in 
the everyday ways and techniques of seeking jobs in Roma communities.  
As our research has brought it up, three major facets of informality could be 
recorded behind such variations in mobilising the available resources outside of the 
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framework of formal institutions: adaptation of earlier occupational experiences and 
the traditional trades of the different Roma communities; reinvented application of 
the patterns of cooperation between Roma and non-Roma in former employment 
under state-socialism; and exploitation of the potentials provided by the division of 
roles and tasks within the Roma community. 
The collection of interviews focusing on the history of work and employment of 
younger and older male and female members of the investigated communities 
revealed important differences. It turned out that the chances for re-entering the 
labour market or for preserving one’s relatively stable positioning were deeply affected 
by the former work experiences as embodied in different occupations and different 
routines of exchange during socialist times. Some occupations and types of work 
practically disappeared from the scene, while others could be fruitfully converted to 
new forms of engagement. Mining and the involved auxiliary activities are a good 
example of the first, while the adaptation of jobs in the food processing industry 
makes the case for the second outcome. By considering such differences, the 
potentials for reconstructing ties with organised labour greatly varied across our 
investigated communities. Of course, it was not the occupation per se but the involved 
skills, practical knowledge and the inventive adaptation of the earlier routines that 
mattered.  
Earlier participation in the informal economy added to these differences. In 
this regard, traditional occupations of the different Roma groups entail diverging 
paths. While experience with trading renders knowledge about the play of the market 
and good skills in contracting and accounting that can be profitably preserved and 
adapted to the new conditions, the old trades of wood-carving or metallurgical 
processing have been swept away by the respective modern forms of mass-production. 
As the interviews revealed, it is not only the content of the previous occupation that 
matters, but being engaged in a multi-pillar arrangement in different jobs also deeply 
influences participation in the informal economy: the different degrees of involvement 
opened up opportunities or set limits for changing the prevailing constellations also 
after the regime change. In this sense we could observe that certain Roma groups 
stood firmly in socialist production without attempts to gain completion and/or 
compensation in the informal economy, while others established a living based on 
simultaneous involvement and a purposeful constant moving between the two 
domains. The former groups faced high risks with marketisation and privatisation, 
while the latter usually reserve some scope of manoeuvring.  
The picture is even more colourful when the gendered differences are 
considered. As the interviews demonstrated, the familial strategies of involvement take 
into account what the formal labour market offers for men and women. As a rule, 
while the opportunities to stay in employment or to become re-employed are 
markedly less for women than for men, their ‘profiles’ relate to each other. Hence, in 
communities deeply ingrained into the functioning of the socialist firms with relatively 
well-paid jobs for men, rigidly shaped constellations driven by the rules and routines 
of the planned economy were on offer also for women, though usually in different 
fields and with less favourable material conditions. As a rule, if there were some 
opportunities for re-employment for men in the course of marketisation and 
economic modernisation, similar opportunities hardly ever came up for women. 
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Therefore, women have been forced by the conditions to turn to the informal 
economy. However, they experience significantly lower chances and high instability in 
this domain where they face a lack of skills for proper adaptivity and a range of 
disadvantages in comparison to those for whom working and trading in the informal 
domain was conditioned by decade-long experience. 
While the interviews demonstrated the importance of knowledge and skills and 
the capacities for adaptation, it turned out that what primarily mattered was their 
embedding into the inter-ethnic relations of work. In other words, good vocational 
knowledge and a long history of experience remain ‘dead material’ unless these are 
ingrained into meaningful cooperation and divisions of roles in cross-ethnic relations 
that deprive them of their ethnic content. As it turns out, the frequency and the 
content of inter-ethnic encounters greatly differ according to the branch of production 
and the requirements of the specific occupations. In certain terrains, the physical 
conditions of the work and a high degree of mutuality and cooperation follow from 
either the risk or the complexity of the tasks that should be performed – a typical case 
is provided by mining. In other terrains the work requires individualised routines and 
those performing the given tasks simply work side by side but without cooperation – 
most activities of animal husbandry or land cultivation provide cases in point. In a 
third type, although cooperation is needed but takes place among purposefully set 
groups of people who, while they rely on each other’s work, might not even see each 
other – this is the case in all those types of factory work where the employees are 
organised into distinct shifts and their work and the division of tasks among them are 
framed exclusively by these units.  
While these differences in cooperation seem to be merely technical, it turns out 
that involvement in one or another form has significant implications amid the post-
socialist conditions. The accounts of the occupational histories testify that personal 
qualities, earlier experience and knowledge of the vocation did not carry enough 
weight in attempts for re-employment: without having somebody among the 
established workers who offers some personal guarantee, Roma have practically no 
chance. In other words, the mediation of a non-Roma actor proved essential. At the 
same time, such contacts are rare assets that, by their nature, require a long history of 
acquaintance and unconditional trust. It follows that it is at best the first type of close 
cooperation that nurtures assistance on the part of the non-Roma workmates; 
experience in earlier work based on loose togetherness or, even more, on the 
hierarchical order of often ethnically composed shifts is simply not enough for 
mediation. It is worth adding that earlier experiences originating from the informal 
economy also matter. By framing them in neighbourhood relations, memories of 
cooperation in the informal domain also colour non-Roma willingness in providing 
testimonies in favour of the Roma applicant for employment.  
At the same time, the official institutions for the purpose of providing 
placement do not work. It turned out in all our countries that the work exchange 
offices or centres provide at best bureaucratic justifications but we did not come across 
a single case in which such institutions would have succeeded in bridging the Roma 
applicants and their future firms.  
Altogether, these experiences show that Roma employment takes place under 
the rule of private relationships and hence, it is governed by the patriarchal contents of 
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such relations. One has to note in addition that such an embeddedness of the work 
and employment opportunities into the private relations deprives Roma of organised 
protection while it hides their efforts from the public eyes and this way contributes to 
maintaining the general views and convictions about their ‘idleness’. 
The third important factor with immediate impact on the chances for Roma re-
employment is the state of cooperative relations within the community. Of course, the 
foundation of such cooperation lays in the families and relates to the division of roles 
in them. The roots of these divisions are usually in experiences of participation in the 
informal economy. Decades have shaped these practices: as we saw above, 
intensification of work in the informal economy has been a widespread response to 
the fading away of employment in the formal economy. At the same time, the content 
of work greatly determines the extent and the form of dividing the roles within the 
family and, on familial bases, within the community. The most important dividing line 
is formed by gender. As a rule, the young and middle-aged male members make 
efforts for gaining employment at any distance on an individual basis, while the female 
members and often the older children set up a chain of mutual help to compensate 
for the losses. In other cases, women offer auxiliary help to men: this is the frequent 
case with traders in informal exchanges for whom women usually render storage, 
packing and often even driving. Yet in other cases, the contemporary practices mean a 
continuation of earlier patterns: whole ‘shifts’ of men and women are formed to 
accomplish different tasks in agriculture.  
These diverse forms of engagement in the informal economy matter in two 
aspects with regard to re-employment. First, well-organised communities can 
accumulate quite important resources to finance the employment search of their male 
members while providing compensation for their absence through supporting their 
families. Second, the practised divisions of roles in the informal domain provide an 
important relational backing: as we saw above, the inter-ethnic encounters in the 
informal economy fill with impressions and meanings the patronage that non-Roma 
offer to their Roma acquaintances. This secondary source of working relations proves 
exceptionally important when remembrance of cooperation in the first economy 
cannot be relied on any more with the passing of time.  
It is worth noting that the informal relations of intra-community work and 
support have the greatest importance for migrants. For the most part, migration is a 
personal path forced by necessity. It is again men who leave first and they do so full of 
uncertainties regarding the possibilities of being followed by their family (Cahn and 
Guild, 2010). In addition to the support that these families need for sustenance, 
usually it is a must for them to find female employment or at least work in the 
informal economy. However, such work does not grow out of the blue: it is the 
working relations and practices within the community that condition it. The deeper 
distinct female roles ingrained in the division of tasks within the community are, the 
better are the chances of migrant families for coping with the hardships of the 
transient phase and also for joining the male members in migration.  
All put together, it seems that there are important variations in the state and 
level of deprivations that Roma suffer due to being cut off from the regular, safe and 
well-paying segments of the economy. At the same time, these variations are not 
strong enough to induce different patterns and paths of work formation: the general 
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trend remains that of deprivation and exclusion and in an ultimate reading, the trends 
are uniform by genre. The differentiating factors and processes have an important 
feature in common: these impact Roma unemployment, re-employment and 
participation in the informal economy in very small circles, at best within the local 
communities that Roma are part of. The impacts always remain individual and they 
never reach whole collectives. Beyond the favourable consequences manifesting in 
better earnings and improved safety of the sources of living and some assistance for 
maintaining the ties to the mainstream, the success always appears rewarding 
individual qualities and efforts, and the sporadic occurrences even underscore such 
impressions. In brief, the positive exceptions are too weak to change the general 
trend.  
On top of all this, the rare instances of re-entrance into the world of formal 
labour are not potent enough to change the public view that considers Roma in work 
as exceptions to the rule of inactivity, which is understood, in turn, as the own fault of 
the ethnic minority. According to the customary reasoning, idleness and reluctance in 
accepting the rules and the rigour of formal employment are parts of the Roma world-
view, and the high rates of unemployment accompanied by reduced re-employability 
are rooted primarily in the bad habits and damaging routines of Roma living. It 
follows that the efficiency of efforts to lead Roma out of this situation depends on 
attaining profound changes in Roma lifestyle, in other words, the key to significant 
modifications lays in the success of educating programmes towards behavioural 
change that take the notion in its broadest sense. This reasoning does not observe 
borders: it follows the same structure and the same arguments in our three countries 
and does not demonstrate differences according to the positioning of the communities 
on the exclusionary/inclusionary scale. The widespread prevalence of the involved 
notions inspires us to call this mainstream argumentation the iron rule of majority 
approaches to Roma that finds access to work and employment a ‘civilisational’ issue 
with sole responsibility of the minority. 
The introduced differences imply the breaking up of common interests: the 
more potent and better negotiating groups are interested in the maintenance of the 
attained informality that favours their attempts and aspirations. Given that usually 
these are the best qualified groups with the best chances for re-employment, the Roma 
majority loses its potential leadership and it remains left to the risky experimentations 
in the informal economy.  
This state of affairs is exploited by the recently ‘invented’ form of Roma 
employment in the framing of public work. Although public work schemes look from 
a distance as if offering collective solutions for the first time, a closer scrutiny reveals 
their deep embedding into informality and into the reproductive cycles of traditional 
patriarchy. First, the schemes are run and controlled by the local majority (the 
municipalities in the first place), and admission amid the usual shortage of placement 
is regulated by the applicants’ behavioural ‘aptness’. Second, public work is not seen 
as a form of employment but more as a corrective measure: by re-establishing the link 
between inputs and rewards it is meant to suspend the ill-famed dependency of the 
poor (and Roma poor in the first place) on accessing welfare funds without returns to 
society. Although the strength of the association between participation in public work 
and entitlement for welfare assistance varies among our three countries (rendering the 
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strongest ties in Hungary where conditionality has been expanded to practically all 
types of public provisions), public work programmes rapidly gained a unifying profile: 
a new arena has emerged with deeply ethnicised contents to establish a separate 
segment of the labour market more or less exclusively for Roma and the ‘Gypsy-ised’ 
groups of the non-Roma poor. Under the ruling of these contents and the lack of 
generally controllable rules, it is a natural development that participation becomes a 
matter of personal services and favours on offer that is pulled out of any monitoring 
and public accountability.  
While this way public work fulfils a number of ‘useful’ functions by meeting 
important majority interests, it has devastating implications for Roma. First, by 
understanding public work as a ‘Roma segment’ of the world of labour, it powerfully 
annihilates attempts of Roma to avoid the segregated and ethnicised paths and try 
accessing employment according to mainstream rules and steps. Second, the strong 
stigmatising contents of participation block seeking employment in more valued 
segments of the economy: Roma carry the stamp of ‘worthlessness’ as associated with 
public work far beyond the time of actual involvement and this sole factor limits their 
capacities in finding more rewarding alternatives. Third, recent expansion of public 
work towards the vocational schools by offering work to youth who start their career as 
being unemployed points towards tendencies of creating a larger arena of education, 
training and work that governs the working lives of Roma apart from the majority. It is 
clear: these spontaneous developments make segmentation and segregation the very 
foundations of deep ethnic divisions in the local society and this way overwrite 
(actually: debilitate) all attempts towards integration and inclusion. The ruling of 
informality serves the undisturbed reproduction of these relations and keeps away 
Roma needs and claims from proper representation and political articulation. 
In sum, when looking at the different aspects and segments of the work and 
employment of Roma, one sees the unbroken ruling of informal relations. Such 
relations navigate entrance to the rarely accessible different forms of employment and 
also to the distribution of all kinds of work. Informality implies personification of the 
working relations that are set less by knowledge and skills but more by behavioural 
traits: the major expectation towards Roma work is to provide flexible reserves for 
meeting majority needs and to keep apart an important segment of the population 
from the constrained employment-opportunities that characterise the post-socialist 
transition. The non-Roma majority has important interests in maintaining the current 
state of affairs. Besides limiting and controlling competition on the labour market, 
informality helps to regulate the at-risk groups of the lower middle class and the 
working class, whereby disciplining is put under spontaneous forces and slips 
institutional control. Furthermore, informality creates an ample arena for personified 
selection whereby the potentials of mass organisation and the politicisation of the 
claims of non-employed Roma are efficiently reduced and kept under strict control of 
the non-Roma community. Finally, informality helps to maintain the personified 
ideology and the adjoining public discourse that visualises Roma non-employment in 
terms of ‘idleness’ and ‘indifference’. This way all recognised employees gain: even if 
earnings are low and the working hours are long, they may see themselves as 
acknowledged and useful members of society whose positive qualities are perceived in 
opposition to the negative ones of Roma. Such an ideological contrasting carries the 
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additional advantage of creating insurmountable difficulties for associations and 
collective actions across social and ethnic boundaries and this way directly helps the 
smooth reproduction of the prevailing relations and structures of uncontrollable 
informality.  
However, all these advantages come from the majority’s perspective. Against 
this, informalisation largely deprives Roma of the potentials of articulating labour 
needs in collective forms. What is more, informality keeps in place their personal 
dependence and helps to frame it in behavioural relations and actions. The revival of 
the old patterns of patron/client relations deprives them of applying an alternative 
framework of processes and structures whereby they become deprived from the 
language of politicisation. By losing the language and the opportunities, Roma 
themselves become active players of the reproduction of the prevailing, highly unequal 
and highly humiliating, relations. Yet again, it is not their ‘indifference’ that hinders 
politicisation, but it is the pressure of the institutions and processes in place that turn 
even the slightest attempts at expressing claims with some political momentum into 




The above excursion to some important segments of education and work as 
experienced by Roma in their daily lives revealed the domination of informality in the 
ways of expressing and fulfilling needs and articulating claims for a change. Of course, 
education and work are not the only areas where Roma experience collective 
exclusion from the forms and scopes of functioning that are put into institutionalised 
frameworks in case of the majority and that are distinguished to a large extent by 
limiting access according to enthnicised principles of participation of the minority. For 
sure, one could find similar constellations if looking at the structuring of the housing 
conditions, access to healthcare or the organisation of fulfilling daily needs. 
Nevertheless, a single paper does not allow for extensive explorations all across these 
areas. At the same time, the lessons drawn from education and work seem powerful 
enough for providing a few generalisable conclusions.  
 The first among these relates to the sources of informality in representing 
Roma needs and claims. Here one meets a high degree of congruence: whether 
claiming desegregation, proper training or local job-creation, the hindrance or the 
outright breaking down of collective representation is conditioned by the in-built 
structures of informality. As we saw above, informality characterises the conditions of 
daily experience. Attempts at seeking proper education and training or finding gainful 
work take place to a large extent away from the ordinary institutional frameworks and 
channels and build mostly on invisible personified relations. As the examples 
repeatedly showed, these personified attempts are deeply embedded into the varying 
individual relationships of Roma with the non-Roma majority and convert the 
fulfilment of needs into the contents of the prevailing patriarchal patterns that these 
relations contain.  
Reliance on such patterns has several further implications. Most importantly, 
these personified arrangements powerfully break up collectivity and allow for singular 
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histories with singular outcomes. This way the potential political claims are 
successfully converted into spontaneous and individualised attempts and rule out any 
collective interpretations and actions. As a consequence, informality with its 
implications of being deprived of institutionalisation and thus being freed from 
external control becomes a self-sustaining feature. Those profiting from it become 
interested in its maintenance, while those who are losing out face deprivation not only 
of similar opportunities but even of the concepts and the language of collective 
representation that others’ success in private encounters makes obsolete and 
inappropriate. As a consequence, deep informalisation of the political potentials is 
fully congruent with the informal working of the system that maintains personification 
as a basic rule of functioning. It could not be otherwise. Amid the informal relations 
and patterns that keep away from the visible and controllable institutions of society it 
is structurally conditioned that needs and claims of the Roma community appear in 
the web of personal favours and services and remain enclosed into myriads of 
personified individual relations all with unique and ungenerisable characteristics and 
contents.  
 While the ruling of informality establishes congruence between the conditions 
and the attempts at changing them, it is not in the intentions of Roma to maintain it. 
Instead, such a state of affairs serves the interests of the non-Roma majority and does 
so by providing multiple advantages for its members. First, as already mentioned, 
informality means the squeezing out of Roma from the institutional domains and 
allows for the application of ‘irregular’ solutions for their case. Informalisation of 
access to certain streams in training or to the restricted opportunities of entering 
employment in certain occupations reduces competition and helps maintaining 
domination over those segments in education or work where external insecurities or 
the prevailing limitations or simply the shortage put at risk direct access even for the 
powerful groups.  Second, informality allows for depriving the claims of Roma of their 
collective nature. By breaking up the always partial and haphazard fulfilment of these 
claims to personified relations and negotiations, these claims appear as if rooted in 
purely individual needs whereby the majority finds it justified to relegate them into the 
private domain and refrain from providing collective responses through collectivised 
institutions and services. Third, informality provides important advantages in politics 
as well. The experience of personification justifies personified argumentations that 
help to paint the Roma cause in a behavioural conceptualisation. Such an approach 
makes the fulfilment of Roma needs a matter of ‘deservingness’ and frames it in terms 
of loyalty and proper adaptation. This way Roma lose the language of politicisation 
before even attempting to translate their personal experiences of discrimination, 
segregation and injustice into criticism and claims of the collective. At the same time, 
the behavioural framing of the approach of the non-Roma majority calls for education 
in the broad sense of the term, whereby political issues and claims are pulled out of 
the play of power relations and are deposited into the professional settings of 
disciplining and ‘educating’. 
When looking at the ruling of informality from the angle of the internal 
relations of the Roma community, the disruptive implications of this state come to the 
fore. First, the breaking down of the claims and strivings of the community to more or 
less successful individual attempts undermines solidarity. This is an unavoidable 
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outcome of depriving the claims and actions of their collective nature. But this is not 
the sole consequence of the process. Since good personal relations with members of 
the majority depend on the richness of the content on offer, more qualified and well 
embedded members of the Roma community have better chances when opting for 
individual solutions. However, this way the more vulnerable parts of the community 
lose the protection that the better qualified and better-off groups could provide. Being 
left to their poor resources, these groups have no means to reduce dependency and 
this way their conditions and potentials remain at the mercy of the majority without 
any mediation. Second, the stratified nature of personification induces contrasting 
interests within the Roma community: those with good chances for gaining personal 
favours join the majority in their attempts at maintaining informality, while the more 
vulnerable parts of the collective increasingly experience the devastating aspects of 
their state. Third, through the lens of personal successes it seems that dependency can 
be reduced and the smartest members of the community gain some scope for 
manoeuvring. However, the always one-time character of the favours that they enjoy 
often fall back to the general conditions of dependency that hit the Roma community 
in its entirety. The frustrations over the betrayal of those following individualistic paths 
and the arising mutual blaming within the community hide the conditioned nature and 
deep structural embedding of the given state of affairs and thus importantly block the 
potentials for collective action through politicisation. This way the illusions of 
betterment through individual strivings and actions contribute to the unbroken 
maintenance of informality and assist the fulfilment of the interests of the majority in 
keeping its relations with the Roma minority outside of the formal domains of making 
politics. 
Finally, informality helps to shift responsibility for the plight of Roma to the 
community itself: Roma appear as ‘uninterested’ in utilising the new institutional 
frameworks that have been created for advancing their rights as a minority whereby 
they miss the opportunity for enriching the contents also of their citizens’ rights. To a 
large extent, such an argumentation gains its empirical evidence from observing the 
speedy emptying of the new legal frameworks, institutions and officially rendered 
services. As we saw above, despite their variability, the respective institutions were all 
called into being by providing administrative arrangements for managing the ‘Roma 
issue’ largely without Roma participation, while no fora and mechanisms have been 
developed to provide institutional framing to the actual local Roma needs or at least to 
offer formal representation of Roma in policy-making. Due to these developments 
(that prove uniform across countries, regions and settlements), the formal 
arrangements themselves have contributed to the informalisation of the Roma cause. 
By forcing the genuine collective needs of Roma onto the sideline, they actively 
invigorate informality as a substitution. However, due to the prevalence of personified 
relations and the lack of collective articulations that are the very characteristics of 
informality, Roma pressures ‘dissolve’ in the arrangements and processes that deprive 
their claims of visibility. The issue of minority rights as a typical collective claim is 
pushed into the background as an ‘empty notion’ and it becomes invisible among the 
manifold needs and claims of immediate daily living. What is more, the emptying of 
the institutions from their respective contents appears as an unavoidable outcome – 
clearly at the responsibility of the minority. 
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 In sum, our overview provides two main conclusions – both with far-reaching 
implications. First, the ruling of informality in Roma politics is not at will or at a 
choice by preference. Instead, it reflects the dominance of informality in the lives of 
Roma that does not allow for collective organising and that does not accommodate 
collective representation. Although collective representation and the institutional 
framing of Roma needs and claims would be the sole most important guarantee for 
elevating the Roma cause to societal level and for making it part of the political 
processes in society-at-large, such an advancement hardly can be hoped for amid the 
continual maintenance of large-scale poverty and exclusion. In this sense strengthened 
claims for efficient economic and welfare policies targeting poverty and exclusion 
across ethnic lines might be argued for as prerequisites for increased Roma political 
participation and a fair positioning of the Roma minority in the socio-political 
structures of representation.  
The second important lesson of our overview regards the structure of interests. 
As we saw, the maintenance and unbroken reproduction of informality serves 
primarily the interests of the non-Roma majority. It helps limiting competition for the 
scarce material resources and labour; it helps to break up unities and collective 
solidarities as potent resources of representation; it helps maintaining informalised 
and personified structures of rewards and sanctions with all their disciplining 
implications; and it helps to deprive the Roma minority of entering into associations 
behind scattered and ill-balanced private formations. In the light of such multi-sided 
advantages, it seems difficult to claim more self-reflection, clearer identification and 
better organisation in Roma politics with extended Roma participation as their 
backing. Nevertheless, the still existing initiatives and the attempts all across the region 
for developing Roma political parties as recognisable institutions in political 
partnership are promising seeds of a gradual change. While such parties and the 
emerging civil organisations with similar aims often face insurmountable difficulties, 
one has to welcome them as the potential actors to turn the wheel around. Their 
future success is not guaranteed. However, their potential in challenging the fate of 
informality and their attempts at developing representation along the claims and aims 
that are articulated by the Roma communities promise to break down the web of 
personal dependencies and help Roma towards elevating their lot out of the rule of 
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Based on findings from a comparative qualitative contextual inquiry 
carried out between 2012 and 2014, the article analyses the formation 
of two Roma settlements in the larger context of a small sized town in 
Romania. The article aims at understanding the constitution of these 
areas as reflected through people’s narratives, while also accounting 
for the influence of economic and political developments on where 
and how they were and are placed on the social and geographic map 
of the city. Altogether, the article illustrates the similarities and 
differences between how the two settlements were founded under 
different political regimes and how are they nowadays subjected to 
ghettoization and reduction to bare life, understood as processes 
characteristic for contemporary global capitalism. At the same time, 
the analysis highlights the limits of the approaches informed by these 
conceptual frames and ends up by pinpointing the need to complete 
them with a perspective that links the politics of spatial marginalization 
to the understanding of how the latter is part of a political economy 
that exploits the spatially marginalized. 
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1. Introduction – the empirical and theoretical grounds of our analysis   
 
The empirical material used in this article was generated by the means of field-
research conducted between 2012-2014 in 25 localities in Romania within the 
umbrella of the qualitative contextual inquiry Faces and Causes of Marginalization of 
the Roma in Local Settings: Hungary – Romania – Serbia.1 In this paper we are 
relying on the last phase of this investigation (Causes and Faces of Exclusion of the 
Roma in Local Communities), conducted in Romania between October 2013 and July 
2014 in three localities (two towns, and one village) selected from the 25 settlements 
addressed during the prior research phase (Vincze et al., 2013; Vincze and Hossu, 
2014; Vincze, 2014). Given the geographical and historical heterogeneity of Romania, 
during the selection process of localities in this country we also had to make our 
choices regarding the historical region the chosen settlements belong to: Transylvania, 
Moldova, and Muntenia/Oltenia. The Romanian Kingdoms (Wallachia and Moldova) 
were subject to a history of Roma slavery for about 500 years (being abolished at the 
middle of the 19th century), while Transylvanian administrations subjected Roma to 
ethno-cultural assimilation policies ever since the Habsburg domination. 
Consequently, socialist industrialization and the assimilation that accompanied it had 
different outcomes for various local Roma groups, historically embedded from 
different socio-economic statuses into diverse power regimes.  
According to the methodology we have agreed upon for selection of fieldwork 
sites in the last phase of the research, in Romania – similarly to what our partners have 
done in other countries (Szalai, 2016, this journal issue) – we opted for three types of 
settlements: (1) a town with mainly exclusionary tendencies, within which there is at 
least one extremely disadvantaged area and another less poor residential zone; (2) a 
town with mainly inclusionary tendencies having a deeply deprived area inhabited by 
Roma and another housing territory where Roma have a better material condition; (3) 
a commune near an urban centre, which is generally isolated and poor, and comprises 
areas inhabited mainly by Roma groups, one of them very deprived while the is other 
better-off. The selected towns of Aiud and Calafat, respectively commune Lungani 
(from the Centre, South-Vest and North-East development regions of Romania) 
embodied the local stages where several Roma groups (some of them deeply 
impoverished and others better-off) were taken part in different ways in the life of the 
larger local society. Aiud was pointed out at a particular time of our research as an 
‘exclusionary town’ mostly due to the eviction practices of the municipality and the 
‘Gypsy school’ functioning on its territory. Commune Lungani (and in particular its 
composing villages with a majority Roma population) was chosen to exemplify the 
case of a rural locality characterized by generalized poverty and exclusion. Calafat was 
selected at its turn to illustrate the case of an ‘inclusionary town’ since there, during the 
																																																								
1 Faces and Causes of Marginalization of the Roma in Local Settings: Hungary - Romania - Serbia. 
Contextual inquiry to the UNDP/World Bank/EC Regional Roma Survey 2011. A joint initiative of the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Open Society Foundation’s Roma Initiatives 
Office (RIO) and the Making the Most of EU Funds for Roma Inclusion program, and the Central 
European University/Center for Policy Studies (CEU CPS). October 2012 – June 2014. 
http://cps.ceu.hu/research/roma-marginalization  
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prior phase of our research, we could notice that one of the local Roma groups was 
settled in a district close to the town centre and in time managed to override the 
boundary between its ‘own’ spoitori area and the larger Dunării neighbourhood 
hosting Romanian dwellers. Nevertheless, at the end of the research on the faces and 
causes of marginalization of the Roma in local contexts we concluded that the 
combinations of inclusionary and exclusionary tendencies identified at the level of 
each locality displayed a much more complicated and nuanced picture of adverse 
incorporation (as also analysed in Vincze, 2015). 
While focusing on one particular aspect addressed by our complex 
investigation about faces and causes of Roma marginalization, i.e. the social and 
historical formation of predominantly Roma-inhabited housing areas, in this article we 
are restricting our attention to the town of Aiud. Aiud is a small sized town with 
22,876 inhabitants, out of which, according to the 2011 Census, 4.06 percent declared 
themselves as Roma. The empirical material displayed in this article, which describes 
the historical constitution and recent developments of two residential spaces from this 
town (locally named Bufa and Poligon), illustrates how are ghettoization (Wacquant, 
2011) and reduction to bare life (Agamben, 1998) shaping the condition of the 
inhabitants of these housing areas founded under different political regimes. Bufa 
exemplifies a trend of the formation of a Roma-only settlement as a result of 
economic in-country migration of an extended Roma family and the growth of the 
settlement that they established on the periphery of Aiud during socialist 
industrialization and urbanization, as well as the tendencies of impoverishment and 
stigmatization that they are running through during current de-industrialization, 
privatization and retrenchment of state from its social roles. On the other side, 
Poligon illustrates the creation of a precarious informal housing area under the very 
circumstances of the collapsing socialist political economy, including among others its 
particular employment and housing policies. Poligon resulted from the relocation of 
Roma families forcibly evicted from the gentrifying town centre beyond the town’s 
boundaries, but not accidentally very nearby to Bufa, which during these times started 
to gain more and more predominantly the meaning of a space associated with poor 
Gypsies. Our analysis demonstrates that although one settlement appears to be 
‘voluntarily’ formed during socialist times, it was created under the constrains of those 
times and nowadays it becomes more and more isolated due to a severe process of a 
social and ethnic/racial stigmatization, while the other was constituted due to the 
involuntary removal/relocation of a group of poor ethnic Roma from one area to 
another, they both carry elements that illustrate how are  the current local practices of 
economic and political power pushing the inhabitants of these areas into urban 
marginality through ghettoization and reduction to bare life.  
The discussion in this paper is mainly based on the analysis of 15 family 
interviews conducted in Aiud, with members of the Roma ethnic minority living in 
Bufa and Poligon.2 Interviews were conducted in the other two Roma inhabited areas 
of Aiud as well (Feleud and Bethlen Gábor), but in this article we will refer only to 
																																																								
2 Fieldwork in Aiud, including these family interviews was conducted by Florina Pop and Rafaela Muraru 
during both the phases of the investigation.  
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Bufa and Poligon in our attempt to describe and compare the two settlements in the 
light of our theoretical background. The interviewees were identified based on specific 
criteria (e.g. families having children under the age of 14, families having at least one 
child aged 14-18, families in which none of the adults is employed, families in which at 
least one adult is employed either permanent or seasonal, families in which at least 
one adult is involved in public employment) so as to achieve a diverse qualitative 
‘sample’ from the point of view of people’s employment status and demographic 
characteristics. We identified our interviewees by the snowball method, while making 
use of the contacts we established in the settlements in the previous phase of the 
contextual inquiry. We conducted the interviews in the respondents’ homes, after they 
were informed about the purpose of the investigation, the means for dissemination 
and the ethical aspects of the research. With regard to the history and formation of 
the settlements, the interviewees were asked to share what they know about these 
aspects, either from their own experience or from the memories learnt from their 
parents, grandparents or other inhabitants. We then analysed these interviews together 
with other information collected from interviews or informal discussions with local 
authorities’ representatives and with data collected from local monographs. 
Drawing on Wacquant’s (2011) approach towards urban marginality, we suggest 
addressing the analytical potential of the term ghettoization for describing the 
processes that our settlements are subjected to. He defines the ghetto as ‘a bounded 
urban ward, a web of group-specific institutions and a cultural and cognitive 
constellation (values, mind-set, or mentality) entailing the socio-moral isolation of a 
stigmatized category as well as the systematic truncation of the life space and life 
chances of its members’ (p. 1). According to the same author, a ghetto includes four 
specific elements, following economic and social domination functions: stigma, 
constraint, spatial confinement and institutional parallelism. Wacquant subsequently 
argues that the ghetto is an instrument of power and control for the dominant group, 
but at the same time it can have an integrative role for those inhabiting the ghetto. 
More precisely, in the face of external hostility, the ghetto becomes a place for social 
and cultural exchange for the confined population, thus providing protection for its 
members and to some extent replacing the dominant norms and structures from 
which they are excluded. The restrictive physical and social boundaries among the two 
groups deepen the divisions and eventually create even more prejudices about the 
confined population, which may be perceived as exotic or inferior. 
On the same lines, Marcuse and Van Kempen (2000) conceptualize ghettoes as 
realms of social exclusion, described by involuntary separation enforced by a 
dominant group which views the excluded population as inferior and ascribes negative 
social, political and economic characteristics to this group. Considering a ‘new spatial 
order of cities’, the authors discuss the ghetto as a form of urban poverty, promoting 
spatial divisions and boundaries, as well as social hierarchies. In their view, specific 
forms of socio-spatial formation based on ethnicity or developed through exclusionary 
processes are the ethnic enclaves and the excluded ghettos, hosting the urban poor, a 
group which is long-term excluded. An important aspect in this conceptualization of 
ghettos is that the market is accounted as responsible for the production and 
reproduction of these divisions, under the overarching umbrella of the state, which 
can as well create and perpetuate inequalities through its social structures. 
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Stigmatization of excluded groups is also explained by Wacquant (2009) aș 
penalization or criminalization of poverty. Wacquant (2001) argues that 
criminalization of poverty has become a specific approach through which the 
neoliberal state addresses social insecurity via economic policies which foster state and 
particularly social-welfare retrenchment. In terms of ‘punishing the poor’ (Wacquant, 
2009: 166), we argue that there are new forms of penalization, such as informal labour 
kept under surveillance and sanctioned by the police or blaming informal housing as a 
form of crime, while restraining the excluded group’s access to local employment and 
housing opportunities. 
From this perspective, it becomes essential to search for a complex 
understanding of how the state and its structures can create spaces where power 
becomes discretionary enforced, as discussed in Agamben’s (1998) biopolitics, 
drawing on the work of Foucault (1978-1979). The author employs the concept of 
camp to describe a hybrid ‘space of exception’ (Agamben, 1998: 99), grounded on 
security reasons and often having a racial or ethnic character. The exception comes 
from the fact that the laws become suspended, since they are used to exclude a certain 
population, but also to put them under the strict control of the state, creating a gap 
between citizenship and human rights. De-nationalized, but under the control of the 
state, the inhabitants of the camp are refused any protection such as that offered by a 
political status. The author further highlights that in this case the state of exception 
becomes ‘a new and stable spatial arrangement inhabited by the bare life that can no 
longer be inscribed in that order’ (Agamben, 1998: 113). The concept of bare life is 
used together with that of sovereign or unmediated state power to explain how in 
present day democracies the individual can be deprived of his/her basic human rights 
and be reduced to bare life, having no political relevance, in the absence of any 
juridical protection. 
Based on these theoretical assumptions, in our paper we argue that the 
development of the investigated settlements in Aiud (Poligon and Bufa) illustrate 
specific patterns of social exclusion encompassing elements of ghettoization or 
discretionary use of power depriving individuals from their human rights or pushing 
them into the instances of bare life. In these urban marginal spaces, the impoverished 
Roma are held responsible for their poverty status and are stigmatized and ascribed 
negative characteristics of inferiority in order to explain their exclusion from the city. 
Some of the exclusionary practices that they are subjected to are the forced evictions, 
the reluctance to legally recognize informal housing and to provide local resources for 
the improvement of housing conditions, and the discretionary use of local policies in 
the field of housing, employment and political participation.  
 
2. Processes of Roma settlement formation in the larger context of Aiud 
 
Aiud is located in Alba county, in the Southern part of Transylvania, in the Central 
Development Region of Romania. This locality has been heavily affected by the 
collapse of one of the biggest industrial platforms in the country, the Aiud 
Metalurgical Company (Întreprinderea Metalurgică Aiud), which provided 
employment for approximately 9000 people in 1990. Other medium-sized and small-
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sized companies in the field of garment manufacture or construction have also 
collapsed or have significantly reduced their activity. At present, according to 
interviews conducted with local employers in the previous phase of our research, 
there are scarce employment opportunities, particularly for people with a low 
educational background. Besides Aiud Penitentiary, which is an important local 
employer but not accessible for the low educated, there are some small employers in 
the field of garment manufacture, construction and footwear, the majority having 
between 50 and 200 employees. Other important economic activities in the larger 
geographical area of the town (Fabrica de Sodă Ocna Mureș, Salina Ocna Mureș, 
Mechel Câmpia Turzii) have also collapsed or have significantly reduced their activity 
in the last decades.  
According to statistics provided by the National Agency for Employment, the 
unemployment rate in Aiud in 2013 was 5%, compared to 5.7% at the national level. 
The percentage of registered unemployed out of the 18-62 age group was 7.9%, thus 
opening the discussion about hidden unemployment in the form of agricultural 
unemployment, seasonal migration or informal labour. As will be discussed in the 
next sections, the Roma illustrate to a large extent the phenomenon of hidden 
unemployment, but in the absence of formal data about the ethnic structure of 
unemployment, we cannot provide statistics about the percentage of unemployed 
Roma and about their participation in support programmes for the unemployed, as 
stipulated by the national legal framework.  
The monograph of Aiud published in 2010 refers to the local Roma population 
only in terms of the census statistics produced over the years. Roma (named Gypsies 
in this monograph) are first mentioned in the 1920 census, when Aiud recorded 8108 
inhabitants, of whom 1954 were Romanians, 5604 Hungarians, 103 Germans and 447 
of other nationalities (‘the majority of them Gypsies’). At the 1992 census, the total 
population of Aiud was 31,894, of whom 1170 self-declared as Roma. According to 
the last census (2011) only 930 persons declared themselves as Roma and the total 
population has decreased to 22,876 persons. 
With regard to Roma political participation in Aiud one should notice that until 
2013 the Roma minority was not represented at all within the Town Hall. Since 2013, 
the Local Council has an elected Roma councillor (nominated by the National Liberal 
Party). Although positively appreciated by the Town Hall representatives and the 
majority of the local Roma population, his activity regarding the representation of the 
needs of his ethnic fellows in the City Council is limited by the unequal distribution of 
local funds between areas that are considered worthy of development and items which 
are cut out of development funds. The support that the local Roma councillor 
provides mainly in one of the Roma settlements (Feleud) is based on external funds 
received by the NGO he administers rather than on local public funds. At the same 
time, the local Roma Party which according to the national legislation is the main 
central and local representative structure is hardly recognized by the Roma in Aiud. 
On the contrary, this structure is highly contested by the local Roma population. 
Throughout the interviews, many people mentioned that they felt that they have been 
used in the political struggles because of the votes they brought, but overall they had 
no influence on the local decision making processes. This appeared to be relevant 
particularly with regard to local housing policy and infrastructural development. There 
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were only few developmental projects which targeted the areas inhabited mostly by the 
Roma population of Aiud, which promised to be participatory and sustainable, but 
had restricted and little effect on the systemic causes of social and territorial 
marginalization, while most importantly they were conceived under the new, 
neoliberal paradigm of entrepreneurial development and competition for external 
funds (Vincze, 2015). As will be discussed in the next section of our article, the areas 
inhabited by Roma generally lack developmental investments, which perpetuate their 
territorial and social exclusion. Therefore, we argue that because of the past and 
recent local policies, as well as due to how they were historically formed, Bufa and 
Poligon became marginalized areas that nowadays are both subjected to ghettoization 
and reduction to bare life. 
Besides Bufa and Poligon, already mentioned in the introductory chapter of 
our article and discussed in more details in the paragraphs below, the town of Aiud 
presents the other two cases of ‘Roma neighbourhood’ formation. However, briefly 
presented below for the sake of signalling their existence and the patterns they 
illustrate, we are not going to discuss them in details, since our aim is to demonstrate 
the similarities and differences between two housing areas that nowadays are both 
subjected to ghettoization and reduction to bare life, but were founded during 
different political and economic regimes.   
Feleud (the informal name of Aiudul de Sus) is a former village, approximately 
2-3 kilometres away from the centre of Aiud, which was lately annexed by the Aiud 
municipality. This area is inhabited by Romanians, but also by several Roma groups, 
some of them self-identifying as caștalăi, others as căldărari or corturari. Most of them 
recall living in Feleud ever since they were born, however some state that their families 
migrated here because of the employment opportunities at the factories in Aiud 
during socialist times. At present, there are Roma families living in Feleud that 
constantly migrate to Switzerland, Spain or France, where they are usually engaged in 
informal labour. There is public transportation from Feleud to different locations in 
Aiud including the hospital and the Town Hall. However, in Feleud one can find a 
‘Gypsy school’, a segregated school, as well as poor Roma families for whom 
migration could not function as successful means to overcome poverty.   
Bethlen Gábor is an area located in the vicinity of the Town Hall. The housing 
security of Roma living in this building has worsened during the last years, since the 
building they lived in formerly as renters of social homes was redeemed by its former 
owner (the Transylvanian Reformed Church District). People were informed that they 
would have to move out eventually, but the old/new owner of the building extended 
the renting contract with the former tenants for a few years. However, according to the 
post 1990 Romanian legislation the state would have had the obligation to provide 
alternative housing for the tenants of the retroceded buildings, until now only a couple 
of families were offered an apartment in the social houses newly built right in the 
vicinity of Bufa. Even if many old tenants from Bethlen Gábor street, Roma, 
Romanian and Hungarian, can hardly imagine themselves being moved from the city 
centre to the proximity of the marginal ‘Gypsy neighbourhood’, the City Hall 
continues the plan to develop this territory as a social housing area even if this plan 
evolves very slowly.  
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3. The formation of the century-old Roma settlement of Bufa         
 
The history of the area is described differently by different Roma inhabitants. One of 
the interviewees, a Roma female, reports that Bufa was named after her grandfather, 
who supposedly was a very wealthy man. This part of her family came from Târgu-
Mureș, where some of her relatives still live. From what she could remember, he was 
an employee at Aiud City Hall. She also stated that her grandfather owned a large part 
of the land and had a horse herd established on the land where Bufa is located today. 
From what her mother has told her, her grandfather lost all his belongings and all the 
title deeds in the 1970 flood. In Aiud’s monograph we find evidence stating that in 
1970 a flood produced damages of ten milliards, Bufa and the industrial area of Aiud 
being the most affected areas. 
 
They were very wealthy indeed, they were very wealthy in those times and my 
grandfather... he graduated college, he was educated, he wanted to become a 
priest (...) and he employed people like these ones from our neighbourhood. 
(Roma inhabitant, Bufa). 
 
With regard to employment, she reported that her grandfather had some sort of 
relation with the town’s cleaning company and public toilets and also with people’s 
transportation to the town by wagon. It is possible, she stated, that her grandfather 
employed inhabitants from Bufa for those jobs. She considered that the majority of 
the Roma living in Bufa were related to each other because they were descendants of 
the old family named Bufa. Another interview described what kind of jobs did the 
early Bufa inhabitants carry out: 
 
Early on, where you cross the barrier (...) on the railways from the depot, there 
came woods and there was some kind of fuel from woods and coals (...) and 
people came there (...) and people from all over Aiud bought woods (...). They 
were waggoneers, my father had a horse and a wagon... and he had the best 
horse out of all. He went to the depot and my father had a lot of orders from 
people to deliver the wood, he knew that money can be made out of 
transportation. (Roma inhabitant, Bufa). 
 
Another interviewed Roma considered that his grandparents built their houses there 
because they were not allowed to enter the town. From what his grandmother told 
him, approximately a hundred years ago, near the place where nowadays the Bufa 
houses are built, there was a forest in which wild animals were often times spotted, 
especially wolves.  
 
There used to be a forest here, all this hill used to be a forest before. And there 
were some houses here of my grandparents, and they stayed here… They stayed 
here because in the past, as it is now with us here, they were not allowed to 
enter into other parts of the town, as we are not allowed today to enter as well… 
They believe we are savages. It is not different now from what it was back then. 
Because if they would have had a place to build a house in the town, we would 
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be in the town now, but they stayed here and so did we. (Roma inhabitant, 
Bufa). 
 
From another interview we find out that Bufa’s history is related to the town’s cleaning 
industry. An ancestor named Bufa is mentioned again, who lived here and was 
responsible for the town’s cleaning, with some employees. It is important to mention 
that during family interviews, the information that the grandparents or parents were 
employed at the town’s public toilets and at the Aiud Metallurgical Company came up 
several times. Finding a place for building a house or for agricultural activities was 
another common aspect described in the interviews, reflecting the inequalities people 
of Roma ethnicity had to deal with through the years. Even at present, the inhabitants 
of Bufa do not possess property or housing documents,3 however they do pay taxes 
for land and house and have done so since three years ago, when the address where 
they now live was recognized in their identity cards. 
 
There was a community here, there was someone from here, an old man, Bufa. 
(...) He was in charge of the town’s cleaning (...).  They enclosed us here, the 
place where the crops were, we called it Berek, a sort of wood, in Hungarian. 
We are Hungarian gypsies, but nowadays the majority of us doesn’t speak the 
language. Only a few of us know what this means and what it is, the ancient 
ones. (Roma inhabitant, Bufa). 
 
Today an approximate number of 100 persons live in Bufa, all of them Roma. When 
asked about the history of the settlement, they answered that they were born there, 
and as well as their parents and grandparents did. According to the stories the 
settlement is supposedly one hundred years old. About their lineage, they state that 
among them there are caștalăi, băieși, căldărari and geambași,4 but nowadays they do 
not consider this as an important identification. A part of them speak Romani 
language, usually the elderly. 
From the local authority’s point of view, there is a strong, allegedly cultural 
difference between Roma from Bufa, and Roma moved recently in its vicinity (the 
Poligon area, whose formation is discussed in the next paragraph). They note:  
																																																								
3 However, there is no published information yet on this recent development, we were told by Simona 
Ciotlăuș, national expert at the Local Engagement for Roma Inclusion (LERI) programme of the EU 
Fundamental Rights Agency, which runs in 22 localities across Europe and among them in Aiud, that as a 
result of the local activities, the group created in Aiud under the LERI programme managed to establish a 
relationship of cooperation with the Town Hall and this endeavour ended up very recently with the 
legalization of several units of informal housing in the Bufa area.   
4 These Roma ‘nations’ (neamuri), sub-groups, people, were delimited on the one hand according to 
their traditional occupations. Geambași Roma were known for their horse trade, while căldărari 
(Kalderash) Roma were metal workers manufacturing buckets or pots, and the băieși (Boyash) Roma, 
also named as rudari ‘originally’ were dealing with gold processing. Some denominations refer to the 
extent to which Roma kept up their traditions. Relative to the groups from above, the caștalăi are 
distinguished as those who do not speak Romani any more. The term băieși might also refer to sub-
groups who supposedly are of an arhaic Romanian origin and do not speak the Romani language.  
 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 2 (1): 183-198.   
VINCZE, E. AND F. POP: ROMA SETTLEMENT FORMATION IN A SMALL ROMANIAN TOWN – 
INSTANCES OF GHETTOIZATION AND REDUCTION TO BARE LIFE 
192	
	
Even the Roma can be divided into two categories, the ones you can reason 
with, who respect the law, such as the community from Hotar, meaning Bufa, 
where there is discipline and order and there are people with common sense, 
clean and they seem to be more emancipated and there are those you can’t 
reason with, they just want, and they have only rights and no obligations. (Local 
authority representative, Aiud). 
 
4. The constitution of a new Roma settlement in Poligon 
 
The official name of this area is Hotar 101 street. The Roma from this area do not 
identify with a certain lineage, nevertheless they recall their parents identifying as 
caștalăi, băieși and romunguri. Only a few of them speak the Romani language. This 
settlement was established in 2010, when local authorities evicted approximately 25 
Roma families from a building in the town’s centre. The authorities partially explained 
their decision by the fact that this building, used in the past for social housing, was 
restored to the owners; but often they justify this action by associating the Roma with a 
form of threat or deviance:   
 
They lived in the centre, in nationalized housing, which was in good condition. 
All they had to do is pay rent, a modest amount. They destroyed the houses, 
turned them into pest holes. They were demolished and they had to relocate 
the ones who lived there. This happened two and a half years ago. Some of 
them are mentally retarded. The majority of them have a mental or a physical 
handicap, although not all of them have a handicap certificate. We now have a 
project through which 31 social houses are being built in the Hotar area for 
those who were relocated.5 (Local authority representative, Aiud) 
 
The evicted persons state that when they were told about their relocation, they were 
also informed that the municipality had built (or was about to build) social housing for 
them in another part of the town. People remember that they were forced to move 
their belongings with the trucks from the town’s cleaning company. They were also 
told to take all the materials they could use to build a house on other land. The 
location where they were taken was an empty field, except for some remaining wall of 
a former construction project and was located on Mureș’ river bank, a place used in 
the past as a military unit, shooting ground and auto park for the army. Nowadays, the 
Roma inhabitants of this area live in improvised wood, textile materials, cardboard or 
clay barracks. As in the case of Bufa, they do not possess any property documents 
relating to their houses, however, they are also paying taxes for the use of the land 
where they have built their houses informally, on the basis of a verbal agreement with 
the Town Hall. 
 
																																																								
5 Out of this project in 2014 only three such social houses were built near Bufa, but none of its 
apartments was distributed to the new inhabitants of Poligon. 
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I didn’t know anything. My mother-in-law came and told us we have to move 
but they didn’t give us another place to live, what are we going to do, where will 
we go? They just said that we would have to move tomorrow. So we arrived 
here and we saw we had no house, nothing (...). And then we started collecting 
the bricks after the demolition. We collected iron, we made some money and 
started building... It was very difficult, and it still is... (Roma inhabitant, 
Poligon). 
There used to be a military unit here. They banished all the Gypsies here, so 
that they don’t live in the centre of the town any more. (Roma inhabitant, 
Poligon area). 
 
Bufa inhabitants recount that in the past this area was well attended, with luxurious 
cars, parks and cabins. Then a vehicle park belonging to the military unit was 
established here, but afterwards this was also dissolved. 
 
Why did it [the car park] remain a desert? Because the bosses from Bucharest 
intervened, they came here to Aiud, others came (...) and got everything out of 
it. And after what they did, everything was empty, they took these people [the 
Roma now living in Poligon], they had places in the market, in the bus station, 
in the back, in the vicinity of an attorney (...) they saw they were filthy, and they 
struggled until they got them out. (Roma inhabitant, Bufa). 
 
According to the interviews with Poligon inhabitants, it seems that some of them, but 
also the parents of the now middle aged adults living in Poligon, migrated to Aiud 
during socialism because of the employment opportunities at the local cleaning 
company or the Metallurgic Company. Both Bufa and Poligon inhabitants stated that 
on the field where today the houses of those from Poligon are built there was a lot of 
scrap-iron and they dug after it and sold it. Nowadays, the Roma from Poligon still 
search for iron on this field, but it is very hard to find any because the field has already 




The stories of the families whom we interviewed revealed that they were very much 
related to the broader social and economic histories of the localities, closely linked at 
their turn to the changes of the larger political regime, including its policies towards 
ethnic Roma. These structural circumstances determined when and how they settled 
down and what kind of conditions could provide for themselves on these territories 
including the areas of the locality where they were allowed or moved or forced to 
inhabit. Family narratives show that their individual or collective options regarding 
spatial mobility were on the one hand resulting from their need to provide sources of 
income compatible with their traditional occupations and other skills acquired in time, 
and on the other hand were moulded by the potential and limits of the changing 
economic and political orders. 
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In the case of the Bufa settlement in Aiud, the interviews informed us that most 
probably the Roma ethnics migrated here because of local employment opportunities, 
and were allocated (or tolerated on) marginal land, with restricted access to the town. 
In the socialist times, being formally employed made the Roma feel ‘more included’, 
as this provided various opportunities for inter-ethnic interactions, as well as a more 
valued social status. But when narrating about the times when they were employed, 
the interviewees still mention that frequently the Roma were accepted in the inferior 
and lowest paid jobs, or even having the same status as today, meaning being involved 
in informal labour. During socialism, the Roma in Romania were provided 
opportunities for school participation and employment, but in many cases this went 
together with their forced assimilation and destruction of traditional communities, as 
well as the embargo against practising traditional occupations. In terms of education, 
gaps persisted between the Roma and non-Roma population and discrimination 
further deepened the difference in attainment levels between Roma and the non-
Roma. This in turn, along with other factors such as discriminatory practices on the 
part of employers led to Roma unemployment or to enrolment in low-skilled and 
underpaid jobs in heavy industry and agricultural state holdings. However, the 
redistributive social policies implemented by the socialist state had a positive effect on 
the poor Roma to some extent, although it often meant low paid jobs and marginal 
and substandard housing. The collapse of public employment caused a severe 
increase in the unemployment rate of Roma. The low-skill levels of Roma and low 
educational attainment made re-entering the labour market difficult for them and 
determined a high rate of long-term unemployment. Furthermore, the deceleration in 
implementing social protection measures for the unemployed contributed to the 
reproduction of a state of poverty especially among Roma, followed by prejudices and 
discrimination that were often initiated at a political or mass media level (Raţ, 2011).  
More recently, the neoliberal trend in social policies has encouraged the 
development of ‘welfare dependency’ discourse that was soon legitimated by local 
authorities, who became managers of local funds as an effect of decentralization. This 
opened the way to discretional use (and abuse) of power on the part of the local 
authorities who were more or less prepared to approach local problems using 
professionals such as social workers. In the case of Aiud, this shift to a neoliberal logic 
was easily depicted in local authorities’ discourse, who explained that poverty is 
created by the poor people themselves and with few exceptions the poor themselves 
are the only ones to be held responsible for their situation.  
 
In my opinion, poverty is made by the person himself. They [those of Roma 
ethnicity] expect only to receive, they don’t even try to find employment, they 
don’t want to work, not even as seasonal or daily labourers. There’s no way to 
reach any agreement with them. All they do is wait for the social aid [the 
Minimum Income Guarantee].  (Local authority representative from Aiud) 
 
The collapse of public employment, the discourse and actions promoted by central 
and local authorities to limit and discourage state subsidies, social benefits and services 
are some of the reasons for the social exclusion of impoverished Roma. Moreover, 
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the local housing policies have not yet clarified the housing situation of the Roma 
living in Bufa and Poligon.   
Whether the Roma have voluntarily decided to settle in Bufa is difficult to 
assess, given that no other alternative was available for them at the time when they 
initially moved there. We argue that this form of constraint corresponds to 
Wacquant’s (2011) understanding of the involuntary nature of an urban space 
characterized by marginality. The isolation of this area from the town is a strong 
element of constraint and confinement, which eventually restricts access to 
opportunities: there is no public transportation to Bufa and the inhabitants here have 
difficult access to public utilities. There is neither access to running water nor a 
heating system. For their water supply, people use a common pump installed in their 
area and they share the costs. Because of arrears in paying electricity bills, it often 
happens that a great part of them are disconnected and have improvised common 
access with their neighbours and they share those costs as well. 
Social boundaries within the city are created and recreated through local policy 
decisions, such as offering the land in the vicinity of the houses in Bufa to the non-
Roma, who have chosen to use this land to raise animals or to cultivate vegetables. In 
contrast, the houses of the Roma are limited to very small pieces of land. These local 
decisions empower social hierarchies, promoting the inferiority of the Roma, who are 
physically and socially restricted in this area. As a mechanism to address stigmatization 
and poverty, the Roma ethnics living in Bufa have developed their own internal 
surviving strategies including helping each other to build or renovate the houses in the 
absence of any state support, a loan system, or finding informal labour networks that 
would accept people of Roma ethnicity as a cheap labour force. Less impoverished 
compared to the Roma from Poligon, some of those of Roma minority ethnicity from 
Bufa are positively appreciated by local authorities’ representatives. The reason for 
this is precisely the institutional parallelism, as described by Wacquant (2011), 
meaning that the Roma from Bufa have somehow substituted state support services 
with their own informal support networks, thus expecting and asking less support from 
the local authorities, who have failed to answer their needs. Another important 
element revealed in the narratives was the penalization of informal labour, while 
offering no other formal employment opportunities or, moreover, while restricting 
access to formal employment. Interviewees described how collecting scrap-iron is 
sometimes arbitrary sanctioned by the local police, while at the same time there is no 
employment support provided by state institutions, although as Minimum Income 
Guarantee beneficiaries they would be entitled to receive such support. In addition, in 
some interviews carried out with local authorities’ representatives, living in informal 
settlements was considered to be illegal, and thus perceived as a local form of law-
breaking on the part of the Roma, yet ethnic tolerance towards the poor Roma on the 
part of the local authorities.  
Furthermore, drawing on our theoretical approach and particularly on 
Agamben’s (1998) work, we can observe how such a settlement becomes a ‘space of 
exception’, controlled by the state. The inhabitants are excluded as local housing 
policies are enforced and kept at the margins using the same local development 
policies which are discretionary applied. For example, the municipality states there is 
no public transportation because the roads are in very bad condition, but the local 
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development plans in the last years have not included any infrastructure work in the 
area. The Roma population in Bufa remains under the control of the state, which goes 
beyond the law and keeps them in an informal status of housing and employment. 
The ‘bare life’ concept is relevant to notice how the excluded Roma are deprived of 
their rights, an action which is explained by local authorities’ representatives as them 
not deserving state support since as citizens they contribute very little to the local well-
being.  
Another aspect revealed in our research was the eviction-based pattern of 
Roma settlement formation. That is justified in the frame of a discourse regarding ‘the 
undeserving Roma’, who are to a higher extent perceived as ‘outsiders’ and pushed 
even further away than the better-off Roma. Poligon area is the settlement in Aiud 
which encompasses most visibly the ghetto and camp characteristics as described by 
both Wacquant (2011) and Agamben (1998). The forced eviction of the Roma from 
the centrally placed social houses to an empty river bank illustrates discretionary 
power enforced to exclude a group of people, in the context of arbitrary use of the 
national and local legal framework. Local authorities explain they had no control over 
the relocations because the building was restored to its former owner, but at the same 
time they stated that the Roma were evicted because of their poor hygiene. Moreover, 
as stipulated by the law in force, it is state’s responsibility to allocate other social 
housing to social tenants evicted from buildings after restitution. Similar to Bufa, no 
legal documents were provided for the improvised houses in Poligon, but the 
inhabitants here were asked to pay taxes for the use of the land and the houses on the 
basis of a verbal agreement with the Town Hall. The withdrawal of state responsibility 
in the field of housing leads to even more impoverishment for the Roma, who are 
refused their housing rights, yet asked to pay taxes in order to be accepted as local 
citizens. Other similar elements between Bufa and Poligon are the absence of public 
transportation and difficult access because of the unpaved roads. The conditions in 
Poligon are even more precarious than in Bufa. There is no access to electricity (apart 
from an improvised connection), nor to water and neither is there a heating system. 
There used to be an improvised pump but during the winter it froze and it could not 
be used any longer. At other times it was disconnected because the inhabitants in 
Poligon could not pay the costs.   
The perception of local authorities is that the Roma in Poligon are themselves 
responsible for their poverty status and their housing insecurity. In their view, they do 
not deserve state support because they do not make enough efforts to improve their 
situation. In one of the narratives, one local public stakeholder explained that all 
social benefits should be cut off in order to end the social welfare dependency of the 
Roma. In addition, the same interviewee stressed that the difficult situation of the 
Roma in Poligon and their inability to overcome their poverty status might be 
explained through the state of mental or physical disability of the people living there. 
In line with Wacquant’s (2009) approach on stigmatising the poor, in this case we 
notice how poverty together with ethnicity are convened as a pathology, an inferiority 
status for which local authorities do not want to carry any responsibility. The Poligon 
area functions as a ghetto, involuntarily formed in order to address the demand of a 
dominant group, while excluding a minority group. A series of negative characteristics 
are attributed to the excluded group, in order to explain their exclusion from the 
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town: mental illness, poor hygiene, unwillingness to work and to participate in the 
educational system. The relocation of the poor to the margins of the town constructs a 
new spatial order of the town, as Marcuse and Van Kempen (2000) notice, ascribing 
an inferior spatial and social position for the Roma.  
Our analysis showed that the economic prospects in the form of employment 
or trade market opportunities determined the Roma groups before socialism and 
during socialist times to internally migrate to and settle in a certain urban area (from) 
where they could play economic (and other) roles accepted and required by the 
mainstream society. Such trends may have resulted in the ‘voluntary’ formation of the 
Bufa Roma settlement in Aiud, whose inhabitants were to some extent economically 
embedded in the local society. However, we could observe that their placement in this 
very area depended on where they were allowed to settle. Likewise, we could also 
notice that after 1990 this residential space also displayed the characteristics of 
ghettoization and reduction to bare life. Besides this trend of formation of residential 
areas inhabited by impoverished ethnic Roma, in Aiud one could also identify 
instances when impoverished Roma groups were forcibly evicted from one vicinity of 
the town to another neighbourhood. The case of Poligon reflects that after the 
collapse of socialism new residential territories characterized by severe physical and 
symbolic isolation and precarious housing conditions were created for impoverished 
people by local public policies. The latter case is most visibly embodying the signs of 
ghettoization that takes place at the intersection of ethnic enclosure and socio-
economic exclusion as a manifestation of advanced marginality (Wacquant, 2008), i.e. 
of the new form of social exclusion in neoliberal regimes, characterized by 
accumulation of economic penury, social deprivation, ethno-racial divisions, and 
public violence in the same distressed urban area.  
Nevertheless, the approach of ghettoization and reduction to bare life as 
understood by the authors used as reference points in our analysis proved to have an 
analytical potential, the cases of Roma settlements in Aiud discussed in this article 
demonstrated that their formation should not only be addressed through them. There 
is a need for further analysis from a perspective that might enlighten how these 
ghettoized areas are reduced to a bare life adversely incorporated into the city’s life 
both as lands and housing areas that generate taxes for the Town Hall while still 
maintaining people’s housing insecurity, and as territories providing homes to people 
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This article is about techniques of exclusion by local governments 
against Romani people. Tackling the case of people of Romani 
ethnicity in Barcelona and Bucharest, I explore evictions and 
voluntary return as practices of segregation within and exclusion from 
the city. I reflect on the condition of being or becoming Roma in the 
process of spatial cleansing by interrogating the construction of Roma 
as an ethnicized mobile minority, a category that is submitted to social 
and territorial exclusion. Under the pretext of defending the social 
security and the urban development of cities, the local authorities 
produce moral panic around the presence of Roma. Portraying them 
first as vulnerable, then as having a mobile life-style, the authorities 
justify a range of interventions that eventually push out the Roma 
habitants and subsequently deny them the right to the city. 
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‘…only after I was evicted, thrown out into the street with my baby, did I realize 




This paper discusses a particular form of metropolitan governance and questions in 
which way citizens, mostly of Romani ethnicity, are labelled ‘vulnerable’, dispossessed 
of their rights and rendered mobile on account of cultural prejudices. Pointing to local 
regulations in the city, I tackle the political practices of evictions of poor and/or 
ethnicized Roma and the ‘voluntary return’1 of Romani migrants. Revealing the 
mechanisms of exclusion in two urban spaces, Barcelona in Spain and Bucharest in 
Romania, my aim is to open up the debate on the condition of being or becoming 
Roma. Specifically, I explore how groups of ethnicized people are forcibly rendered 
mobile having their residential rights contested, and their socio-economic conditions 
ignored. 
Analysing the context of Barcelona and Bucharest as highly urbanized spaces, I 
point to the multidimensional concept of the right to the city (Harvey, 2012; 
Wacquant, 2014), and to the social and political dynamics negotiated in the city 
(Appadurai, 2000; Asquith and Poynting, 2011; Pullan, 2013). Undertaking the right 
to the city, scholars consistently discuss the social and spatial dimension of governance 
(Harvey, 2003, 2012; Bernardot, 2008; Marcuse and van Kempen, 2011; Marcuse, 
2012; Brenner et al., 2012). The literature on administrative and political 
development of the globalized cities opens up enough questions for debate: patterns 
of systemic discrimination, the emergence of neoliberal ideology in the city, state re-
articulation, urban governance through social policies and redistribution, and the right 
to the city (Leontidou, 2010; Attoch, 2011; Merrifield, 2011; Aalbers and Gibb, 2014; 
Bhan, 2014; Rolnik, 2014).  
Unravelling the right to the city, Marcuse notes ‘it is not the right to the city that 
is demanded, but the right to a future city, indeed not necessary a city in the 
conventional sense at all, but a place in urban society in which hierarchical distinction 
between the city and the country has disappeared’ (2012: 35). When political power 
limits citizenship rights, the debate is overtaken through the right to the city. That is to 
say, abridged by Czepczynski, that the language of power becomes ‘urbanized’ (2008: 
1).  
This study explores the processes of citizenship rights limitation under 
metropolitan governance to explain how the people of Romani ethnicity are denied 
the right to the city. Taking into account critical urban theory (Short, 2014; Parker, 
2015), I exploit the meaning of moral panic as a political intervention (Critcher, 2008, 
2009; David et al., 2011; Dandoy, 2014). Moral panic represents a short-term 
moralizing strategy against less civilized others, marginalizes and expels a culturally 
scapegoated group of people. Particularly, I describe the strategy of moral panic 
																																																								
1 I use here ‘voluntary return’ with quotation marks to challenge the mainstream understanding of the 
term, and the allegedly ‘voluntary’ character of these returns. Below, I will drop the quotation marks for 
ease of readability.  
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aiming to spatial cleanse Roma from the city, at the same time denying them the right 
to the city. 
In doing so, I recall the notion of spatial cleansing, explained by Hertzfeld 
(2006) and Czepczynski (2008), which refers to the attitudes and actions taken by 
authorities at national or local level that transform the urban space in order to ensure 
appropriate political control. Spatial cleansing defines a sort of violence that entails 
‘the disruption of fundamental security for entire groups of people’ (Herzfeld, 2006: 
142). Drawing detail from my case studies, I discuss the recent urban modalities of 
spatial exclusion: displacement, evictions and voluntary return, and how these types of 
racial-spatial segregation are directed towards people of Romani ethnicity (Vincze, 
2013; Picker et al., 2015). Specifically, the term ‘voluntary return’ (retorno voluntario) 
is used as such by social services in Catalonia, and in Spain in general, while only 
recently scholars have questioned the ‘voluntary’ character of return policies (see 
Webber, 2011; SAIER, 2015; Kalir, 2016). 
Within this conceptual architecture, I decipher the political techniques of 
exclusion used by the local governance in two cities, Barcelona and Bucharest. 
Introducing the term ethnicized mobile minority I discuss a certain Roma label that is 
generated in urban contexts. The Roma denominator is used to categorically 
encompass different marginalized and vulnerable people, mobile minorities and 
ethnically classified Romani groups.  
The primary data I am using is based on my own field research conducted 
sequentially during the years 2013-2015 with civil servants, NGO workers, as well as 
with Romanian migrants (people of Roma or non-Roma ethnicity) in Spain and with 
evicted people in Romania. The data were collected from thirty in-depth semi-
structured interviews and six sessions of participant observation. Adding to this, I draw 
upon secondary sources, analysing the historicity of social and urban 
exclusion/inclusion processes decided at the local level where citizenship transforms 
its meaning according to people’s territorial belonging. In both cities, these processes 
take place through urban development, constitutional change, political regime and 
administrative reorganization. Although the research was conducted in the frame of 
two distinguished individual research projects, both were using similar research 
methods: interviews with public servants, planned group discussions, direct 
observation, and secondary source analysis. 
The first section explains the moral panic enacted against the Roma. This 
political strategy manipulates groups of people to render them vulnerable. The second 
section develops on the historicity of inclusion-exclusion processes of Romani shaped 
along different political regimes in Barcelona and Bucharest. Illustrating through 
empirical research and secondary data, I analyse the regulatory effect of moral panic 
while reinforcing the dormant racism and politics of exclusion.  
The conclusion summarizes the analytical architecture built on illustrative 
elements of first and secondary sources about the governance in the cities of 
Barcelona and Bucharest. While tackling the Romani urban situations, the end point 
demonstrates how moral panic acts against migrants and ethnicized vulnerable people, 
forcing their mobility.  
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1. Moral panic: Roma become an ethnicized mobile minority  
 
This section develops on the concept of moral panic when directed to people of 
Romani ethnicity and correlates the stages of the short-term strategy with the political 
practices of ethno-spatial cleansing.  
Moral panic is enacted against those considered threatening the community, the 
norms established by society. Sometimes, moral panic is directed towards the group of 
people defined as Roma. Reflecting on the way in which people of Romani ethnicity 
become the scapegoats for metropolitan governance, I argue that local authorities 
manage differently groups of people. First, I investigate the criteria applied for the 
group/s selection. Second, I explore the concept of vulnerability, previously related to 
Roma issues and explicitly evoking the Roma victimhood. Third, admitting the city 
may select different targets for scapegoating, I describe the manner in which Roma 
become part of the social conflict negotiated to redesign the urban space.   
To begin with, the governing authority selects the target group/s employing the 
category of vulnerability. On the one hand, labelling vulnerable a group of people, the 
authority prepares the ground for either benevolent inclusion or punitive exclusion. 
As I show further, vulnerability enacts both processes of securitization and social 
provisions. On the other hand, moral panic endorses the politics of emergency which 
are characteristic of the repressive power (Agamben, 2002). Without being self-
evident, when directed towards a group of vulnerable people, moral panic becomes an 
instrument of the repressive power, excluding rather than including the target group. 
 
1.1. Group selection 
 
Anderson et al. (2014) explain how hierarchy of deservingness (and belonging) 
intersects with the system of (il-)legalizing people, allowing ‘foreigners’ to enter or not, 
reside and have access to social benefits on a given territory. Her analysis focused on 
nation-states tactics and different approaches to exclude non-citizens becomes useful 
as I emphasize similar strategies employed by local authorities.  
The metropolitan governance selects the group/s of people to be included or 
excluded from the city by applying local administrative rules. Exploiting the absence of 
state’s leverage and avoiding political accountability, the local authority endorses 
norms for recording (or not) the presence of people on their administrative territory. 
By means of technical regulations the local governance decides who belongs and who 
does not belong to a community, who amy inhabit its territory. In order to do that, the 
authority activates services for social provisions able to identify people in precarious 
situations. Subsequently, the authority approves the repressive actions of the public 
services.  
Initially, the group selection is done by the social services. Analysing their 
practices of attending people in precarious situations, some particularities are 
revealed.  
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In Barcelona, people living in social housing (piso de inclusión) are periodically 
surveyed by civil servants as part of their job. The regulations applied during the 
evaluation process are obligatory for allocating social benefits to poor families. For the 
civil servants, people and families have to live according to the standards of extreme 
marginality to solicit social support. By selecting the target group for social benefit, 
these centres for temporary housing can be considered places where the state of 
exception is applied: those submitted to such a mechanism of surveillance being 
initially suspected of non-integration behaviour. Romani migrants who have no means 
to ensure their legal status as residents may sometimes qualify for social housing (piso 
de inclusión). When this applies, Romani migrants should both prove their 
willingness to integrate into the community but also to maintain their vulnerable 
condition in order to access further state provisions.  
In Romania, the state collects data about people according to their ethnicity, 
without guaranteeing straight-forward social justice. For example, in order to apply for 
social benefits, one should fill-in a form specifying the Roma identity, but without an 
open option for ethnic self-identification. Roma are rather considered itself a category 
of vulnerable groups. The classification is important, but makes a small difference 
within the competition between several vulnerable groups. Once a person decides that 
they belong to the category of a vulnerable group, they have to choose: either they self-
identify as of Romani ethnicity, or submit their classification into another 
disadvantaged group (living on or below the poverty line, being a single-parent family, 
large size family etc.). One person cannot fall under more than one category. One of 
the results of such a classification within the social services registration leads, in 
Bucharest, to ‘ethnic differences in housing conditions… the Roma [being] worse off 
in terms of both space and quality compared to the Romanian majority population’ 
(Gentile and Marcinczak, 2014: 462).  
 
1.2. Addressing vulnerable group/s: unsustainable politics 
 
In the international political context vulnerability has been widely associated with 
migration and especially with Roma (Helms, 2014; Heaslip, 2015). Scholars who 
analyse vulnerability in relation to Roma rarely provide a consistent concept 
(Jovanović, 2015), one of the persistent confusion being between vulnerability and 
vulnerable group/s. Roma have been listed among vulnerable groups, and over-
represented as such in EU policy documents. Portraying Roma as vulnerable group/s 
reinforces their political liability and, not surprisingly, increases the association of 
Roma with human trafficking and exploitation. Contrary to this, the framed politics for 
Roma do not address a ‘group at high risk’ that will impose an intersectional approach 
(Crenshaw, 1993; Platt, 2011). Jovanović explains that Romani have been put into 
vulnerable situations by institutional discrimination, but neither ‘their ethnicity’ nor 
racism have been addressed as factors influencing Roma vulnerability (2015: 4-13). 
She further marks the difference saying that while the category of vulnerable group 
points to institutionalized discrimination, vulnerability reveals a moralizing structure.  
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Vulnerability enacts moral panic producing on the one hand subjects that 
should be saved, and on the other hand the dehumanization and criminalization of 
those of Romani ethnicity.  
The suitable ‘vulnerable Roma’ becomes the suspect that fails the inclusion 
strategy, although the politics addressing Roma integration are supposedly 
implemented. Roma portray a threat to society against the apparently rightful and 
benevolent local administration. Roma as a vulnerable group proves to be a concept 
built on unsustainable politics for those of Romani ethnicity. The more politics are 
drafted for vulnerable group/s the more people of Romani ethnicity have to fit the 
group/s description of ‘vulnerable Roma’. This categorization of ‘Roma’ as a 
vulnerable group precedes and makes it possible to expel and evict people of Romani 
ethnicity by previously assigning them cultural prejudices.  
Further, by using ‘making someone vulnerable’ I explain the way in which a 
group of people is labelled rather than ab ovo belonging to a certain socio-political 
category. Vulnerability is not an intrinsic characteristic of people, instead the public 
structure enables the category in order to respond to existing internal logic and 
bureaucratic regulations. The aim is excluding the group from the 
community/territory through practices of evictions and voluntary returns.  
 
1.3. Maintaining social conflict for urban development 
 
The next step in the tactic of the local authority is the intervention of repressive 
structures against the selected group. After the identification and containment of the 
‘vulnerable group of Roma’ by the social services, the authority proceeds to 
scapegoating in order to expel the undesirables.  
Both in the country of origin and in the host countries, Roma cultural 
scapegoating articulates primarily on prejudices of nomadism, being considered a 
community with a highly mobile life style (Pușcă, 2010; Roccheggiani, 2011; Coquio 
and Poueyto, 2014). By collectively labelling them ‘nomads’, the state creates a doubt 
over the Roma’s right to belong. Indirectly normalizing homelessness, the prejudice of 
nomadism against those of Romani ethnicity explains the ‘inclusive exclusion of the 
Romanies’ (Armillei, 2015), the way Romani are accepted by the urban community as 
a temporary exception. These cultural characteristics attributed to Roma on behalf of 
their vulnerability affects people beyond their poverty status or migration 
opportunities. In fact, Romani migrants have been pushed to circulatory migration by 
grey job market opportunities and the context determined by their living possibilities 
such as squatting buildings or settling in slum housing (Nacu, 2011; Voiculescu, 2014).  
Urban development relies on social conflict (Kramer, 2010). This social 
conflict is produced and maintained by territorial population registration and through 
repressive measures of evictions and expulsions. Contrary to moral panic that is a 
short-term strategy, urban development is a long-term process determined by the 
commitment and continuity of political governance. However, both political strategies 
require a tensioned social dynamic. Thus, while the urban planners prefer a 
conceptual debate, researchers concentrate their attention on the technical aspects of 
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urban politics – housing policies and residential or infrastructure development. Left 
outside of direct political debate, urban planning intertwined with social services 
provisions legitimize the spatial cleansing in a straightforward meaning of racism and 
dispossession. In fact, the urban planners’ and social workers’ most valuable task is to 
control poverty and keep a cheap labour force available.  
To summarize, the moral panic strengthens a common identity and resettles 
the borders of the community in order to ensure the state’s governance over the 
territory and its population. Similarly, the city undertakes similar privileges deciding 
upon belonging criteria, especially under the guise of urban development which 
pretends to be a politically neutral action.  
 
1. Evictions and voluntary returns: the urban solutions  
 
The spatial marginalization or ghettoization of Roma settlements in Europe was the 
topic of several research studies and reports (Clough Marinaro and Daniele, 2011; 
ISPMN, 2013; Piemontese et al., 2013; Piasere et al., 2014; Berlin, 2015; Studia 
Sociologia thematic issue, 2013). Besides, the spatial marginalization is connected to 
the identity and (mis)recognition of Roma within an ‘oppressive social and cultural 
construction of the space’ (Chiesa and Rossi, 2013: 2) or within institutional racism, an 
expression of long preserved ethnic inequalities. In particular, the housing policies for 
Roma have been criticized throughout countries like Italy (Beluschi-Fabeni, 2015), 
France (Nacu, 2013; Legros, 2011; Legros and Olivera, 2014; Fassin, 2014), Romania 
(Rughiniș, 2004; Berescu, 2011; Racles, 2013) and scholars have paid attention to 
evictions and forced mobility detected despite the right to decent housing or freedom 
of movement (Cames, 2013; Parker and López Catalan, 2014; Romanos, 2014; 
Armillei, 2015).  
Being migrants or nationals, those of Romani ethnicity are challenged for their 
right to the city in the most conspicuous way: they are evicted, expelled and exposed 
to the sheer violence of power. The informal settlements (squats, slum housing, 
barraque, platz, părăseală) trigger local police intervention. Thus, the mobility of 
Romani migrants is enforced by local authorities that prefer evictions instead of 
legalizing their settlements.  
Cousin and Legros (2014) explain the political leverage of evicting Roma 
migrants in France. In their study, the authors point to evictions as being the actions 
conducted by civil and administrative power and directed towards ‘illicit settlements’. 
By contrast, Picker et al. (2015) argue that the emergence of a ‘Gypsy-camp’ is both a 
spatio-racial colonial type of governance and a form of governance through control 
directed to a certain category of people. In Spain and Romania, the eviction and 
voluntary return procedures represent a shift of power from the state to local and civic 
authorities, depicting even less accountable local authorities.  
Further, I focus on the way the governance through eviction relies on the 
unexpressed ethnicization of migration. I illustrate through the examples of Bucharest 
and Barcelona in which way the people of Romani ethnicity are chosen to be the 
scapegoats.  
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Mentioned above, the metropolitan governance uses two methods, urban 
development and social services, to contain and exclude the marginal population. The 
social services have the role of supporting the integration of the marginal population, 
whereas the repressive structures punish those failing to integrate. To redesign the 
urban landscape local governance uses techniques of segregation, eviction, or 
gentrification. The engine for maintaining urban development is the social conflict 
necessary for the political interest to manipulate the social dynamic. One of the tools 
of social conflict is scapegoating Roma, calling them nomads or migrants, un-
integrated and un-settled, becomes the handy tool of metropolitan governance.  
The scholarship considers Bucharest throughout its history and in the recent 
past a violent and violated urban space, although this is rarely backed by analyses on 
class or ethnic social structure. Meanwhile, Barcelona has been successively subject to 
dire spatial and social changes, producing rich debates on urban identity, but also 
accepting blind spots of neoliberal ideology.  
 
2.1 Barcelona: the urban ideology 
 
Being the second largest city in Spain, Barcelona is the capital of Autonomous Region 
of Catalonia. Having some political autonomy, Barcelona yields its own political and 
administrative regulations. Hosting in the metropolitan area two thirds of region’s 
population, the city became one of the most visited places. Barcelona’s urban politics 
and architecture challenge and change the life of its inhabitants at a high speed, often 
being called a space invaded or endangered by mass tourism. Scholars and politicians 
debate the notions of residential area, right to housing, property rights, public urban 
space, both proudly considering as political acts the associations of neighbours or 
squatted places (i Ventayol, 2010; Vallhonrat et al., 2011; García-Vaquero, 2012; 
Romanos, 2014). Following the urban anthropology and historical literature of 
Barcelona, I evoke here some moments of political urbanization.  
Highly industrialized Barcelona almost tripled its population during the 1960s, 
receiving people affected by civil war, Franco’s forced evictions or internal migration. 
Shanty towns grew outside the scope of urban planning. They were never recognized 
as part of the city, neither were the working class people living there. The work related 
migration of Spaniards pushed urban development and challenged the housing 
situation of the population. In the late 1970s, under the fresh authority of Catalonia 
(Comunidad Autónoma), urban planners remodelled the city. The facelift was called 
the fight against barraquismo (a twisted word rooted in barraque, meaning shack, but 
sounding like barroquismo, a classical, recognizable, architectural style). The policies 
to eradicate shanty towns or informal housing systematically spread around the old 
city. The removed working class population went to inhabit newly built houses in the 
neighbourhoods of La Mina, Carmel or Sants-Montjuc. Furthermore, other shanty 
towns were demolished, moving people according to social housing plans. As 
Vallhonrat et al. (2011) put it, each time the Gitanos were the last occupants of the 
shanties (e.g. San Roc de Badalona, La Perona). Moreover, just before the Plan to 
Eradicate Slums would end, in late 1980s, the last inhabitants were given the 
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alternative: to receive money if they chose to return to their cities of origin (Vallhonrat 
et al., 2011).   
Supported by a consistent financial input and decentralized administration 
(Olympic Games in 1992, autonomous status, administrative reform), the political and 
urban intervention against shanty towns in the history of Barcelona translated into an 
amnesty for migrants without legal housing. A logic that gave the opportunity to the 
city to develop its own political strategies of inclusion-exclusion. 
The 1990s witnessed two major political changes in the migration management 
and in the wealth redistribution system. Firstly, the migrants’ status started being 
regulated by an administrative norm2 and the local interpretation of the state’s Foreign 
Law3. The Spanish Foreign Law establishes different conditions for the ‘normalization’ 
of the migrants, but each autonomous region has the freedom to choose the way in 
which the policy is implemented. For example, Grigolo (2010) explains the debate 
around the migrant evaluation of ‘settling’ (arraigo) through labour or social inclusion. 
Managing migrants turns out to be profitable for political reasons: ‘local authorities are 
responsible for the registration (empadronamiento) of all city residents independently 
of their migration status’ (Grigolo, 2010: 899). Hence, the right over the territory 
claimed by the local authorities guarantees the governance of the people residing 
there.  
Secondly, while the redistribution of wealth is narrowed to the state’s decision, 
the city should find ways to produce wealth for its own budget. The Catalan region, 
one of the most decentralized neoliberal administrations, uses social services equally 
as a surveillance system. The foreseeable results are: the lack of political accountability 
towards citizens or non-country nationals; no political adherence to human rights 
conventions and regulations; highlighting the role of the social services in surveillance 
of the daily life of vulnerable people. The local administration actively produces and 
maintains people in vulnerable situations through evictions (desahucios), discretionary 
usage of power over the people living in Barcelona, and poor redistribution of welfare 
or random allocation of social benefits.  
This policy affects mainly people with a high degree of vulnerability, 
championed by the Romani migrants and Gitanos (Macías 2008; López-Catalan, 
2012). Further on, I rely on my fieldwork notes taken while researching the policies 
and institutional practices towards Gitanos and Romani migrants in Barcelona. I detail 
here two situations illustrating the entanglement of ethnic and social policy of the local 
authority in the city of Barcelona.  
For example, the Galician Gitanos in Barcelona were considered a decade ago 
to be a ‘nomadic’ or ‘semi-nomadic’ community. The social services created SASPI, 
an externalized dedicated programme that functioned for the integration of some tens 
of people. These few Galician Gitano families have been demanding their right to 
social housing since their arrival in Barcelona when they registered at social services. 
																																																								
2 Ordenanza de medidas para fomentar y garantizar la convivencia ciudadana en el espacio público de 
Barcelona is a highly debated norm after the present mayor, announced structural changes in June 2015. 
The text of the normative can be consulted here: http://ajuntament.barcelona.cat/ca/informacio-
administrativa/normativa Accessed: 24-03-2016. 
3 Foreign Law (Ley de Extranjería) 1985, modified in 2000, 2005, 2008. 
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For more than 10 years they have been settled and were living in caravans on the same 
public space. Despite this, in 2015 they had to face eviction without receiving any 
social housing. The families allegedly did not qualify for social housing due to an 
extensive list of people left without housing during the crisis-years. This was the 
explanation given by the head of Immigration Department of Barcelona city council. 
Moreover, the Gitanos were also unable to access the social housing policies framed 
for local Catalan Gitanos, policies crafted in the Plan Integral del Pueblo Gitano4. 
According to the judge’s verdict, the Galician Gitanos living in c/Alaba have been 
illegally occupying the public space, therefore they have been legally evicted.  
Another situation shows how the Romani migrants are excluded from both the 
Plan Integral del Pueblo Gitano, and from social housing programmes. While public 
and private places are squatted by activists, homeless people, migrants, locals, or the 
Romani migrants (predominantly coming from Romania),5 it is the Roma that played 
the scapegoat role in the metropolitan area of Barcelona. During my interviews, the 
social workers and mediators explained what made Romani migrants so visible:  
 
[They] had an impact on the citizenship because there were a lot of them that 
came; and their clothes and their way of living with the children in the streets… 
this created social alarm. (interview Jordi 2015)  
And another one details: 
(...) there is not a big percentage, the quantitative level is not too… but the 
people got alarmed. Nowadays, the Romanian is the scapegoat. Always when 
there is a problem – I am talking about the Romanian Gypsy – any problem, a 
Romanian Gypsy will show up. So, fantastic! The problem is already… only the 
Romanian Gypsy. In Badalona [part of metropolitan area of Barcelona], you 
know, the mayor won the elections doing a campaign against… focused on the 
issue of Romanian Gypsies and house squatting. (interview Clara 2014) 
 
In the decentralized administrative system of Catalonia, private companies or NGOs 
working under contract manage the public services for city councils. For example, in 
the metropolitan area of Barcelona, the projects are developed together by the city 
council and several companies specialized in providing social services. The social 
intervention usually follows the denouncement of misbehaviour, meaning when 
people occupy a public or private space. The team of mediators provided by these 
externalized social services can be accompanied by the police or not depending on the 
intervention. The practical results of the mediators’ intervention translate into 
evictions:  
																																																								
4 Within the EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies states take the responsibility to 
implement the strategies according to their own constitutions. In Spain, the management of Roma 
Integration policies is left to the autonomous regions. In Catalonia the document has been developed and 
financed by the Social Services Department - Departamento de Bienestar i Familia, Generalitat de 
Catalunya.  
5 Romani migrants called Gitanos del este are also from other countries such as Bosnia-Hertzegovina, 
Hungary, Bulgaria, but according to public servants working in social services more than 90% are from 
Romania. 
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Do you know what we were basically doing? Evictions. Meaning, there was an 
empty place here in this neighbourhood, I remember… c/Agricultura. 300 
persons. This cannot be like that… This cannot stay. In a city like Barcelona 
which tries to have an international opening, which tries to have a specific image 
of high level in the Mediterranean area… I cannot allow it. So, what do we do? 
We have looked and then evicted. […We asked for] and the police came 
saying: ‘Pack your bags and you are leaving.’ (interview Claude 2014) 
 
Not only do the social workers maintain the bias of cultural identification, but they 
also exaggerate the stigmatization of Romani migrants. The local administration swiftly 
moves from mediation programmes to evictions, finally offering Romani migrants the 
‘voluntary return’ solution. Besides being targets for the evictions, Romani migrants 
are submitted to practices of voluntary return under the benevolent gloss of social 
services. The distinction relies on a subtle tactic of local governance: while for an 
eviction a judge’s order is necessary, the voluntary return is provided as ‘help’ for 
evicted Romani migrants.  
 
Look, I do not like the word cultural, the adjective cultural I dislike, but I see it 
as a condition of generations and of history, of …how to say it, of cultural 
inheritance, family legacy. Meaning, if my grandfather lived, and my father lived 
like his father, and I live like my father, my sons will live like me. We cannot 
stop this. We cannot dismantle this legacy. So, starting from here it has been 
decided that one of the policies was to make a reality plan. We talked with the 
families [of Romanian Roma] and offered them to return to Romania… this a 
very common practice. Many will deny it but it is like that. They send them 
away: ‘Do you want to go to Romania? Here [have some money] and goodbye!’ 
So, we cannot help them. (interview Claude 2014) 
 
The housing rights for Galician Gitanos and the social services approach to Romani 
migrants leads to structural exclusion of entire groups of people. In Barcelona, the 
moral panic acts to deny the right to the city to an ethnicized group. The local 
authority controls who belongs to the urban community by a continuous surveillance 
of the territory. At the same time, the diversity of decision units in the decentralized 
system encourages a dispersed control that accumulates political power without 
claiming but administrative entitlements. 
 
2.2 Bucharest: a violent city? 
 
Bucharest’s urban development has been documented and framed as a place 
constantly subjected to natural and inflicted disasters. From the earthquakes, plagues 
and fires that destroyed the urban settlement several times, to wars and civil 
disobedience ending in bloodshed, what is called the violent transformation of a city 
qualifies the place as a metropolis, as a desired, claimed urban space. Bucharest 
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establishes itself as a metropolis according to different standards of urban evaluation. 
The biography of the city, covering urban planning, human geography or public space 
development typically evidences the ideological positions of the changing regimes and 
ruling elites.  
Recent studies are keen to explain the broader mechanism of post-socialism 
affecting the living conditions in Central and Eastern European countries (Tsenkova 
and Nedović-Budić, 2006; Light and Young, 2014; Stanilov, 2015). Outlining 
historical arguments and emphasizing the brutality of the politics – like the socialist 
regime in Romania, scholars rarely engage with spatial governance or critical urban 
theories (Nae et al., 2014; Patroescu et al., 2015; Suditu et al., 2015; Ghyka, 2015). 
Exceptionally, the housing sector has been tackled (Stan, 2006; Chelcea, 2006), with a 
particular attention to Bucharest for its recent socio-economic segregation (Ioan, 
2007). Indeed, some studies have focused on the context of urban and housing 
development during the socialist regime, its further transformations and social 
consequences (Marcinczak et al., 2014; Gentile and Marcinczak, 2014). Summarizing, 
the literature on the city of Bucharest gathers different disciplines, keeping the 
spotlight on the political urban changes, but failing to tackle the ethnic and class 
dimension of urban policies.  
The ideology, limited post-war housing stock, and the need to shelter the 
workers to build the city determined the nationalization process (1948-1951/2). The 
socialist centralized system erected and allocated houses according to the scheduled 
need of the work force solicited by the state companies. By the 1960s, building 
locative spaces intensified the urbanization process, at the same time using the recent 
nationalized housing stock to accommodate the state’s institutions. The political 
ideology, while simulating the implementation of de-segregation criteria and equal 
rights to housing, kept a blind spot on ethnic identity. During the socialist regime, the 
quality and legal status of housing stock, as well as the interests of stakeholders created 
different forms of spatial segregation. The resulting pool of housing stock was the 
chance for working migrants to settle in the city, then moving from nationalized 
houses to new ones.  
When nationalized building ceased to be a priority for the state (late 1970s-
1980s), the houses were left to degrade and then allocated to poor families, mainly 
people of Roma ethnicity. The Romani living in destitute houses near Bucharest or in 
the city were assigned homes according to their work place. In this way, the socialist 
centralized urban planning produced its own undesirable, the ‘unhousable underclass, 
both segregated and highly deprived’ (Marcinczak et al., 2014: 1402). By allocating the 
poorest houses to the Roma, the state excluded them from the urban community. 
As Cîrnu (2013) points out, after 1989 Bucharest followed urban planning less, 
but rather the residential areas extended with scarcely any infrastructure rehabilitation. 
Moreover, the city underwent two major legal interventions: the selling of the state 
housing stock to the population and the restitution laws (Stan, 2006). The high 
percentage of private house ownership and gradual but constant shrinkage of the job 
market are among the factors that influenced the stagnation of social housing 
investments. The regulation and deregulation of the real estate market reached the 
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tipping point with the so-called global economic crisis. The locative space remains the 
lowest in Europe, and the social housing policies are under-financed.  
In fact, nowadays the social housing policies address two categories of 
beneficiaries: the people fulfilling the criteria for state benefits, and the people evicted 
from ex-nationalized houses. However, the housing law6 permits the local authorities 
to decide the priorities, as well as the criteria used for housing allocation. The housing 
regulations change constantly, as is confirmed by the manager of the housing 
department in one of the city council committee meetings: ‘the law has changed and 
thus the criteria [for housing allocation] have changed’ (Ionel, Local Council 
Bucharest, 2009).  
People applying for social housing, who are entitled to make such a demand at 
the time of application, often discover that are not able to fulfil the necessary criteria. 
The civil servants acknowledge the anomaly of a constantly changing law and 
complain about their situation and the impossibility to take decisions:  
 
(...) look, anything that will be done in housing national strategy will get down to 
these criteria. They are established by each city council every year. For example, 
one criterion now is that a family with 7 children and without income gains up 
to 20 points, whereas somebody who has a PhD will accumulate 40 points. 
(conversations Andrei, Ministry of European Funds 2015) 
 
The second category is represented by the people evicted from ex-nationalized 
houses. Initially, the state protected the tenants living in nationalized houses against 
the owners, but its ‘involvement in the post-socialist era in building houses for the 
disadvantaged categories of the population is punctual and with no significant effects 
with regard to the housing stock or the socio-spatial architecture’ (Suditu, 2014: 77). 
After the restitution process, the evicted tenants should have been given social houses. 
Instead, the state only permitted an increased number of evictions in Bucharest.  
The recent evictions in Bucharest reveal a structural violence inflicted on 
families and ethnicized individuals. For example, a Romani woman evicted and left 
homeless lived for four years with her family in a shack (baracă) on the same street 
where the Bucharest mayor’s building is located. Although she was clearly in a need of 
social housing, having a file submitted to the local authority, she never received an 
official answer regarding her situation. One day, apparently a delegation of ‘foreigners’ 
were passing by and asked about the situation of that shack and why the family is living 
in the middle of the street. Within 24 hours the woman and her family received an 
offer of social housing in an apartment complex somewhere in the city. Still, since 
then, a few years have passed but she did not receive a contract, nor can she pay the 
electricity bill in her own name, nor can she have the place as her legal dwelling. For 
another woman the experience of being thrown out into the streets represented the 
moment when she understood the role her ethnicity plays. Initially she was shocked 
by the blunt racism of some civil servants that in her case would have decided her fate:  
 
																																																								
6 Housing law no. 114/1996. 
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He [the manager of housing department] said to me ‘I cannot… it hurts my 
heart if I have to give houses to the Gypsies’ (conversations Nastasia 2014) 
 
Then, the media representation of the eviction, the reaction from civil-society and 
activists and finally from several implications of disapproval from a Roma 
representative gave her the sense of ethnic identity in a way that, she said, she had 
never experienced before: 
 
They [the Roma representative at the municipality level] said about us that we 
stayed there illegally, that ‘the Gypsies occupied those houses illegally’, but it is 
not true. And also… look, my husband is a Romanian, I am a Gypsy, a Roma, 
but I never had this [type of] conversation before. Before, nobody said to us… I 
never felt like now, that I am a Gypsy. Both of us have jobs, you know, I am 
employed at the municipality. After all that scandal… only after I was evicted, 
thrown out into the street with my baby, did I realize that I am Roma. 
(conversations Nastasia 2015).  
 
The consequences of evictions on social structure translate into a wide political and 
economic input for racial marginalization of those of Roma ethnicity (Vincze and Raț, 
2013), with harsh consequences to their citizenship (Vrăbiescu, 2015). In Bucharest, 
the racist discourse doubled by a constant marginalization within housing policies, 
accelerates the social and spatial exclusion of people of Romani ethnicity. The 
political responsibility towards the citizens is overtaken by the social securitization 
claims and urban development necessities. The social benefit is contested for that 
group of people forcibly rendered mobile. This group of people becomes an 
ethnicized mobile minority, to whom the local authority is denying the right to the city.  
The low-income and minority group tenants are the first to be affected by 
evictions, while neither the dimension of the phenomena is recorded, nor are the 
racialized systemic policies critically addressed. Thus, no systematic data are collected 
at a local level and no specific policies are developed. There are no social housing 
policies for the Roma minority at local or national level, and no Roma integration 
policies address the housing problem of the migrants. The social housing is an eluded 
option for the politics of evictions, both in Bucharest and in Barcelona. The two cities 
display significant differences in the implementation and politico-economic context, 
but a meaningful parallel can be detected in the ideology and governance of the 
excluded. 
During my research in Barcelona and in Bucharest among the people evicted 
from their houses on different grounds, transformed into ‘nomads’, the Roma 
safeguard a tolerated and welcomed exceptionality. Nevertheless, others might be 
moulded in the urban matrix: the migrants, the undocumented, the illegalized. Even 
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the local citizens, as Romano (2014) suspects, are equally exposed to the same 




Within the broader context of metropolitan governance this article illustrated, through 
the examples of Barcelona and Bucharest, the way in which local authorities enact 
administrative regulations to exclude people considered undesirable. The argument 
builds upon moral panic theory and defines political practices of evictions and 
voluntary returns as forms of spatial cleansing, actions having a clear ethnicized and 
racialized dimension. Claiming urban development and social security, the local 
authorities instrument cultural scapegoating for spatial cleansing and social 
restructuring. Inflicting sheer violence, practising spatial cleansing and denying the 
right to the city, the local governance develops an urbanized language of power.  
Social conflict is necessary for social security and urban development, and to 
maintain social conflict the authority routinely enacts moral panic. Within this 
strategy, a target group is selected and qualified as vulnerable in order to legitimate 
forms of exclusion against it. Vulnerability exposes the target group to benevolent or 
punishing practices of the local authority, enabled by the social services and the 
repressive structures. Acting against the selected peoples, the local authority attributes 
a cultural stigma to them. In an urban space the cultural stigma applies to groups of 
people first rendered vulnerable, then forcibly mobile. To expel the undesirable 
people, the political intervention of moral panic aims at spatial cleansing. 
The paper discussed how urban governance enacts moral panic against the 
Roma. Roma scapegoating preserves the social conflict, at the same time alleviating 
the political responsibility to secure social provisions for vulnerable groups. The local 
authority not only forces their mobility, but also blames Roma for their alleged failed 
integration. Being migrants or not, Roma can be labelled an ethnicized mobile 
minority, representing the racialized consequence of the metropolitan actions against 
dispossessed citizens.  
The paper argued that governing through evictions instead of being the 
exception, has become the norm at city level. On the one hand, ruling according to 
administrative regulations permits the local authority to gain power over citizens. 
Acting like the state, the metropolitan discourse uses the paradigm of the undeserving 
poor living on its (sovereign) territory. On the other hand, the undesirable labelled by 
the metropolitan governance is an ethnicized mobile minority, the group of people 
identified as unable to integrate or adapt to the city norms. Their status is civilly and 
morally judged, and not debated in the political arena of citizenship rights.  
The dispossession and displacement substitute the political act with an administrative 
rule, actuating the discretionary power of street level bureaucrats. The emergency 
measures, evictions and voluntary returns, as well as cultural scapegoating indicate the 
																																																								
7 One of the most prominent figures is Ada Colau, president of the platform of those affected by 
mortgages (PAH, Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca) and the recently elected mayor of Barcelona. 
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new leverage of local governance. Barcelona and Bucharest have incorporated into 
their governance the practice of spatial cleansing, displaying a pattern of violence 
adequate only to the sovereign state. The leading ideology allows the local authorities 
to explicitly deny the territorial belonging of people of Romani ethnicity, thus 
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Jody Jensen and Ferenc Miszlivetz (eds) (2015) Reframing Europe’s 
Future. Challenges and Failures of the European Construction. London 
and New York: Routledge. 
 
This thought-provoking book addressing the challenges and failures of the European 
integration processes from an interdisciplinary perspective has been published in the 
series of Routledge Advances in European Politics. The main aim of the book is to 
contribute to the deeper understanding of the structural problems standing behind the 
European crisis and to the identification of ways out. The editors emphasize in the 
introduction that in previous crises there always was a pro-integration bias to proposed 
solutions on which consensus was based. These days that is far from clear as more 
and varied voices articulate increasing frustration, dissatisfaction, distrust, and cynicism 
with the current state of affairs in Europe. Furthermore, the increasing number of 
asylum seekers means great external challenge to the integrated Europe. We might say 
that the ship of European integration is cruising on troubled waters under gloomy sky.  
Historical perspective might help to preserve some optimism. To illustrate this 
I would like to recall the observation that European integration is rather similar to the 
construction of a Gothic cathedral in the Middle Ages. The construction of a gothic 
cathedral lasted for centuries; those who started never saw the end product; it 
happened that the original plans were altered, new architects had different ideas, and 
there were periods when the construction came to a standstill because the financial 
burden was too high. New rulers had different priorities; there were personal 
antipathies between the leading figures in the construction, there were quite 
understandable and hardly understandable delays, the faith in the construction was 
lost, but anyway, somehow they passed the point of no return, and if you look at 
Europe today, we have many marvelous gothic cathedrals (sometimes only finished in 
the nineteen century though.) But the longue durée optimism is not exempt from the 
painstaking process of search to find solutions to the deep problems of histoire 
événementielle of today. The authors of this book promote the idea that the project of 
European construction has always accelerated because of periods of crises. What the 
authors have in common is a drive to change the current state of affairs, “while 
endorsing a more balanced multi-stakeholder (states, markets, and society) approach 
to problem-solving.” 
The authors raise a very important question that came into a challenging new 
perspective in 2014: What is Europe as a politico geographical concept? Is Ukraine a 
part of Europe from the point of view EU enlargement in a time when young 
Ukrainians are sacrificing their lives because they are convinced that they belong to 
Europe?, is this problem addressed by Ferenc Miszlivetz. József Böröcz scathes 
geopolitical scenarios to preserve Europe’s competitiveness and economic weight on 
the global stage, a scenario called North-Atlantica which would include the EU and 
the NAFTA, or another one called Northern Eurasia: the EU and the CIS together. 
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Well, although the economic rationality behind these scenarios can be seen, the 
political logic contradicts such constructions, because size matters. Even in the case of 
the Turkish membership size might be the real problem and not cultural and religious 
background. A stronger inclusion of the NAFTA states or the CIS would completely 
change decision making by diminishing the role of the current leading member states 
of the European Union. Stefano Bianchini recalls the Bavarian premier Stoiber’s 
concept of the absorption capacity of the EU, an idea that can be considered the real 
limit of the integration for policy makers. This could be translated like this: no 
enlargement can endanger the decision making weight of the leading member states. 
Another delicate issue is the impact of integration on polities.  As György 
Schöpflin underlines, the EU faces considerable difficulties to accommodate collective 
identities in the integration processes; although there is an additional half sentence in 
the Lisbon Treaty, actually the rights of historic and linguistic minorities are not 
protected by the law of the EU and as Steve Austen points out, the protagonist of 
cultural citizenship should consider that collective rights must be recognized. But 
there are problems not only with ethnos, but also with demos on EU level. The pro-
active demos is missing in European governance, as it is pointed out by Jody Jensen, 
mainly because European political elites systematically keep EU policies out of 
electoral politics, even in the case of the election of the members of the European 
Parliament. 
The financial crisis and its wider implications is a major topic in the book. The 
Euro, the symbol of the post-Cold War phase of the European integration led to 
dissatisfaction and in certain cases to despair. I think Tibor Palánkai is right in 
emphasizing that the original sin was committed when Germany and France violated 
the Maastricht rules without negative consequences. When Angela Merkel said no to 
the transfer union, it clearly proved what Doris Wydra and Sonia Puntscher quoted: 
the European system of democratic states is one where some tend to dominate others. 
It is called diffused reciprocity. As Federico Rampini points out, the outcome of the 
German behaviour is almost paradoxical, Angela Merkel, inaugurating her third 
mandate as a chancellor, seemed almost eager to embrace the social policy requests of 
her junior partner, whereas Germany continues to preach austerity abroad. Discussing 
problems of the Euro-zone, Annamária Artner concludes that data reveals that the 
euro zone has been harmful for the less developed members while it helped the 
stronger ones become even stronger. Stuart Holland emphasizes that the policies 
imposed by the Troika as a treatment for the Euro crises in many respects resemble 
to the policy of the Brüning government of Germany of the early 1930’s. Holland 
emphasizes the importance of learning from the New Deal. A great expectation of the 
population of new members has also failed in many respects and as it has been 
demonstrated by Dóra Győrffy, the dissatisfaction with democracy is an important 
root of the crisis.  
But what are the roots of the crises? And what kind of crises is it? On a high 
level of abstraction Elemér Hankiss correctly emphasizes that the continuity or the 
belatedness of modernism in the period of postmodernism might be a powerful 
reason. György Schöpflin basically sees an epistemological crisis. Anyway, on the level 
of the basic political premises the main reason might be the contradictions among 
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three major tendencies: deep economic integration, powerful nation states, and 
democratic politics. Or, on even a lower level of abstraction the contradictions among 
the ideas of fiscal consolidation, the preservation of welfare state and green 
investments. 
To find solutions first we should understand the achievements correctly. 
Europe achieved a lot in past decades. It is important to remember that Europe 
created a new phase in the history of international relations. As Steve Austin points 
out, the EU can be seen to have added a new chapter to the Von Clausewitz doctrine 
suggesting that “the EU is the continuation of peace by other means”. Analyzing the 
effects of the Lisbon Treaty, Jaap Hoeksma concludes that the EU can no longer be 
described in terms of the traditional categories of states or as a union of states but 
rather constitutes a new phenomenon of international law. I would say that it has been 
the case even before the Lisbon Treaty. The member states are not simply nation 
states any more, membership in the EU creates a new quality of statehood, which 
cannot be described by specific terms of international law. Moreover, the EU itself is a 
sui generis phenomenon, neither a federation nor a confederation of states. The EU 
is a regulatory union, but it is not an international legal phrase. 
Social scientists were not able to foresee the crisis. As Ferenc Miszlivetz states, 
as far as the future for post-crisis Europe is concerned two things are clear: the fear 
from German Europe, from the Bundesrepublik of Europe, and the chance for a new 
social contract. It is also sure that neither member states nor markets are able to 
provide automatic solutions, and the EU does not exist, evolve in social vacuum but in 
the shadow of global tendencies. 
In this review I selected only a very small fraction of the great reservoir of 
thoughts which can be found in the book. The title is Reframing Europe’s Future. In a 
way all of us is a part of that project. There should be some possibilities to overcome 
Unordnung und frühes leid. 
 
Gábor Kardos (kardos@ajk.elte.hu) 





Zoltán Ádám is Assistant Professor at the Department of Comparative and 
Institutional Economics at Corvinus University of Budapest and Managing Director of 
Kopint-Tárki Institute for Economic Research. He holds a PhD in economics from 
Debrecen University, an MPhil in Political Science from Central European University 
and a Master in Public Administration from Harvard Kennedy School. He was editor 
of Külgazdaság, Kopint’s bi-monthly economic journal in 2006-09 and sat on the 
editorial board of Beszélő, a Hungarian liberal political journal in 2005-15. 
 
Attila Bartha (PhD in Economics) is a research fellow at the Institute for Political 
Science of the Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences and an 
associate professor at IBS Budapest. He is an editor of the journal Intersections. East 
European Journal of Society and Politics and teaches courses at the Doctoral School 
of Sociology at Corvinus University, Budapest. His main areas of research are 
comparative public policy, welfare policy and political economy. 
 
Eszter Bartha, habil Ph.D. Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Sociology MTA TK 
and Associate Professor at the Department of East European Studies, ELTE BTK. 
Main research area: 20th century labour history in East-Central Europe. She is the 
author of Alienating Labour: Workers on the Road from Socialism to Capitalism in 
East Germany and Hungary. She has published extensively in Hungary and 
internationally on the subject of East German and Hungarian labour history. 
 
András Bozóki is Professor of Political Science at the Central European University in 
Budapest. He has published books and journal articles in topics of democratization 
and its discontents, Central European politics, the role of intellectuals in the regime 
change, the transformation of communist successor parties, and the theory and history 
of anarchism. He has taught as visiting professor at Columbia University in New York, 
and at universities of Tübingen, Nottingham, Bologna, Ljubljana, as well as at Smith 
College, Mount Holyoke College, Hampshire College, and in his native Hungary, 
Eötvös Loránd University. He has been a research fellow at UCLA in Los Angeles, at 
the Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin, the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study, the 
European University Institute in Florence, the Sussex European Institute, and at the 
Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna. He was chair of the Hungarian Political 
Science Association and a founding editor of the Hungarian Political Science Review. 
He is member of the editorial associates of the European Political Science, Journal of 
Political Science Education, CEU Political Science Journal, East European Quarterly 
and Taiwan Journal of Democracy. 
 
Sonja Dragović earned her bachelor’s degree in economics from the University of 
Montenegro in 2012, after studying for a year at the University of Maine, USA, and 
for one semester at the University of Economics in Krakow, Poland. She obtained a 
joint master’s degree in urban studies in 2015 through the 4Cities programme, which 
entails a semester of study and practice in each of the programme cities, Brussels, 
Vienna, Copenhagen and Madrid. She co-authored a book of interviews ‘Ženske 
hronike’ (‘Women's Chronicles’) in 2014, seeking to show women’s perspectives on 






Attila Gulyás graduated at the Budapest University of Technology and Economics 
(BUTE) as an Electrical Engineer in 2004. He holds a PhD in Engineering 
(Department of Power Engineering, BUTE, 2012). Parallel to these studies he 
participated in various research projects on the field of sociology and entered the 
sociology PhD programme of the Corvinus University Budapest at the Institute of 
Sociology and Social Policy. He obtained his PhD from this programme also in 2012. 
In 2011 he entered the Master in Artificial Intelligence programme of the Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven from which he graduated in 2013. His main research interests in 
the field of sociology are experimental economics, rational choice, and well-being 
related issues. In the field of engineering he is mainly active in the topic of lightning 
and lightning protection. 
 
Gábor Illés is a junior research fellow at the Institute for Political Science, Centre for 
Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and an Assistant Lecturer at the 
Institute of Political Sciences, Faculty of Law, Eötvös Loránd University. His research 
interests are political theory (more specifically: political realism and political discourse 
studies) and political leadership. 
 
Ádám Mayer holds a PhD from Eötvös Loránd University of Sciences (Budapest, 
Hungary). He is Associate Professor (International Relations/Humanities) at Webster 
University Thailand Campus (2013 – present). Formerly Instructor, International and 
Comparative Politics, American University of Nigeria (2010 – 2013). He has formerly 
been a project manager with Aga Khan Foundation, Afghanistan and with Hungarian 
Inter-Church Aid in Faizabad, Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif and Samangan, Afghanistan. He 
also holds an MA in International Relations (2007, International University of Japan) 
and an MA in History (2005, ELTE). His book entitled Naija Marxisms: 
Revolutionary Thought in Nigeria will be published by Pluto Press in 2016  
 
Florina Pop (PhD) is assistant professor at Babeș-Bolyai University, Faculty of 
Sociology and Social Work. In the last years, she has conducted research in the field 
of social exclusion and marginalisation of the Romanian Roma population, the impact 
of social policies on disadvantaged groups, particularly the Roma, and social 
inequalities in education and employment. 
 
Miklós Sebők (PhD) is a research fellow at the Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences. His recent research appeared in the Journal of Comparative 
Politics and the Japanese Journal of Political Science. His main research interests 






Júlia Szalai (DSc in Sociology). In her teaching and research work, Júlia Szalai has 
been engaged in studying intersectionalities of class, race/ethnicity, and gender in 
multiethnic societies across Europe with a closer focus on poverty and social exclusion 
in the post-socialist societies of Central and Eastern Europe. Her recent studies have 
addressed issues of structural transformation and the emergence of the post-socialist 
welfare states. During the past fifteen years, she has been involved in a great number 
of cross-country comparative studies, and she has been affiliated with a wide range of 
institutions of acknowledged research centres in Europe and the United States. In 
recognition of her work, she was honoured by the Scientific Board of the Soros 
Foundation (‘Creativity Award’ – 2003), the President of Hungary (2004), and, twice, 
the Hungarian Sociological Association (‘Polanyi Award’ – 2005, 2015). On the basis 
of her achievements in comparative social studies, she was elected by the United 




Enikő Vincze is professor in sociology at Babes-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca, 
Romania. Currently she offers courses on European social agenda, critical urban 
theory and methodology of social research. During the 1990s she conducted research 
on nationalism, ethnic identity politics and feminism. Since 2004 she has participated 
in and/or coordinated investigations and published studies on processes and causes of 
exclusion and marginalisation of ethnic Roma in healthcare, education, the labour 
market and housing, including the examination of intersectional discrimination of 
Romani women and the political potential of Romania, and as well as of how 
capitalism and neoliberal governance are connected to spatial, housing and 
development politics. Since 2010 she has been involved in housing rights and social 
justice activism. 
 
Ioana Vrabiescu is currently a Fellow at the Roma Initiative Office of the Open 
Society Institute working on the exclusion of Roma ethnics in Europe. She is a vice-
president at the Romanian Women’s Lobby, a founder member of Front Association, 
and the editor of the website feminism-romania.ro. Her PhD on the development of 
Roma nationalism was obtained from the Political Science Faculty at NSPSPA 
University in Bucharest. Her articles have appeared in various journals and edited 
volumes. 
 
